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In a speech at Ottawa on' November 14, 1953, President
Eisenhower stated:
You of Canada and we of the United States can
and will devise ways to protect our North America
from any surprise attack by air.... Our security
plans must now take into account Soviet ability
to employ atomic attack on North America....
This was the first (and only) official public announce-
ment of the U. S. decision to undertake continental defense
on a major scale -- a decision reached after almost seven
years of domestic debate regarding the "hows" and "what
fors" of defense in the nuclear age. During the next five
years, more than $12 billion was spent en this program. In-
deed, by January 1958, the Air Force Chief of Staff could
complain that "the active air defense is a can of worms...,
there are so many different kinds of v/eapon systems." None
of them, however, was the least bit effective against the
incipient ICBM threat which had made an abrupt appearance in
late 1957. Nevertheless, U. S. bomber defense programs con-
tinued well into the ballistic-missile age, with cumulative
1946-66 expenditures reaching approximately $40 billion.
Testimony of General Thomas D. White, Hearings, U. S.
Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
Inquiry into Satellite and Hissi-le Programs, (Part II) , 85th
Cong., 2nd Sess., January 1958, p. 1539.

2Part I of this study will examine the evolution of the
U. S. active air defense posture between 1946-66. Active
defense shall be defined as those military programs designed
to destroy attacking aircraft and missiles after being
launched from their bases, plus the associated warning, com-
mand, control, and communications equipments and organiza-
tions. And the specific examination of this evolution in
Section C of Chapters 1-3 will consider, in turn, the roles
and missions aspect (i.e. the organization and definition of
air defense responsibilities among the services) ; the re-
search, development, and procurement of the systems them-
selves; and finally, the deployment of the systems and the
operational capability of the overall posture. Accordingly,
only minimal attention will be paid therein to other "damage-
limiting" programs such as: counterforce offense to destroy
pre-launched enemy forces; passive defense measures to re-
duce the vulnerability of population or property to the ef-
fects of delivered weapons; national intelligence programs;
and theater force defense.
As background for this discussion, Section A of Chapters
1-3 shall be a review of the "signals" of strategic offensive
capability and intent received from the Soviet Union, e.g.,
authoritative statements, studied disclosures of new weapons,
redeployment of forces, and other less self-conscious indica-
tors of quantitative and qualitative improvements in Soviet

3strategic weapons systems. Section B will then discuss how
these signals were perceived in the U. S. and the apparent
effect of these perceptions on the developing defensive pos-
ture .
The principal questions which Part I seeks to answer
are (1) to what degree is the evolution of U. S. air defense
explained as a series of actions/reactions in a strategic
"dialogue" with the USSR, (2) were there other U. S. factors,
biases, and influences which operated to muffle or amplify
significantly the reception of these Soviet signals and dis-
tort their feedback upon the defensive systems development,
(3) to what extent can the evolving U. S. air defense pos-
ture be explained as a series of purely domestic bureaucrat-
ic decisions which bore no perceptible relation to the
changing Soviet threat, and (4) what were the values of air
defense perceived to be within the context of America's over-
all strategic deterrence policy. Part II will consist of a
similar undertaking -- but in somewhat less detail — for
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Section A . Stalinist Signals of Strategic Offensive Capa-
bility and In tent • '
The post-World War II Stalinist regime^ in its published
military doctrine limited its air forces to the traditional
role of supporting ground forces, and belittled the effec-
tiveness of nuclear v/eapons. Stalin emphasized that any fu-
ture capitalist-socialist war would bring victory to the USSR
by virtue of her non-air-atomic "permanently operating fac-
tors" which included the stability of Russia's home front,
the morale of her armed forces, the ability of her command-
ers, and the quantity and quality of her army divisions.
Further,- the USSR military press would often exhort that the
Soviets would not be led to initiate war simply because they
could achieve surprise, for it was not in itself considered
decisive. In addition to such traditional defensive doctrine,
Stalin's "peace movement" was launched in the early post-war
years overtly to propagandize Russia's defensive intentions
to Western European nations and the "Third World".
These declarations were also matched by demonstrations
of Soviet emphasis on the development of defensive v/eapons
systems. The USSR displayed new Mig-15 jet fighter aircraft
4

5on Aviation Day 19 47, and many more soon appeared over the
Moscow and East German skies. The unexpectedly large num-
bers of Migs which the Soviets put into combat in Korea re-
inforced the image of USSR air power as being predominately
defensive-oriented.
If such signals manifested no military threat to the
continental U. S., there were other indications of an incip-
ient Soviet offensive air-atomic capability which, in the
context of the evolving Cold War, appeared more ominous to
American security. On May Day 19 48, there was a fly-by of
several long-range Tu-4 bombers developed presumably from
the U. S. B-29 which had been impounded following a forced
landing in the Soviet Far East toward the end of World War
II. Further, hastily taken photographs of the 1951 Red Army
Day fly-past revealed a plane bigger than the Tu-4, with an
aerodynamic structure that could lead to the conclusion that
it was an intercontinental B-36 type, with turboprops for
speedy attack at low as well as at high altitudes. With
these aircraft, the USSR apparently began regular reconnais-
sance flights of U. S. air borders during the Summer of 1952.
The missions came from Soviet Kamchatkan and Arctic bases,
and reconnoitered Alaska, Northern Canada, and Greenland.
Reported by Joseph and Stuart Alsop, New York Herald
Tribune, March 17, 1953, p. 1.

6Of course, the principal demonstration of Stalin's
efforts to develop a strategic offensive air capability
occurred in September 19 49, with the first recorded Soviet
atomic explosion, several years ahead of most Western pre-
dictions
.
Nor was offensive naval power being neglected. In-
tensive Soviet firing trials of improved V-2 type rockets
from submarines in the Baltic were reported in 19 50 and
1952. 3
From the background of such disclosures of offensive
capability, it becomes relevant to examine the Soviet doc-
trinal pronouncements regarding the contemplated use of
such air power in any future war. Russian military writing
seems to reveal little belief in the efficacy of mass
2Soviet interest in a nuclear capability was revealed
implicitly by Andrei Gromyko in a speech on May 19, 1947,
which strongly hinted that the U. S.' atomic monopoly was
on the verge of collapse; and by Foreign Minister Molotov
who boasted on November 6, 1947 that the "secret of the atom
bomb... has long ago ceased to exist." Further, Arnold
Kramish in his Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union (Stanford,
19 59) has shown that there was sufficient information pub-
lished in Soviet journals prior to 1943 to indicate (had
it been evaluated thoroughly by the West) that the USSR
was abreast of the West in nuclear physics up to 1941 and
only slightly behind when they resumed work in 194 3. See,
especially, Chapter 2.
3Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, "Long Range
7iir Attack," in Asher Lee (ed.), The Sov i et Air and Rocket
Forces (New York, 1959), p. 109; and Asher Lee, "Trends in
Aerial Defense," World Po li tics , VII (1955), p. 246.

7destruction as a method of warfare. Moreover, the Communist
concept of war has always been keyed to the class struggle.
The proletariat of an enemy state represents, hence, -an al-
ly of the USSR (cf. the mutinies in post-World War I Germa-
ny) ; and, in this sense, the bombing of industrial areas and
cities would represent a negative strategy *-~ one which
might rob the USSR of the assistance of a subversive Fifth
Column within an enemy country. The Soviets believe, addi-
tionally, that the defeat of the enemy requires the annihi-
lation of his armed forces. Thus, "the long standing Soviet
view Csince 1946 J ... clearly places primary emphasis on coun-
4terfcrce strikes against Western nuclear delivery systems."
In summary, the Stalinist signals of strategic offen-
sive capability and intent were ambiguous on face value.
The dictator's post-war defensive systems production and
"peace movement" overtures, coupled with a military doctrine
built upon the fundamental strength of the Red Army, could
be contrasted markedly with his concerted effort after 1949
to develop a strategic offensive force capable- of intercon-
tinental attack. It is how these signals were perceived in
the United States that we shall next consider.
4 . .Raymond L. Garthoff, Introduction to Military Strategy
Soviet Doctrine and Concepts, edited by Marshal V. D. Soko-
lovsky (New York, 1963)
, p. xv. See, also, Garthoff 's "Air
Power and Soviet Strategy," Air University Quarterly Review
,
IX (Winter 1957-58), pp. 91-94.

Section B. Domestic Perceptions of the Soviet Thre a
t
During the 1946-52 period, the USSR's strategic air-
atomic capability was perceived in the U. S. to be not
sufficient enough to require the development of a con-
tinental air defense system. The general public had no
clearly structured system of thinking about even the
rudiments of atomic energy. The Truman Administration as-
sumed that American security depended principally upon
restoring the balance of power in Europe and balancing
the budget at home. The scientific community in the main
urged the politically unrealistic dispersal of cities and
industries as "the most important if not the only answer
5
to the threat of atomic aggression". And the military,
albeit torn by inter-service disputes, could agree that "no
plans for defense should be made in derogation of the
striking offensive air arm in being." Each of these
domestic factors deserves amplification. In combination
they acted to move the U. S. toward an underestimation of
the potential Soviet offensive threat to North America,
Eugene Rabinowitz, "The Only Real Defense," Bulletin
of the Atomi c Scientists ( BAS ) , VII (September 1951)
,
p. 242.
Survival in the Air Age , the Report of the President's
Air Policy Commission (The Finletter Report) , reprinted in
Air Force , XXXI (March 19 4 8) , p. 17
8

9and away from a significant consideration of active air
defensive requirements.
1 . The American Public
To be sure, it is natural to expect that in the early
post-World War II years, the American people -- geographic-
ally protected from intercontinental attack and psychologi-
cally conditioned by a lack of tragic experience which seemed
to outweigh any Pearl Harbor traumas — should clamor for
demobilization and the return to peace as the "normal"
pattern of relations among states. Further, so long as
any potential enemy had only TNT bombs, America's World
War II experience could readily be used to diminish the
perceived seriousness of the air threat. During the war,
the U. S. dropped thousands upon thousands of TNT bombs
and only slowly weakened the enemy's will and capacity to
continue the conflict. Besides, the shuttle-bombing of the
sort that was done from bases in Britain against targets
in France and Germany was much easier to conduct than inter-
continental bombing such as would have to be carried out
against the United States.
But, in addition, the public was quite uninformed
and unimpressed by the potential loss of the U. S. atomic
monopoly. What little public discussion there was of the
issue prior to 19 49 overemphasized the technical difficulties
of making a nuclear weapon by suggesting that a balanced

10
industrial system was required; and underestimated the
Soviets' capacity to make progress in specific areas of
research by concentrating their resources and ignoring
such things as consumer goods.
Even after the unexpected Soviet explosion in September
1949, popular perceptions of the seriousness of the air-
atomic threat shifted only slightly. Turnericans continued
to rely on their quantitatively superior nuclear stock-
pile, and were buoyed by such statements as that made by
General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff: "For an industrially backward country the problem
of making an atomic bomb is not so difficult as the prob-
7lem of turning it out in quantity and delivering it." On
the political plane, moreover, the U. S. took "refuge in
a mythological world peopled by traitors, conspirators and
o
counterrevolutionary liberators." If the Soviets had the
bomb, they got it only by stealing American secrets. Stop
7
"This Way Lies Peace," Saturday Evening Post , October
15, 1949, p. 170.
o
Henry Morgenthau, "The Political and Military Strategy
of the U. S.," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, X (October
1954), p. 323. Cf. Walter Marseille, "Negotiation from
Strength," BAS
,
XI (January 1955), p. 15: "The Communist
threat is perceived not so much as an external danger but
as a sacrilegious attempt upon the inner sanctums of
American life. Therefore, it appears so unnatural and so
immoral that it must be doomed to remain unsuccessful
except in case of our own moral failure." See, also,
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the security leaks and the USSR would quickly fall behind
in the arms race.
This general attitude of the public with regard to
the air-atomic threat after 1949 can be attributed to a
variety of factors: suppression of fear, feelings of
impotence (what can I do about it?), and, most importantly,
to the ambiguity of the atomic energy stimulus. Lay
critics emphasized the inhumanity of the bomb and held out
the hope of UN reconciliation of basic Cold War differ-
ences or Soviet acceptance of the Baruch Plan. Some
traditionalist Western strategists (echoing Stalin) em-
9phasized the bomb's ineffectiveness as a decisive weapon.
Some journalists stimulated a "no place to hide" mentality,
while the "one-or-two-bombs-and-it ' s-all-over" school of
military analysts seemed to dominate the editorial pages
of many American newspapers. And the generals, admirals,
E. Donovan and S. B. Withey, "Some Attitudinal Consequences
of Atomic Energy," Annal s of the American Academy of Arts
and S ciences
,
CCXL "(November 1953), pp. 108-117.
9Especially influential was P. M.S. Blackett's, Fear,
Wa r and the Bomb (New York, 1949), pp. 1-9, 39-72. If was
even estimated that against certain types of resistant
targets of concrete, the A-bomb might be less effective than
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and scientists debated about possible attrition rates by
air defense to the degree that some systems to reduce poten-
tial destruction which were then technically and economical-
ly feasible tended to become lost within the cacophony.
The range of public debate on strategic air-atomic is-
sues at this time can be manifest by the following apprais-
als made by two eminent scientists which appeared simultane-
ously in the U. S. :
There is no defense against the atomic bomb.
There can be no effective interception of the
bombing aircraft despite radar screen, guided
missiles and supersonic fighters; 12
Great bombers are essentially fragile instru-
ments, relatively lumbering in their flight
and incapable of surviving modern defensive
action. Penetration of hostile skies has be-
come an appalling task for any bomber fleet. 13
Finally, it will be recalled that, in January 1953,
ex-President Truman publicly announced, "I am not convinced
Russia has the atomic bomb . . . . I am not convinced the
Russians have achieved the know-how to put the complicated
This point will be returned to in Section C below.
Louis T. Ridenour, One World or None (New York, 1949),
p . 222
.






mechanism together to make an A-bomb work." Small wonder
that similar doubts and confusions persisted in the minds
of lesser informed Americans, and that any public clamor
for air defense systems was absent.
2. The Truman Administration
It seems clear that the executive branch contributed
directly to the retarding of a significant public under-
standing of air defense requirements by maintaining a re-
markable degree of silence about official U. S. and USSR
atomic capabilities. An explanation for this is not
difficult to find. With regard to U. S. air-atomic power,
"uncontradicted testimony Cbefore Congress 1 Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy] show Ted] that in 1947... our
weapons position verged upon the tragic. The U. S. then
possessed so few bombs, according to Mr. Lilienthal
["Chairman of the AEC ] , that we might have tempted fate if
public statements even mentioned the importance of numbers
15
in building an atomic deterrent to aggression."
New York Times , January 28, 19 53, p. 1.
1 5
U. S. Congress, Investigation into the U. S. Atomic
Energy Commiss ion , Report of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, Senate Report 1169, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., October
13, 19 49, p. 13. President Truman has written: "In no
document in my office, in the AEC, or anywhere in govern-
ment, could anyone find the exact figure of the number of
bombs in the stockpile, or the number of bombs to be pro-
duced, or the amount of material scheduled for production..

14
In the case of the Soviets' atomic energy program, it
would appear that before September 19 49 the Administration
had been emphatically told that there was nothing of con-
sequence about which to speak to the public. For example,
General Leslie R. Groves, who supervised the wartime Man-
hattan District Project, had reportedly advised the govern-
ment that the Soviets would need fifteen or twenty years to
build an atomic bomb. Within the intelligence community:
"The Navy figured 1965. The Army guessed 1960. The Air Force,
in what was considered a biased and 'alarmist' estimate
had put the date at 1952." Further, it is revealing to
note that between September 23, 1949, and October 22, 1951,
two of the three White House announcements regarding USSR
nuclear tests described the occurrences as "atomic ex-
plosions" which led to public speculation that perhaps
17
the events were unintentional and counterproductive.
Indeed, as late as 1953, it was declared by Bernard
Brodie that "the secrecy which continues to beset the
The figure in question would be recorded on separate and
detached pieces of paper safeguarded in a special way and
of which only a bare minimum of copies existed." Years of
Trial and Hope 1946-52 , Vol. II (New York, 1956), p. 345.
J. R. Shepley and C. Blair, Jr., The Hydrogen Bomb:
The Men, The Menace, The Mechanism (New York, 1954), p. 13,
1 7
See New York Times, January 28, 1953, p. 14.

15
entire subject of atomic weapons and their military uses
is so pervasive that anyone who discusses the subject
publicly must regard it not merely as a factor which must
control his own writing but as a substantive issue of the
18first importance to his argument."
An interesting counterpoint to this silence on the
Administration's part was the good deal of public dis-
cussion by its members -- in and out of uniform — who
19
advocated preventive war against Russia. Such proposals
could only dampen further any impetus for an on-going air
defense program, as the granting of the initial move to
the enemy was a foundation premise for its requirements.
The Truman Administration, of course, rejected pre-
ventive general war, as well as isolationism and appeasement
as policy alternatives, and opted for containment as
the political core of its diplomatic efforts. This doctrine
had as its operative assumptions — at least until 1950 --
that Moscow was likely to be reasonably cautious in the
use of Soviet military force in pursuit of its expansionary
"Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical?," Foreign
Affair s, XXXII (January 1954), p. 219.
For a description of such proposals during 19 45-54,
see Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the
Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York, 1956) , pp. 329-334;
and Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the
Politics of Power (London, 1962), pp. 32-34.

16
objectives; and that "situations of strength" could be
built in Europe and elsewhere (via economic, military and
technical assistance, and alliances and commitments) to
contain Soviet probings until such time as the regime would
"mellow" or collapse. When joined with the deterrent
power of the U. S.' offensive air-atomic force, collective
defense would inhibit if not completely prevent the danger
that war would result through the miscalculation of aggressors
In 19 50, Communist armed force in Korea caused a vigorous
re-orientaticn in U. S. policies. There developed from
this the heightened perception of the nature of the inter-
national system as bipolar. Alliances became adjusted to
the requirements of a Strategic Air Command (SAC) forward
base system, and conventional ground forces expansion was
urged to meet a threat which would build to a "crisis" by
1954. What is important to note for our purposes is that --
since the above policy was premised on an appraisal of the
Soviet threat as being synonomous with the Red Army menace
to U. S. interests in Western Europe — continental air
defense programs accordingly received low priority within
... • 20the Administration.
? One can speculate, in this connection, that, in so
far as a conventional defense could allow the U. S. to
shield Europe without necessitating the bombing of Soviet
cities and industries, there may have been the thought within

17
Related to these policy matters , of course, were the
Congressional pressures to reduce taxes and the balanced
budget desires of the Administration. This situation resul-
ted in a $15 billion defeiise budget ceiling prior to 1950,
and greatly hindered the allocation of funds to air defense
research and development. To support such financial consid-
erations, many high level government officials asserted that
the Soviets were seeking to entice the U. S. into bankruptcy
by means of large defense outlays. Indeed, "the more trucu-
lent the Russians became, the more cause there Was to look
to the state of the economy rather than to the state of the
defense budget.... To maintain military forces larger than
those possible for $15 billion would serve Russian purposes
21
not American."
the Administration that this could induce the USSR to re-
frain from an air-atomic attack on U. S. cities -- and hence
diminish the perceived urgency of an air defense buildup.
(I am indebted to Assistant Professor George H. Quester for
this observation.)
2] Warren R. Schilling, "The Politics of National De-
fense: Fiscal 1950," in Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glen
H. Snyder, Strategy, Politic s , and Defense Budgets (New York,
1960)
, pp. 104-105^ "This powerful rationalization for low
American budgets (usually linked to alleged statements of
Lenin) runs through the thought of both the Truman and Eisen-
hower Administrations, virtually dominating the latter down
to 19 57. There is no scrap of serious evidence that it ever
represented Communist policy." Walt W. Rostow, The United
States in the World Arena (New York, 19 60)
,
p. 2 2 6n.

18
Yet, by the end of President Truman's last year in
office, the government's perceptions of the Soviet air-
atomic threat had altered to the extent that a National
Security Council recommendation then for greatly expanded
air defense expenditures would receive the concurrence of
the outgoing Administration. Behind this judgement in
December 19 52, however, lay six years of uneasy dialogue
within and between the U. S. scientific and military com-
munities regarding the feasibility of air defense in the
nuclear age.
3. The Scientific Community
American scientists were, themselves, jolted by the
unexpectedness of the first Soviet atomic explosion. Dr.
Vannevar Bush, for example, had predicted in 19 46 that it
would take the Russians twenty years to perform this feat
22if they relied entirely on their own resources. Others
had pointed out that "bacteria now are the poor nation's
weapon against the atom bomb .... |/f] hey are quite as
deadly ;... enough bacteria can be hatched in a single beer
23barrel to wipe out the population of the U. S." The
22 Shepley and Blair, The Hydrogen Bomb, p. 13.
23Statement of F. J. Libby, Hearings, Senate, Sub-
committee of the Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental
National Defense Appropriations B i ll for 1948 , 80th Cong.,
2nd Sess., April 19 48, p. 146.

19
result was a dearth of serious scientific thought regarding
the technical problems of active air defense.
These problems seemingly received little attention
even after 1949. American scientists, for the most part,
began then 'to urge defense through pre-attack dispersal
of cities and industries as offering the only promise of
24post-attack survival. Involved in this focus upon
dramatic, unrealistic, population-protection measures
was the scientists' basic moral revulsion against mass
destruction, compounded perhaps by Manhattan Project and
Hiroshima guilt-feelings. There was also the more prag-
matic appreciation that, by mid-19 50, about 80 percent of
the U. S. aircraft industry was concentrated in Seattle,
Los Angeles, and Long Island, and the atomic stockpile was
concentrated even more geographically. In addition, there
was throughout this period the scientific judgement that
uranium was extremely scarce (especially in Russia) and
that, consequently, atomic bombs were too precious to be
used on anything but the most important population or





passim. It should be noted that this




25industrial complexes. Host fundamentally, however, was
the distressing fact that until around 1952 there just
seemed to be no technological break-throughs on the horizon
which would enable the defense to "catch-up" with the of-
fense; and, hence, dispersal programs instead of active de-
fensive systems received the support of the scientists.
Finally, it appears that a concerted scientific effort
to respond to the incipient Soviet bomber threat by active
air defense research was further hindered before 1952 by the
overshadowing issues within the scientific community of a
fervent opposition to the hydrogen bomb concept (and the U.S.
decision to build one), and the scientists' attempts to di-
vert nuclear materials from the SAC stockpile by innovations
in tactical nuclear weapons for European ground defense.
Thus, the emerging issue of Soviet inter-cont inental offense
versus American air defense was obscured by the domestic de-
bates over how the U. S. military offense should best be
structured in order to meet or forestall Soviet perimeter
,. . 26thrusts
.
25For example, an article by the New York Times science
writer, William L. Laurence, on October 7, 1951, headlined:
"Soviet Atomic Capability Far Smaller Than Ours; Russia
Lacks Rich Uranium Sources and an Adequate Industrial Plant."
The article purported to show that Russia could not hope to
achieve any significant production of atomic bombs.
2 fi




Even before the USSR displayed its new Tu-4 bomber in
1943, there seemed to be general theoretical agreement with-
in the military that a Soviet attack would come in the
form of a blitzkreig upon Europe and North America simul-
taneously; for it was felt that no future aggressor would
repeat Germany's twice-made mistake of conquering proximate
27
enemies first while leaving America for last. Enthusiasts
of airpower, however, felt confident that a full-scale
atomic counter-offensive against the heart of the enemy's
warmaking potential would secure victory fairly quickly
urgings against the development of thermonuclear weapons
may have buttressed Air Force arguments for more SAC
bombers. That is, the scientists did not reckon ap-
parently that one airplane with one H-bomb could do
what scores of bombers with atomic bombs were being
programmed to do. Further, there was seemingly no sig-
nificant early appreciation that H-bomb warheads might
be required if relatively inaccurate missiles instead of
SAC bombers were relied on for delivery. (Thus, it is
perhaps understandable why "Air Force officers, including
the Chief of Staff, seemed unimpressed with [General Elwood
P."] Quesada's serious concern over the scientific opposi-
tion to the thermonuclear bomb." Shepley and Blair, The
Hydrogen Bomb , p. 137.) By indirectly buttressing the
Air Force's budget-battles for bombers, the scientists
made air defense appropriations even more difficult to
justify.
2 7See Vincent Davis, Post War De fense Policy and the
U. S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill, 1966), p. 223. Doubt-
lessly, the U. S. ' rapid post-war demobilization goes far
to explain such an argument.

22
without requiring a costly war of attrition between surface
2 8forces or, presumably, widespread continental air defenses.
For their part, U. S. Army spokesmen argued that- "the
V-2 bombs in World War II never stopped :.. until the In-
fantry seized the sites on the ground... even though Cwej
had undisputed control of the air for months...." They
would therefore submit that "the only way you can keep
!"a potential enemy! from attacking the U. S. with certainty
is to hold the bases in Greenland and Alaska... in New-
29foundland, in Iceland, m the Azores." Accordingly,
any requirement for Army anti-aircraft artillery battalions
within the continental U. S. was not perceived to be a
pressing one.
Also, as suggested above (General Bradley's state-
ment on p. 10), the Soviet demonstration of an earlier-
than- expected nuclear capability in 19 49 really did little
to alter the basic predispositions of the services toward
the question of active air' defense. There was now, to be
2 8
See, e.g., the statement of General Carl Spaatz,
Commander of Army Air Forces, Hearings, U. S. House of
Representatives, Subcommittee of Committee on Appropri-
ations, Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for
1948 , 80th Cong". , 1st Sess., March 1947, pp. 401, 601-602.
2 9Testimony of Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the
Army, Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Supple-
mental National Defense Appropriations Bill for 1948 , 80th
Cong77~2nd Sess., April 19 48




sure, the recognition that the Soviets might consider one-
way Tu-4 attacks (capable of reaching any point in the U. S.)
to be feasible. Moreover, it was thought that "since Rus-
sia's present bombers [ were ] good for only one mission, the
Air Generals would dispatch them at the outset to as many
different targets as possible while the element of surprise
31
still gave them maximum probability of success." But ap-
propriation requests for continental air defense programs re-
mained insignificant.
Thus, the services continued to follow the' 1943 Finlet-
ter Report recommendations. They placed primary reliance on
strategic offensive development, in order to meet the "crisis
year" of 19 54 (always, so it seems, several years in the fu-
ture). During the 1950-51 rearmament, therefore,
the Air Force... was being built up to a strength
which had no relationship to the burdens directly
imposed upon it by the Korean War. Although
99 percent of the Air Force effort in the Korean
War was devoted to tactical uses, the major
procurement expenditures for expansion were
going for an increase in strategic air power ~~
for relatively long-range air-atomic capabilities —
E.g., Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington's
remarks, Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, De-
partment of Defense Appropriations for 19 51 , 81st Cong. , 2nd
Sess., February 19 50, p. 1233.
31
Ned Root, "Strike One City," Air Force , XXXIII (March
1950), p. 17. Italics added.
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rather than for ground support C and air de~
fense3 fighters. c
The Korean experience itself was ambiguous in its ef-
fects on the perceived requirement for an air defense build-
up. At this time the Soviets were being credited with -an
operational bomber force of about 450 Tu-4's (but fewer than
33100 atomic bombs) . In Korean combat against the comparable
U. S. bomber (the 3-29), Mig fighters were effective to the
degree that daylight raids over North Korea had to be stop-
ped. Hence, proponents of U. S. fighter-interceptor systems
could point to an increased rationale for their development.
Yet, it seems apparent that the Air Force perceived instead
that the 3-29 failures would accelerate the development of
higher performance long-range bombers in the USSR (and thus
negate any U. S. air defense advances), especially in view
of the Tu-4's lack of the radar bombsights and long-range
navigational gear so necessary for night and all-weather
3 2
Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-6 8: Prologue to Rearmament,"
in Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, Strate gy, Politics ...,
p. 356. (Italics added.) In October 19 4*9, Admiral Arthur
Radford had asserted, in testimony undenied by the Air Force,
that "less than six percent of Air Force R&D f unds C was 3 ear-
marked for tactical and fighter types." Hearings, House of
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, The National
Defense Program-Uni fication and Strategy, 81st Cong. , 1st
Sess., October 19 49, p. 52. (Italics added.)
33General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, USAF , "The Truth About
Our Air Power," Sa turday Evening Post , February 17, 1951,
pp . 2 0, 102.
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operations. Hence, publications sympathetic to the Air
Force made the first public revelations in early 1951 of the
Soviets' development of a true, intercontinental B~36 • type
34bomber and of a new twin- jet medium bomber : n October 1952.
It was also, an Air Force-related magazine that produced in
mid-19 52 one of the earliest published warnings that Soviet
3 5hydrogen bombs were in the offing.
But, in order not to magnify such a potential air-atom-
ic threat to the degree that an air defense "ground- swell"
would ensue (and, perhaps, because of insufficient "firm"
intelligence) , the Air Force never officially recognized the
development of new Soviet heavy bombers during this period.
Just what it was that flew over Moscow at the 1951 Air Show,
therefore, was reported in March 1.9 5 3 as being a "major in-
telligence puzzle."
34 .William S. Friedman, "How Strong is Russia's A-Bomb
Fleet?," Air Force, XXXIV (February 1951), pp. 25-27. This
disclosure of a B-36-type bomber, expected to be in produc-
tion "at least by 19 54", was made in advance of the Soviets'
Red Army Day flyby and was reportedly based on "confidential
independent European sources". (p. 27). The first report
of USSR twin- jet medium bomber development was made in Avia-
tion Age , XIX (October 1952), p. 33.
35Air Force , XXXV (June 1952), p. 22.
Joseph and Stuart Alsop, New York Hera l d Tr ibune,
March 17, 1953, p. 16. In this connection, Air Force-related
publications again acted seemingly to curb any momentum which
was being generated for air defense by injecting occasional
cautionary notes regarding the progress of U. S. defensive
programs. For example, immediately after reporting on the
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In short, throughout 1952, the American military policy
makers' consensus seemed to be that Soviet heavy bomber de-
velopment was lagging so far behind the West's that it could
be assumed that the Russians were clinging to their tradi-
tional use of air power as a defensive and tactical tool
(after all, they had reportedly built upwards to 20,000 com-
bat and support aircraft) , and that they were too backward to
build complex jet bombers. Also, there had been no evidence
of a Soviet atom bomb test since October 1951. By early 1953
it was thus posited that "in all probability they have set-
tled upon a type of weapon less versatile and efficient than
the Americans' but generally satisfactory by Soviet stand-
ards .
Despite such an appraisal of Soviet intentions and capa-
bilities, one can question why the USAF was so reluctant to
place a higher priority on air defense systems development
during this period. That is, why did the Air Force re-
spond to the initial Soviet intercontinental threat by a
U. S. 1 new F-89 interceptor just coming off the production
line, Air Force speculated that "perhaps the enemy doesn't
fo 1 low"our~ h igh- speed, high altitude pattern. Suppose he
decides to play his aerial invasion rather slow and low and
very maneuverable ~- which would generally raise hell with
our interceptor concept." "All Weather Defense — How Close
Are We?," Air Force, XXXIV (May 1951), p. 35.
37




flight into more offensive technology? For the air defense
of the United States had been assigned to the Air Force as
a primary mission by the Key West Agreement of 1948. -More-
over, the interdependence of air defense weapons and SAC '
s
offensive power is evident throughout the Air Force' s .doc-
trinal pronouncements. The actual running of an air war,
the effective use of air space, the proper deployment of
air cover for forward SAC bases, the economics of develop-
ing and procuring fighter and bomber aircraft, the techni-
cal problems -- all these demand close interrelating of the
two air power systems.
Yet, in the context of defense budget ceilings and in-
terservice frictions, the military's strategic doctrines
had to follow the battle for new weapons and functions rath-
er than to be the source from which they were derived. The
Air Force battled for bombers. To support its requests, the
Air Force based its strategic doctrine on the conclusion
that nuclear air power could achieve victory in war before
the enemy could do unacceptable damage to the U. S. Such a
conclusion, of itself, predisposed this service to place a
low priority on defensive systems planning and procurement.
There were, however, additional factors which caused
the Air Force to prefer an increasingly large number of bomb-
ers rather than a major re-direction of limited available
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funds toward the protection of the existing force or the ac-
tive air defense of continental complexes. The offensive-
38
mindedness "Spirit of Douhet" was pervasive within SAC.
In support of its arguments, the Air Force would often as-
sert that "the bleak and blunt evidence of the last war
proved conclusively that no bombing attack mounted in suf-
ficient strength by the Americans, British, or Germans ever
39
was turned back by the most strenuous defensive action.' 1
There was, moreover, the very real concern that SAC might be
called upon to carry out U. S. treaty commitments to Allies
40
which would require a large nuclear retaliatory capability.
The most basic explanation of this Air Force position,
however, was the fact that throughout the 1946-1952 period
(and beyond) the USAF rejected the technical and military
feasibility of continental U. S. air defense in the nuclear
age, per se. General Vandenberg (Chief of Staff during much
of this period) , both in his Congressional testimony and
published articles, emphasized that air defense — even with
3 8
Douhet had written in 1921: "All influences which
have conditioned and characterized warfare from the begin-
ning are powerless to affect offensive aerial action."
39Vandenberg, Saturday Evening Post , February 17, 1951,
p. 20.
40 See Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age
(Princeton, 1959), p. 270ff.
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all the improvements he could foresee ~~ could never obtain
more than a 30 percent attrition rate under the most
favorable daylight circumstances and much lower if the
enemy chose to exploit U. S. defensive weaknesses or de-
41
velop new offensive countermeasures
.
And still other arguments were used by Air Force
spokesmen during these years to diminish the perceived
requirement for active defense systems development. In
19 47, the SAC Commander, General George C. Kenney, argued
publicly that a small B-36 force could act as an effective
41The "30 percent-maximum-kill" argument was voiced
by Vandenberg, for example, at the Hearings, House of
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, National
Defense Program -- Unification and Strategy, 31st Cong.
,
1st Sess., October 1949, p. 511; in the New York Times
January 18, 1951, p. 4. ("even if you had radar installa-
tions every ten miles and the ground literally covered
with interceptors..."); and at the Hearings, House of
Representatives, Subcommittee of Committee on Appropri-
ations, Department of the Air Force Appropriations 1954
,
83rd Cong., 1st Sess., March 1953, p. 28. His successors
carried on the same argument: General Nathan Twining,. at
the Hearings, House of Representatives, Subcommittee of
Committee on Appropriations, Department of the Air Force
Appropriations 1955, 8 3rd Cong., 2nd Sess., February 19 54,
p. 70; and General Curtis Le May at the Hearings, Senate,
Subcommittee of Committee on Armed Services, Study of Air
Power, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., April 1956, p. 218. (Herein-
after referred to as Airpower Hearings) . It is worth
quoting Walter Millis here: "The fact that the Air Force
clung through years to the conclusion that '70 percent of
the attacking forces would get through 1 seems to reflect
the inapplicability of statistical analyses to this issue,
rather than the accuracy of the result." Arms and Men
(New York, 1956), p. 351.
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airborne radar net at less expense than a ground-based
42
system. In 1949, Air Force Secretary Symington agreed
that "the basic requirement of an adequate national air
43defense is an adequate production capacity of the country."
In 1950, Major Alexander P. deSeversky suggested that the
U. S. already possessed an enormous defensive advantage
over the Soviet Union due to its dense electronic network
of telegraph, telephone and electric wires and conduits,
44
and elaborate radio and television systems. In 1951-53,
General Vandenberg- supplemented his "30 percent-kill-rate"
argument by submitting that the "millions of highly trained
men required to maintain elaborate defensive systems would
impose an intolerable drain on our manpower pool"; that,
more than interceptor planes, "we'll need the help of
divine Providence to shoot down hostile planes with atomic
45bombs before they unload"; and that, in any event, as
Cited in H. A. Long, "The B-36 is a Tanker," The
Freeman
, March 26, 1951, an article reprinted in the
Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department
of Defense Appropri ation s for 1954 , 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
May-July 1953, pp. T578-1582.
43Testimony at Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on
Approps
.
, Nati onal Military Establishment Appropriations
B ill fo r 19~50 (Part I) , 81 s
t
"Cong. , 1st SessTT^January
1949, p. 237.
44Air Power: Key to Survival (New York, 1950), p. 177.
45Saturday Evening Post , February 17, 1951, pp. 101,102.
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General Spaatz had said, if one's air forces suffered casu-
alties of only 4 percent on any raid, morale would probably
deteriorate to such an extent that it would be doubtful that
m i a 46tne air war could continue.
As a corollary to this negative attitude of the USAF
toward continental air defense, the governing SAC assumption
that any Soviet nuclear delivery force could be located and
destroyed on the ground manifest, among other things, a low
regard for the Soviets ' defense against bombers. From this
there arose an insensitivity to improvements in the USSR air
defense posture which would logically have called for in-
creased U. S. fighter cover capability, bomber electronic
countermeasures development, or even efforts at incorpora-
ting any relevant Soviet advances into the U. S. air defense
47program.
46Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps . , Depart-^
ment of Air F o rce Appropriations for 19 54, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess., March 19 53, p. 28.
Despite the World War II experience with the crude
German air defense which caused the abandonment of unes-
corted daylight bombing missions, the Air Force in its post-
war planning rejected the priority development of modern
long-range fighter escorts because "we have new tactics,
techniques, altitudes, and speeds for our bombers." (Gener-
al Vandenberg at the 19 49 Unification and Strategy Hearings,
pp. 464-465.) Cf. General LeMay at the 1956 7\ir Power
Hearings: "In the past it has been so easy for bombers
to penetrate a defensive system with losses you can stand
that nothing much has been done in the way of research on
penetration systems...." (p. 145.) It appears that a
governing Air Force perception until the Korean War was that
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Interestingly enough, at this same time that the Air
Force was minimizing the attrition capability of a con-
tinental U. S. air defense system, lengthy negotiations . were
being conducted with the Canadian government regarding
that country's possible large-scale production of USAF F-86
fighters. Indeed, in early 1950 the Canadian Defense' Mini-
ster was treated to a U . S. air shew during which the F-86
"really performed." Shortly thereafter, Canada agreed to
48
produce 100 F-86's from components totalling $11 million.
It seems interesting to observe, furthermore, that,
whereas the USAF thought little of its ability to degrade
a Soviet manned bomber attack, SAC -- and the other services
appeared overimpressed by USSR offensive air deficiencies.
a bomber' with MACH .85 speed would be "invulnerable" due
to the "protection" of the sonic barrier and irrespective
of Soviet fighter capabilities. That is, the best any
interceptor could hope for was one pass at the bomber.
Then the distance between the fighter and the bomber would
be so great and the fighter's maneuvering in and out of the
sonic barrier so difficult that the bomber could go on
its way. See, for example, Air Force,- XXXIII (June 1950),
pp. 43, 45, which discusses the good performance of the
B-36 against the Navy's "Banshee" fighter during extensive
tests performed by the Joint Weapons System Evaluation
Board in 19 49-50. (Note the irony here, also: It was
at the insistence of the Navy during the "B-36 vs. Super-
carrier" dispute that these tests, which reinforced the
"Big Bomber" generals' perceptions, were held.)
4 8
Testimony of Defense Minister Claxton, Debates of
the House of Commons (Dominion of Canada) Official Report,
(Hereinafter referred to as HANSARD), Session 1950, Vol.
IV, June 8, 1950, pp. 3377, 3383.
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The fact that the Soviets had. only quite limited experience
with strategic bombing in World War II would frequently be
recalled. Even then, their operations were poorly planned
and comparatively ineffective, and many times less than 30
49percent of the aircraft on a mission reached their target.
Military journals would emphasize the Soviets' lack of radar
instruments for blind flying, their poor standards of long-
range navigation and their apparent lack .of interest in air-
refueling. Air Force General "Hap" Arnold stated in 1949
that "the one thing the Russians don't understand is strate-
50gic bombing." And as late as 1955 it was submitted that
"the Soviet pilots have neither the technique nor 'the know-
how' of strategic bombing, which is extremely complicated
and efficiency in which only comes with long experience in
„51
war.
49 . • . .See Robert A. Kilmarx, A History or Soviet Air Power
(New York, 1962), p. 193. •
50Hearings, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Investigation o f the B-36 Bomber Program , 81st, 1st,
October 1949, p. 331.
51
Major R. Hargreaves, USMC, "Age of Unease," U. S.
Naval Institute Proceeding s, LXXXI (April 1955), p. 368.
"When Soviet airmen joined in the bombing of the Tirpitz,
of the fifteen aircraft employed -- each of which carried
a two thousand pound bomb — eleven failed even to find the
fjord where the vessel lay, while of the four that did
discover it, not one scored a hit; and this in favorable
flying weather." Ibid., p. 368n. In 1964 , General Le May
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Thus, the above perceptions within the Air Force acted
to direct that service away from the high-priority develop-
ment of an air defense program for U. S. industrial and
population complexes. Further, even in 19 5 2 when the SAC
base system was recognized as a possible target for Soviet
52bombers, it was not considered sufficiently vulnerable
to require special protective measures and could be assumed




was still opining that, since the USSR had no real wartime
training in strategic bombing, they could not be "hot-
shots" in the air; and that the Soviets would catch-up
with the USAF only when all the World War 11-experienced
SAC officers retire I See Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm.
on Approps. and the Committee on Armed Services, Depart -
ment of Defense Appropriations for 1965
,
(Part I) , 8 8th,
2nd, February 1964," p. 725.
52One of the earliest arguments that "Stalin's forces
would be guilty of the greatest conceivable blunder if they
pulverized a dozen of our cities and left our strategic
bombing forces unscratched. . . " was made by Ned Root, "Strike
One City," Air Force , XXXIII (March 1950), p. 19ff. (Al-
though the thrust of the article was that the U. S. should
not, therefore, waste money on city-defense -- not the
assertion that SAC should be protected.)
53 See, for example, E. S. Quade , "The Selection and
Use of Strategic Air Bases: A Case History," in Quade (ed.),
Analyses for Military Decisions (Chicago, 1964), pp. 25-26.
Indeed, many of the Air Force's formal systems analyses
and Staff papers in the early 1950 's "used to leave the
enemy offense out of account altogether. While differential
air attrition had been looked at, differential ground at-
trition for a long time was not allowed to figure at all."
Albert Wohlstetter , "Analyses and Design of Conflict Systems,"
in Quade (ed.), p. 130. See, also, Brodie, Strategy in the
Missile Age, pp. 166, 245.
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As late as 19 51, moreover, even the question of where
the strategic striking force should be based in the con-
tinental U. S. was not considered a very important issue.
Consequently, the U. S. continental base system "just grew."
It was not .planned in any way to complicate the enemy's
problems of navigation, the number of targets, attack
54 •' .
coordination, etc. In addition, Air Force policy be-
tween 1949-55 was to locate the bulk of SAC ' s B-47 air-
craft on about thirty North American base's, and, when ex-
treme tension or surprise attack occurred, transport the
planes overseas to about seventy bases, to operate from
there with a minimum of active air defense protection and
5 5
a maximum of time exposed to enemy air (or ground) attack.
In short, whereas during this period the USAF relied for
its continental defense on the ability of its air-atomic
offense to deter or, if need be, blunt a Soviet attack, the
policy assumed such favorable operating conditions and
54 See Air Power Hearings, p. 156. Further, it is
striking that the Air Force, until 1953, "cooperated"
with the Soviets' strategic planners by asking CONUS air
base builders to concentrate the elements on a base and so
reduce to a minimum the cost of utilities, such as roads,
water, and drainage pipes. See B. L. R. Smith, "Strategic
Expertise and National Security Policy: A Case Study,"
Publi c Policy (Harvard University Graduate School of Public






"one-way" nuclear attacks that the Soviets consistently
branded the policy as "bankrupt."
It should be pointed out, also, that there was no
particular effort made by either the U. •£>, Army or Navy
during this period to alter these basic perceptions and
policies of the USAF regarding air defense ,• although they
each had a secondary air defense mission. The Army was
concerned primarily to buildup its infantry and armored
units for European ground defense. As an army anti-air-
craft artilleryman lamented in 1955, "Anything not concerned
with field armies falls outside the concern of- most of the
57Army." The Navy, for its part, clamored for a role in
"pinpoint" strategic bombing of military targets and em-
phasized the capability of a large
>
attack carrier force to
divert a' good portion of the Soviets' air offense from on-
5 8land targets. That Naval thinking on air defense questions
56
See Raymond L. Garthoff, The Soviet Image o f Future
War (Washington, 1959), p. 82, and his Soviet S trategy in
the Nuclear Age (New York, 1958), p. 136; and Ralph E. Lapp,
"Eight Years Later," BAS, IX (September 1953), p. 285.
Colonel Bernard Thielen, USA, "Guardian of Our Air
Frontier," Army Combat Forces Journal , V (April 1955), p. 14.
58Such "offensive-mindedness" was criticized ironically
by the USAF. It urged that the Navy should concentrate
on anti-submarine warfare since most major U. S. cities
lie within 100 miles of the coastline and the "Russian sub
fleet might easily prove to be the counterpart of the U. S.




was, in the main, superficial is evidenced by the fact that
during the acrimonious "B-36 versus Super-Carrier" dispute
of 19 49, the Navy never raised the question of the vulnera-
bility of aircraft on the ground to a surprise air-atomic
59
attack. Additionally, it was only in late 1952 that the
Navy placed its first radar picket ship on twenty-four hour
,, , . , , . 60duty ror coastal defense.
Some tangible efforts were made , however, in the
direction of shielding the North American continent's in-
dustrial and population complexes, despite the overpowering
glitter of SAC ' s offensive sword, and the other domestic
influences discussed above which acted to delay a full
appreciation of the air-atomic threat between 1946-52. Let
us then next examine these efforts. In so doing, we shall
have occasion to observe the extent to which other purely
domestic factors operated to restrain the development of
an air defense system -- apart from the Soviet threat which
was perceived only dimly. We shall consider, in turn, the
organizational evolution of air defense roles and missions
within the military; the research on and the development
59An observation made by Quade, "The Selection and
Use...," in Quade (ed.), Analyses .
. ,
p. 99.





and procurement of active defensive systems; and, finally,
the actual deployment and operation of these systems-.

Section C. The Development of an Incipient Air De fense
Capability
1. Rol es and Missions
Dating back years before World War II, the Army had
had the mission and equipment for anti-aircraft defense.
Whether it was for forces in the field, vital installa-
tions, or population complexes, Army weapons had served
to provide the main element of defense against air at-
tack. The Army Air Force had had an equally important
and complementary task in this area. Its manned aircraft
would be used to intercept enemy attacks before they
reached the targets specifically defended by Army anti-
aircraft artillery (AAA) . To the end of World War II,
this distinction in mission was comparatively clear and,
for the most part, went unchallenged by the services.
However, in 19 46, when the Army Air Force (AAF)
established the Air Defense Command (ADC) to provide a
commander to coordinate the air defense battle, a dispute
arose almost immediately over which agency, the AAF or
the Army Ground Forces (AGF) , should have the air defense
mission. The dispute was grounded in the concept developed
fi 1
This paragraph draws upon Colonel V. C. Wegenhoft,
USAF, "Defense in Depth," Air University Quarterly Review
,




during the war that an Air Force commander should have
operational control of a wide area including the AAA de-
ployed therein. The AAF took the position that the increased
speed of modern bombers, the pending development of guided
missiles, and the possibility of surprise attack on the
continent made it essential to have such a coordinated
defense-in-depth under one commander. The AGF challenged
this concept and proposed a return to the pre-war dis-
tinction between "anti-aircraft defense" (local defense)
and "defense by air" (area defense) . This dispute would
continue with varying degrees of intensity throughout the
post-war period.
The Unification Act of 19 4 7 gave the newly formed
USAF the mission of providing the means for the coordi-
nation of air defense among all services. Service roles
in air defense were not spelled out, however, until the
Key West Agreement of March 19 48. The USAF was given pri-
mary responsibility for continental air defense and the
Army and Navy were both given a collateral role of pro-
viding defense forces to supplement those of the Air
Force
.
Little is known about whether there was a dispute at
Key West over these assignments. It seems likely, however,
that any such Army-Air Force contention was greatly over-
shadowed by the more widely publicized service disagreements
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over roles and missions for strategic bombing and recon-
naissance, amphibious operations, submarine warfare , and
protection of shipping. Moreover, as the unclassified .
portion of the Key West Agreement made no mention at all
of guided missiles responsibilities, an important source
of Army-Air Force friction was, perhaps, temporarily by-
passed. It also appears as though the Army (and its Coast
Artillery Corps) was satisfied by an aspect of the Agreement
which it interpreted to distinguish between operational
control of AAA units based in the continental U. S. (vested
in the Air Force) and those in overseas theaters of operation
where, according to the Army, " command as wel l as control
of AAA units assigned to field armies, corps and divisions
would remain' with those armies, corps and divisions...."
Finally, the assignment of air defense to the Air Force
was further softened by a requirement in the Agreement
that all doctrines affecting AAA in joint operations
were to be arrived at jointly.
By February 1949, therefore, General G. P» Saville,
the USAF ' s ADC commander testified: "We have been working
Colonel Donald J. Bailey, Coast Artillery Corps,
"Our Anti-Aircraf t Artillery Has A Bright Future," Anti -
aircraft Journal , LXXXXIII Csic J (March-April 19 50)", p.
11. This distinction was important to the Army, which
felt it likely that operations in the U. S. would be only
transitory in preparation for a troop movement overseas.

42
in the closest possible coordination with the Army and the
Navy. There is no evidence of any kind of any interservice
question that I am aware of. It has been technical problems
/TO
not responsibility problems."
Yet the soldiers seemed to recognize the dangers of
a unilateral ADC, and several bitter fights ensued in
19 49-50 regarding the possible impact on air defense of
technical advances in electronics and surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) -- advances which forebode an increased
blurring of the distinction between area and point defense
concepts. It was not until August 1950 that the Vanden-
berg-Collins Agreement provided an arrangement satisfactory
to the Army for the participation of AAA in air defense.
The exact degree of operational control over anti-aircraft
defenses was very carefully spelled-out. The Agreement,
in effect, "limited the authority of the Air Force to that
64
of prescribing when AAA weapons could or could not fire."
This degree of control seemed to allow the Army Anti-Aircraf
t
Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Armed Services,
To Authori ze the Secre tary of the Air Force to Establish
Land-Ba^sed~ATr Warning and Control Install ati ons for the
National Security , 81st, 1st, H.R. 2546, February "1949
,
p. 339.
Colonel James F. Howell, USA, "Continental Air De-
fense Command," Anti-Aircraf t Journal , LXXXXVII Csic)
September-October 1954), p. 15.
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Commander sufficient freedom of action to exploit the
maximum capabilities of his weapons, and the service re-
lationship was reaffirmed in the Chidlaw-Lewis Agreement
of 19 52. 65
With regard to U. S. Navy participation in continental
defense, an informal agreement between the Navy and air de-
fense officials was worked out in mid-1950. Under this ar-
rangement, available Navy fighter aircraft in the continental
U. S. would come under the air defense commander's control
in case of an emergency, in return for USAF assistance in
submarine searchs when requested.
Against the background of the above interservice
agreements and disagreements, the formal command organi-
zation of the Air Force's air defense units was passing
through several stages. As stated previously, the Air De-
fense Command (ADC) had been formed in 19 4 6 to coordinate the
air defense battle and to man and control the air warning
system. The ADC was to work closely in an emergency with
the Alaskan Air Command which had been established in De-
cember 19 45. The primary functions of the ADC in peacetime,
65Jonathan Carmen ("pseud."), "The Air Defense Muddle,"
Army , VII (February 1957) , p. 43.
6 Harold H. Martin, "Could We Beat Back an Air Attack




however, consisted of the training and administration of
the National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces which
formed the principal combat components of the ADC.
In December 1948, the ADC and Tactical Air Command
(TAC) combined their organizations under the Continental
Air Command (CONAC) , whose commander thus had the responsi-
bility for both air defense and tactical air programs. In
July 19 50, CONAC was finally able to deal with a single
commander who controlled all Army air defense components
when the Army Anti-Aircraft Command (ARAACOM) was formed.
And, in January 19 51, ADC was taken out from under CONAC '
s
wing and re-established as a separate command, but with
primarily operational responsibilities. Thus, for the
first time, air defense became the sole responsibility of
a major USAF command and its commander relieved of a
welter of minor administrative duties. Yet, it was not
until the establishment of CONAD, in September 1954, that
all U. S. air defense forces were organized on the principle
of unity of command rather than that of voluntary cooper-
ation.
One other aspect of the command organization for air
defense needs to be mentioned: that of the USAF — National
Guard Bureau relationship during this period. The Air
National Guard (ANG) , since the end of World War II, had
been planned as the principal source of America's air defense
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combat capability; and, in 1949, ANG forces constituted
two- thirds of those available for defense of the continent
in an emergency -- the main portion of the Regular Ai.r
Force being deployed to exterior bases almost at once after
M-Day, in support of U. S. international commitments.
Yet the USAF was quite unhappy with its command structure
vis-a-vis these forces. (And, considering that the ANG
received all its aircraft directly from the Air Force, the
ramifications from such inharmoniousness could be signifi-
cant.) As Secretary of the Air Force Symington complained:
In the final days of the [19 47 J unification,
when everybody was compromising in order to
get any bill, the National Guard interests
wedged into the act the fact that the National
Guard Bureau would continue to handle the
Air National Guard along with the TArmyj
National Guard, and this meant that the Air Force...
would in the usual case be under Army officers
with respect to its Air guard. 6 8
USAF Statement, Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on
Approps., National Military Estab lishment Appropriations
Bill for 1950 (Part II), 81st, 1st, March 1949, p. "42.
As General G. P. Saville, USAF, the ADC commander stated:
"The whole philosophy is to use Cthe reserve components^
to the maximum and not maintain and pay for day-after-
day an enormous thing in being any larger than it has to
be." Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps., To
Authorize the Secretary of the Air Force to Establish . . .
,
81st, 1st, February 1949, p. 344.
Hearings, House, Committee on Armed Services, To
Authorize the Composi tion of the Army of the U. S. and the
Air Force of the U. S
.




The issue of the federalization of the ANG for ready-
availability during emergencies was also a disturbing one
69
to the Air Force. It concurred with the Gray Board' rec-
ommendations to President Truman in 19 4 7. that "the federal
government . in its relationship to the National Guard must
operate through a patchwork of expediencies" with the sever-
al states, a patchwork that could be abrogated at will by
the states." In 194 8, Lieutenant General Klwood Quesada,
First USAF Special Assistant for Reserves, made a widely
quoted statement that the ANG would never be effective un-
til brought under federal command; and his sentiments were
echoed publicly in 19 49 by Lieutenant General Ennis White-
head, Commander of CONAC . Although by the mid-1950' s these
USAF-ANG issues had dropped into the background, there is no
doubt that the questions they raised between 19 4 7-52 exempli-
fied another instance where domestic political factors in-
tervened in the strict military calculation of the proper
structuring of air defense roles and missions.
2. Systems Research , Deve lopment, and Procurement
It has already been shown how various domestic per-
ceptions of the Soviet threat in the U. S. between 1946-52
69 The following discussion is taken from Brigadier
General Royal Hatch, USAF, "Militia: Old Cloak, New But-
tons," Air Force, XL (February 1957), pp. 65-66.
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resulted in the molding of the American weapons buildup
around offensive systems. In a fundamental sense, however,
the relative dearth of air defense programs at this time
can also be explained by defects in the • organization of
the U. S.' national military research and development. (R&D)
effort, which hampered innovative research.- And it surely
seems obvious that proponents of air defense required some
sort of qualitative technological breakthrough to bring
the perceived offense versus defense scales more into
balance, especially when the World War II experience with
existing defensive systems (unlike the experience with
bombers) could not be called upon to justify their quanti-
tative deployment.
An important aspect of this problem centers on the
operation between 1947-5 2 of the Defense Department's
Research and Development Board (RDB) . When the RDB was
established in 19 4 7 a percentage of the funds appropriated
for military research and development was allocated to
the Board so that it might initiate projects on its own.
In the ensuing years, so a Congressional committee re-
ported, "the extent of expenditures declined because of
the failure of some chairmen of the R&D Board to exercise
70its authority in this direction." An ex-Chairman of the
70Organ iz ation and Administration of the Military
Research and~~Development Programs, Twenty-Fourth Intermediate

48
Board, Dr. L. V. Berkner, chose to explain the situation
thusly: "The Board devoted itself primarily to the per-
fection of existing weapons and relatively little to the
advocacy of radical new military measures which science
was capable of producing. .. .The basic failure was due to
71defective organizations."
The RDB was made up of functional groups of civilian
scientists and military officers which, by the end of
19 52, had increased to more than 10 active committees,
7?panels, and working groups. The fundamental problem was
that the civilian scientists could spend less 'than ten or
fifteen days a year with the Board and, hence, could give
advice only on their particular area of full-time expertise.
As a result, "the committees had to be organized according
to such subject fields as aeronautics and atomic energy
rather than by 'operational categories' dealing with warfare
Report of the Committee on Government Operations, Sub-
Committee on Military Operations, 83rd, 2nd, H.R. 2618,




71Memorandum from Berkner to the Honorable R. Walter
Riehlman, dated June 29, 1954 and reprinted in Hearings,
House, Military Operations Subcommittee of Committee on
Government Operations, Organization and Administration of
the Military R&D Programs, 8 3rd, 2nd, June 19 54, p. 6 33.
72Research and Development (Office of the Secretary of
Defense ) , Thirty-Second Report by Committee on Government
Operations, 85th, 2nd, H.R. 2552, August 1958, p. 63.
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73problems, for example , ... air combat, etc."
Within the Air Force, itself , research and development
responsibilities were essentially combined until April
19 50 with the supply and logistics functions under the Air
Material Command (AMC) . Consequently, apart from whatever
other predispositions may have existed within the USAF
toward offensive systems, the AMC ' s philosophy of procure-
ment tended to dominate that service's "in-house" research
into possible defensive innovations. For, as Dr. James R.
Killian, Jr. observed:
There is a quite proper attitude and procedure
in procurement that tries to account for every
single piece of equipment down to the last nut
and bolt and screwdriver. When you start doing
that with research you may cripple it with red
tape. There are also Cinf lexiblej contracting
procedures in procurement that have been proven
repeatedly not to be applicable to research and
to hold it back when you try to make it applic-
able. 74
Even after the R&D function was separated organiza-
tionally from the AMC by the establishment of the Air
73 Ibid., pp. 64-65. (Italics added.) For a more de-
tailed discussion of the RDB ' s operations see Don K. Price,
Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American
Democracy" (New York7~~19 54)
, pp. 144-152.
74Hearings, House, Military Operations Subcommittee
of the Committee on Government Operations, Organization
and Administration of the Military Research and Development
Programs
, 83rd, 2nd, June 1954, p. 435.
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Research and Development Command (ARDC) in 1950, the Air
Force's research programs were still fettered by their
prior subordination to supply and logistics. Hence, a.-
Congressional report in 1954 stated that. "the ARDC pro-
curement activities continue to function under established
Air Force procurement regulations, and consequently remain
7 5
under the influence of production-procurement policies."
The exact significance of these bureaucratic factors
upon the rate of technological advance in air defense
"hardware" can, of course, be only surmised. Further,
any discussion of the Air Force's approach to air defense
R&D must take into account the studies done at that service's
behest by Project RAND and the Lincoln Laboratory of M.I.T.
In May 1948, the Air Force contracted with the RAND Cor-
poration for an extensive program of research on air de-
fense problems which bore fruit in 3.9 52 in a study which
shall be discussed below. More important during the 19 51-52
period was the work carried on at the Lincoln Laboratory
of M.I.T. The establishment of Project Lincoln was initiated
by General Vandenberg in December 19 50 in response to the
Soviets' atomic explosion, and to a report by the USAF '
s
Scientific Advisory Board which stated that post-war advances
75Riehlman Subcommittee Report, p. 20
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in high-speed computers had made possible the centralized
"7 C
control of the air battle over a vast area. (Of course,
Vandenberg was also responding to the directives in NSC-68
of early 1950 which included greater attention to continental
defense problems.) Work was begun in early 1951 on two
projects which eventually culminated in the -Semi-Automatic
Ground Environment (SAGE) system and the Distant Early
Warning (DEW) line -- critical components of the mature
U. S. bomber defense posture. And Air Force sympathizers
proclaimed that, by May 1953, "every cent Project Lincoln
Chad] asked for [had] been granted by the Air Force. This
['included] a four month period in which M.I.T. progressively
raised its estimates from $4 million to $8 million to $13
million to $18 million, as the full Lincoln program rapidly
evolved.
Indeed, according to Air Force magazine, the USAF in
November 1949 wanted to respond to the Soviets' atomic
explosion by a "Manhattan District" approach to air defense,
1 C\
Statements of two of the Directors of Lincoln Lab-
oratory: Dr. A. G. Hill (Hearings, House, Military Opera-
tions Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Organization and Administration of the Military R&D
Programs, 8 3rd, 2nd, June 19 54, p. 3 9 2".), and Dr. C. F.
J. Overhage (Hearings, House, Subcommittee of Committee
on Government Operations , Systems Development and Manage -
ment (Part 3), 87th, 2nd, August 1962, p. 1036ff.)
"The Truth About Our Air Defense," Air Force ,
XXXVI (May 1953), p. 29.
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7 8but was turned down by higher authority. The evidence for
the Air Force's turning then to M.I.T. to create a central-
ized laboratory for new research also suggests a perception
of some urgency in solving the air defense problem. The
RAND Corporation was not chosen for the additional work be-
cause "the kind of research RAND was willing and able to
provide on the air defense question would not meet the re-
quirements and the time schedule that the Air Force had en-
79
visaged in originally assigning the task to RAND...."
Moreover, it appears that the Air Force did not choose to
utilize its extant Cambridge Research Center (AFCRC) in or-
der to avoid the time consuming task of adding personnel to
AFCRC through cumbersome civil-service regulations, and the
delays attendant to the equally cumbersome military chain of
80
command in which AFCRC was enmeshed.
Yet, these Air Force efforts must be seen again within
the context of the more vocal and diffused "Big Bomber" ar-
guments which dominated that service's perceptions at this




79Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation; Case Study
of a Non-Profit Advisory Corpora tion (Cambridge, Mass.,
1966)
, p. 89.
80 See pp. 392-393 of the testimony of Dr. A. G. Hill
cited in footnote 76 on p. 51 above.

53
between the Project Lincoln air defense-minded scientists
and the USAF during 1952-53 highlight this point.
In any event, by mid- 19 50, a survey of the research on
and development of fighter aircraft, defensive missiles, and
surveillance radar revealed that
there are no interceptor planes in any of
the Air Force's operational units which
are equipped adequately with both radar
searching systems and fire control instru-
ments. The first batch of 'modified' all
purpose planes changed about to meet the
new requirements in half measure are now
coming off the assembly lines, but pro-
duction contracts for new planes built
from the ground-up as true interceptors
in the modern sense of the word have not
yet been let.
There is not one C missile-guidance device
3
of sufficient operational efficiencies to
make it possible to go into production on
a single missile type.
Studies to overcome radar's inherent line
of sight limitations by incorporating nov-
el methods of utilization of existing
equipment were stepped-up only when the
Radar Network Installation Program was ex-
pedited in 1949. 81
81
"Locate, Recognize and Hit Targets," Air Force
,
XXXIII (June 1950), pp. 31, 52. There was also the recog-
nized possibility that piloted "air-rammers" could have
been developed comparatively inexpensively, as an interim
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Indeed, it was not until the 1953-56 period that true
all-weather interceptors, air-to-air and ground-to-air
missiles, and low-altitude gap-filler radars were deployed
in operational numbers within the U. S . air defense system.
As a final note on air defense research at the time of
the incipient Soviet air-atomic threat, it should be
mentioned that the Air Force was not alone in its lack of
timely innovative systems. For the Army reported in early
1949 that "no equipment has been devised which is satis-
factory against jet-propelled aircraft. Three hundred
and fifty m.p.h. seems to be the point at which we cease
o o
being fully effective."
The continental air defense systems which were de-
veloped and procured for deployment between 1946 and 1952,
therefore, were essentially improved versions of World
War II equipments. And it scarcely needs emphasizing that
the actual number of these aircraft, radars, and anti-
aircraft artillery which reached operational status (and
measure, to increase the defensive attrition rate and still
give the pilot a fair chance of survival. See R. W. Marlowe,
"The Tactics of Suicide," Flying, XLIII (August 1948), p. 20.
8 2
Testimony of Major General K. F. Cramer, USA,
Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Na t. ional Mili-
tary Estab lishment Appropriations Bi ll for 1950 , 81st, 1st,
March 19 49, p. 76 6.
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could be maintained) was strictly limited by the Defense De-
partment's fixed budgetary ceilings and "balanced forces"
philosophy of apportionment among the services. President
Truman's decision in December 19 4 3 to cut back the USAF air-
craft program from seventy groups to forty-eight groups thus
entailed a reduction from twenty-five to twenty in the regu-
lar forces fighter-group goal, and the concomitant planned
modernization of only eleven of the twenty-seven Air Nation-
al Guard groups
.
Further, although it had been under active investigation
since 19 47, a plan for the first permanent network of eighty-
five aircraft control and warning (AC&W) radar stations in
the continental U. S. and Alaska did not receive any appro-
priated funds until the Soviet atomic explosion caused Con-
gress to authorize the Air Force in late 1949 to divert from




, Part 2, pp. 130, 40. Seventeen of the twenty
USAF fighter groups were to be day-only (seventy-five air-
craft per group) and three were to be all-weather (thirty-
six aircraft per group). Ibid.
,
p. 130.
84Testimony of General Muir S. Fairchild, USAF, Hear-
ings, House, Subc. of Coram, on Apps
.
, Department of Defense
Appropriations for 1951 , 81st, 2nd, February 1950, p. 1220.
With reference to the proposed AC&W net, General G. P.
Saville, USAF, ADC Commander, testified in February
1949: "What we are doing is in balance with what we
are doing in other armed forces projects. And that
was one of the concerns of the JCS : To see that these
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While the Korean conflict caused the USAF ' s authorized
strength to jump successively to 58, 95, and 143 wings, the
major procurement expenditures went for strategic offensive
power, with very little modernization and expansion of the
ADC's 17 operational wings. Also, throughout 1952, the pro-
posed ''stretch-out" and "whittling-down" of USAF programs by
the Administration and Congress, respectively, threatened to
delay seriously the completion of the radar net; delay fur-
ther the conversion from VHF to UHF in ground equipment to
handle the new interceptors equipped with UHF; and prevent
the provision of sufficient navigational aids to permit at-
tainrnent of an all-weather operating capability.
things were all in balance." (Hearings, House, Subc. of Coiran.
on Armed Services, To Authorize the Secretary of the Air
Force to Establish. .
.
, 8Tst, 1st, February 1949, p. 337). It
should be mentioned, however, that in late January 1949, "in
an effort to get on with this program rapidly," the Air Force
diverted as much funds from its past appropriations as was
legally possible to begin construction of the AC&W control
centers. (Ibid., p. 335.) Simultaneously, the Congress auth-
orized $85.5 million for construction of the full radar net
but adjourned before the funds could be appropriated. It
hardly needs adding that in the building of the AC&W control
centers, "materials and construction methods [were to be J
utilized which iwouldj result in the lowest total costs...."
( Ibid . , p. 347.) The question of "hardening" such centers
to any degree apparently never arose.
q c
Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations for 1953, 82nd, 2nd, June 1952,
pp. 782, 784-785, 788-790. A decision in 1952 for the exten-
sive build-up of air defense systems was also obviously hamp-
ered by the election year uncertainties regarding what poli-
cies a new administration might adopt.
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These examples of the restrictions upon air defense
occasioned by domestic economic considerations could in-
deed be expanded. Suffice it to say, such budgetary ceil-
ings exacerbated the fundamental problems which proponents
of air defense development otherwise faced within a military
environment whose traditions and doctrinal assumptions fa-
vored offensive systems. It remains to discuss the specific
deployment and operation of the defensive systems that were
procured. That is... just what was the U. S.' evolving ac-
tive air defense capability between 1946-52?
3. Systems Deployment and Operation
After the Battle of Midway in mid-1942, when the threat
of Japanese invasion of the U. S. was broken, the skeleton
air defenses which had been established during the war were
progressively de-emphasized. In 19 46 and 1947, under the
pressures of demobilization, continental defenses were prac-
tically non-existent.
Interestingly enough, it was Arctic area requirements
that received much of what little attention was being paid
at this time to a possible air-atomic threat. General Carl
Spaatz, sporting a polar-projection map, was fond of point-
ing out to Congress that, whereas "in the past, wars tended
to move on parallels of latitude..., with the advent of the
new weapons .. .warfare will follow more nearly meridians of
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longitude, and come over the Arctic frontier; this changes
o g
our whole defensive picture...." The U. S . -Canadian
Permanent Joint Board on Defense reported in 1946 that
"for many years the Soviet Union has been assiduous in
collecting data and conducting air and sea operations in
the polar area, on a scale that dwarfed the efforts of any
other country"; and emphasized improving the ability of
8 7
U. S. defense forces to operate under Arctic conditions.
The first training operations conducted by ADC forces, there-
fore, were mobility and cold weather maneuvers in 1948.
Later, in response to the Soviets' initial atomic explosion,
General Omar Bradley opined, "If you are going to increase
anything, the first increase ought to be the ground forces
p p
and air forces in Alaska...." An extensive exercise
("Sweetbriar" ) conducted in early 1950 demonstrated the
extent of feasibility of air operations in the Alaskan
area and provided the basis for plans for an air defense
8 6
Hearings, House, Subc. of Coram, on Approps., Mi litary
Establishment Appropriations Bil l for 1948 , 80th, 1st,
March 1947, p. 602." See "also Spaatz's statement at the
Hearings, House, Military Establishment Appropriat ions Bi ll
for 1947 , 79th, 2nd, May" 1946, p. 401ff.
8 7
Melvin Conant, The Long Po lar Watch: Canada and
the Defense of North America (New York, 1962), pp. 30, 33.
8 8Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps., De-
partment o f Defense Appropriations for 19 51 , 81st, 2nd,
March 19 5 0", p. 72.
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build-up in the Arctic. For, by April 1950, the entire
Alaskan area defense capability was vested in thirteen
modified "all-weather" F-32 prop interceptors and seventy-
five day-only F-80 fighter aircraft -- both types obsolescent
1 +- A A 89by any standard.
It was not until after the Czechoslovakia coup of
February 19 4 8 that any perceptible efforts were made in
the direction of air defense within the continental U. S.
Before that time only one active radar station had been
established in the U. S. , while four radar sites deployed
90in Alaska operated for just a few hours each day. The
ADC before 1948 was equipped with aircraft left-over from
SAC and TAC allotments and could not train all of its own
pilots, let alone the Air Guard pilots who were supposedly
manning "surplus" planes from the regular Air Force in an
air defense role. In the ANG, indeed, practically all
flight training had been stopped in 1947, other than
91
for a series of schools, due to lack of funds. The
O Q
See Charles Corddry, "Air: Key to the Arctic," Air
Force , XXXIII (April 1950), p. 25.
Lieutenant General Robert M. Lee, USAF, "The Role
of Aerospace Defense," Air University Quarterly Review ,
XIII (Summer 1962), p. 9.
91Testimony of General Walsh, USA, Hearings, Senate,
Subc. of Comrn. on Approps . , Military Establishment Appropri -
ations Bill for 1948, 80th, 1st, June 1947, p. 128.
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Army's situation was no better. By the Spring of 1948
there were only two Regular Army AAA battalions formed in
the U. S., and only 54 percent of the Army National Guard
92AAA units had even been organized.
In late March 19 48, therefore, General Spaatz ordered
the ADC to take some World War II radars out of mothballs
and deploy them around the Seattle-Hanford complex, in the
industrial northeast, and in Albuquerque. The ANG, in April
1948, had just begun to emphasize the importance of aircraft
control and warning- groups and had hurriedly organized thir-
93
teen such groups (twenty percent of the required total)
.
The Soviets' Tu-4 flyby in May gave added impetus to
the Congressional authorization in February 1949 for the con-
struction of the seventy-five station permanent radar net-
work in the continental U. S. (plus ten sites in Alaska).
The Air Force expedited the project with $50 million diverted
from other USAF projects after the Soviets' explosion in
September 1949.
As this radar system was not scheduled for operation
until 1952, however, a mobile forty-four station "Lashup"
9 2Testimony of General Omar Bradley, USA, Hearings, House,
Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, National Milit ary Establishment
Appropriations Bill for 1949 (Part III), 80th, 2nd, May 1948,
p. 1223; and Major General K. F. Cramer, USA, ibid. , April
19 48, p. 415.
9 3 Ibid . , (Major General Cramer), p. 414.
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early-warning net v/as rushed to completion by mid-1950 to
provide interim protection to the northeast, northwest, and
California areas. The Air Force, in further response to the
Soviet atomic demons tration, gave priority to manning and
equipping fighter and radar squadrons and to extending the
94
operating hours of the system.
These hectic and perhaps illogical efforts in 19 4 8-49
to acquire immediately some kind of defense represented in
retrospect the only post-war period during which air defense
seemed to take priority over other U. S. national security
concerns. 3y 1950, however, air defense doctrine was still
conceived largely in World War II terms: partial, domestic-
based early-warning coverage to alert both fighter aircraft
and point defense anti-aircraft artillery protecting major
industrial and population complexes. The air battle would
be conducted visually within America's borders by day -only
fighters, along tactics to be selected by those on the
scene. "Speed of reaction to a raid warning, range of
flight and the air battle tactics were basically similar to
those that had governed the epic Battle of Britain ten years
, .,95earlier.
94Lieutenant General Lee, Air University Quarterly Re-
view , XIII, p. 9; and "Air Defense of North America," Air
Force , XL (August 1957), p. 252.
95Conant, The Long Polar Watch, p. 34.
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Furthermore, at the time the Korean conflict broke out
in mid- 19 50, the deployment of U. S. air defense systems
continued to reveal other glaring weaknesses. The radar net
still was not operational twenty-four hours daily due to a
lack of trained personnel; and the stations tended to be lo-
cated -~ not at the best technical sites -- but on govern-
ment property that could be gotten land-free, with a resul-
tant degradation of their intercept-control capability from
attendant ground-clutter problems. Moreover, there were no
Navy picket ships on station to extend radar coverage by
compensating for the line-of-sight limitations of the ground
based equipment.
Most of the U. S.' AAA was still in mothballs. An a-
greement between the services and the Munitions Board as to
the disposition of the antiaircraft battalions had not been
completed, and only a few of the highest priority installa-
tions were being guarded by AA guns. Additionally, as it
was less expensive to concentrate by battalions than to dis-
perse by batteries around the target perimeter, the deploy-
96
ment of these few AA guns v/as far from optimal.
The only all-weather interceptors the U. S. had in any
numbers were old World War II piston F--82 aircraft and not
all of the day-only F-36*s had radar-pointing for their




guns. Only a handful of the ANG fighter units were even
equipped with jet aircraft. Most of the Regular fighters
were deployed by groups at permanent airbases (rather than
by squadrons at smaller fields throughout
.
the area under
their protection), which would seem to extend the time in-
volved in getting all the aircraft airborne during an
emergency, due to runway limitations, etc.
With regard to the location of the ANG fighter units,
strict strategic considerations again had to be often sub-
ordinated. Original allocations were made on the basis of
one fighter squadron to each state, and the remaining units
were allocated on the basis of population. As Major General
K. F. Cramer, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, described
the process: ' ...
The specific locations are determined in the
first instance through the availability of the
population necessary to man and maintain the
units. Then there is some thought given to
the availability of facilities on which these
units can be based. Thereafter the exact lo-
cation is a matter in which the governors and
the USAF...must be in agreement ....' In the event
the State that we offer L'the ANG unit J to from
a strategic standpoint is not able to accept it
because probably it has already another unit or
two there, then we offer it to the next best
from a strategic standpoint . 97
97Hearings, House, Comm. on Armed Services, To Authorize
the Composition of the Army . .
.
, 81st, 1st, H.R. 1437, January
19 49, pp. 229, 189.
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The Korean War sped up the acquisition of SAC rights
to overseas bases and the extension of direct SAC control
to exterior areas vital to its operation. Yet there was
no attendant increase in SAC ' s forward air defense pro-
tection. In the continental U. S., the effects of the Korean
experience on America's air defense posture were ambivalent.
The Air Force in the Fall of 19 50 received a supple-
mental appropriation to complete the radar net in the U. S.
during fiscal year 1951; and reservists recalled to active
duty enabled the first full time operation of the extant
warning and control system. In mid-19 51 an agreement was
reached with Canada to proceed at once with the construction
of the Pine Tree warning and tracking line along their com-
mon border. The Ground Observer Corps (GOC) ( which had been
established in 19 50, recruited more vigorously for civilian
spotters to help plug some holes in the non-existent low-
altitude radar capability. Between January 19'51 and April
1953, the number of GOC members increased from 50,000 to
200,000, yet this latter figure still represented only 40
98percent of the USAF goal for the GOC. On July 14, 19 52,
the GOC initiated a 24-hour-a-day surveillance program
("Operation Skywatch"), yet their "ground observers' guide"
98
"Air Defense of the U. S.," Life, January 22, 1951,
p. 33; Air Force, XXXVI (April 1953), p. 38.
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at this time had neither a picture nor a description of
99the only real air -atomic threat, the Soviets' Tu-4.
During 1951, the development of the Army's radar-con-
trolled, fully automatic 75-millimeter , "Skysweeper" AAA
and its surface-to-air guided missiles was drastically
speeded-up by the fact that 87 percent of U. S. air losses
in Korea were due to enemy ground fire. The new equipment
was to be used to defend U. S. cities. In the interim,
between June 19 5 and June 19 52, the Army increased the
number of its active AAA battalions in the U. S. from 4 8
4- i-in 101to 110.
It was with regard to continental fighter defenses,
however, that the international events of 1951-52 caused
the most significant changes. By January 195 2, the Air
Force's fighter-interceptors had been widely dispersed on a
99New York Time s, July 3, 19 52, p. 3.
Hanson Baldwin, New York T imes , July 21, 1952, p. 4.
Antiaircraft Journal , LXXXXV Lsicj , (July-August
1956), p. 45. "Although in selecting these AAA sites
primary emphasis must be placed upon the tactical re-
quirements for the protection of population centers and
other vital locations, consideration is also given to the
public so as not to disrupt civilian communities by re-
moving valuable agricultural or industrial properties from
useful pursuits." Secretary of the Army Robert F. Stevens,
Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department of





one-squadron-per-base deployment. The principal rationale
here was the increased capability to get the planes air-
borne on limited notice by relieving the jams that the former
wing-per-base deployment would probably cause. And there
is some evidence that an important factor in this decision,
made shortly after the Soviets 1 1951 May Day flyby, was the
"entirely new type of plane" that could attack the U. S.
] 03
at greatly increased speeds. To complement the above dis-
persal, the Air Force also requested funds to install at the
new fighter bases high speed refueling and alert readiness
facilities. Hence, by early 19 53, a leading USAF spokesman
could state: "I would think that you could have every [fighter]
102Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter's
statement, Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
,
Department of the Air Force Appropriations for 1 9 53, 82nd,
2nd, January 19 52, p. 8. Finletter added: "The medium
bombers are on a two-wings per base deployment. The heavy
bombers are on a one-and-two-wings per base deployment.
This is not the way we would prefer to have them, but in
order to cut down annual charges this calculated risk of
somewhat crowded deployment has been accepted." It would
be Finletter, writing in mid-19 54, who would make one of
the first authoritative public pleas for a "new military
strategy" grounded in a well-dispersed and well-defended
SAC base system, both in COMUS and abroad. Power and
Policy: U. S . Foreign Policy and Military Power in the
Hydrogen Age (New York, 1954), especially pp . 19ff,; 29ff.
10 3Secretary Finletter's phrase, Hearings, House, Subc.
of Comm. on Approps., Military Public Work s Appropriations




airplane in the air in three hours throughout the U. S."
Significantly enough, while the Air Force was thus
increasing the number of fighters it could put into the air
in a compressed time- frame, the RAND Corporation was carrying
out tests which demonstrated that "beyond a certain number
of Caircraft] tracks, which... is about twelve, that they are
trying to follow, all the Cground-control-intercept] per-
. .
. ,,10 5
sonnel just goes crazy.
How were these new ADC fighter bases' selected? In
July 1951, Colonel II. R. Maddox testified that "the limi-
tations imposed by the location of the aircraft control
and warning sites £were 3 very specific insofar as the
selection of associated airfields Cwas3 concerned"; and
that "consideration was given from, strategic requirements
to what aviationman John Doe is going to do in his off-duty
hours, while at the same time considering the public interest,
General Ricks, USAF, Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm.
on Approps., Department of the Air Force Appropriations for
1954, 83rd, 1st, March 1953, p. 221. " As an interesting counter-
point to the USAF dispersal policy were the concurrent plans
of the ANG to deploy all its newly received first-line air-
craft within a complete wing (broken into the one squadron-
per-base pattern) rather than scatter the modern aircraft
throughout CONUS . See General Pilcher's testimony, Hearings,
House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Supplemental Appropri-
ation s Bill, 1954 (Part 2), 83rd, 1st, June 1953, p. 34.
] 05
Dr. W. G. Whitman, Chairman of the RDB , testimony,
Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps., Department of




civil aviation requirements, and the post-emergency use
of facilities constructed with public funds." Ten
months later, Maddox testified that the controlling factor
in base selection was the ability of Russia to fly bombers
into a particular area and the likelihood of their attempt-
ing to do so in wartime; and secondly, the need to establish
107
a "defense-in-depth posture.
The question of how the ADC base locations were de-
termined was soon a rather academic one. For, in 1951-52,
it became necessary "to strip all CF-86J Sabres from the air
defense of the U. S. to put 125 Sabres in Korea to battle
10 8
some 500 Mig's." Indeed, according to Secretary Finletter,
"at one time during the Korean War we denuded our air de-
109fenses almost entirely."" The unexpectedly heavy Communist
10 6
Hearings, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Mi litary and Naval Construction , 82 nd, 1st, H.R. 4525,
July 19 51, pp. 136 8, 1375.
107Hearings, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Military and Naval Construction , 82nd, 2nd, H.R. 7674,
May 19 52, p. 42 44. By May 19 52, Maddox had been raised to
Brigadier General rank, with (one would suppose) an atten-
dant elevation of perspective to these more weighty, stra-
tegic concerns. Which perspective represents the more
valid description of the ADC ' s base selection process shall
be left to the reader to decide.
1 08Senator Stuart Symington's speech to the Senate,
June 25, 19 53, reprinted in Department of Defense Press
Releas es , 242-53, p. 22.
109Power and Policy, p. 22.
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fighter opposition in Korea was not the only reason for such
action. In addition to moving ADC planes to the Far East,
there was a substantial deployment to NATO which, according
to General Matthew Ridgeway, was then shorter on combat air-
craft than on anything else. Furthermore, the twenty-two
ANG fighter wings which were recalled to active service be-
ginning in late 19 50 could not compensate for this loss of
continental defenses as most of these planes v/ere similarly
deployed overseas, where they were to remain in an active
status even after the Korean Armistice.
For those fighter planes which did remain in the conti-
nental United States during Korea, President Truman in Nov-
ember 19 5 gave an unprecedented authorization for the ac-
tual interception of unidentified -aircraft
..
This move came
in conjunction with a Civil Aeronautics Association require-
ment that all planes making approaches to the U. S. from
seaward file flight plans and navigate over certain check
points. But as such a requirement was not made for aircraft
entering the U. S. from Canada, the majority of the ADC's
Reported by Roswell L. Gilpatric, "Retreat in Air
Power," Reporter , June 23, 1953, p. 10. Canada, also, met
its UN and NATO commitments during the Korean War at the ex-
pense of its home defenses. The RCAF sent all of its fight-
ers out of the country except the one squadron of CF-100's
which was then in the process of being organized. See
HANSARD, Session 1952-53, Vol. IV, April 14, 1953, p. 3819.
This was reportedly due to the problems of working out
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pilots -- located in the industrial northeast and northwest,
and lacking any electronic Identification Friend/Foe (IFF)
equipment -- were required to "scramble" on all suspicious
aircraft from the north, and probably sometimes wished that
they, too, were battling Migs in Korea.
Indeed, one of the most enduring effects of the Korean
conflict on continental air defense was the wealth of combat
experience which accrued to U . S. fighter pilots and tech-
nicians. Also, the very favorable ratio of air combat kills
for U. S. aircraft against the Migs was generally attributed
to the superior quality of American airmanship and did much
to increase the esteem of defensive air power within the U.S.
Air Force community.
With the approach of 19 53, as we have seen, domestic
United States perceptions of the Soviet air-atomic threat
were dimmed by the traditional image of a defensively-ori-
ented Russian military machine. Also, the growing ring of
U. S. overseas bases seemed secure (militarily and politic-
ally) for the B-47's, and the potential vulnerability of the
intercontinental B-36's to the new Soviet all-weather inter-
ceptor (Yak- 25) was not a disturbing issue. Moreover, the
U. S. 1 own new all-weather interceptor (F-94C) was coming off
the production line. Finally, there were published indications
an agreement with the Canadian government. See Martin, Satur-
day Evening Post , November 4, 19 50, p. 148.
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of the contemplated use of nuclear weapons for air defense
systems which, some American authorities on air defense then
felt, might enable the U. S. to attrite 9 5 percent of an
+-4- i a a- 4.- 112air attack under any conditions.
Yet, at this same time, there were other very dis-
quieting signposts being raised. First, with regard to
the reported Russian reconnaissance flights of the Alaskan,
Northern Canadian and Greenland borders during the Summer
of 19 52, none of the missions was intercepted and almost
none v/as radar-sighted. They left only their vapor-trail
behind them as identification. Secondly, tests run by
the U. S. ' own aircraft on its air defenses were beginning
to reveal severe defects in the system, especially in the
IT 4degree of vulnerability to electronic countermeasures
.
Third, reports were increasing from responsible commentators
which emphasized that the potential Soviet submarine threat
115
to North America could no longer be ignored. Fourth,
"A-Bombs for Air Defense," Ai r Force , XXXV (July 1952),
p. 22.
113
'Joseph and Stuart Alsop, New York Herald Tribune,
March 17, 195 3, p. 1.
114
"Air Defense of North America," Air Force, XL,
pp. 258-259.
15E.g., F. Uhlig, Jr., "The Threat of the Soviet
Navy," Foreign Affairs, XXX (April 1952), p. 22.
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progress in the development of the U. S. 1 own hydrogen bomb




In partial reaction to these disturbing signs, U. S.
physical scientists began to join forces with civilian
military analysts in 1952 to urge that the U: S. 1 active air
defense effort be greatly expanded. No doubt the scientists
were also affected by the demonstration of the efficacy of
air defense which the Korean Migs manifest against B-29 day-
light raids. There was additionally, perhaps,, the fear within
a major portion of the scientific community that the timely
diversion of military resources to air defense systems was
the one remaining way to avoid the dreaded development of
a significant U. S. (and USSR?) offensive hydrogen bomb
capability.
There were yet other, more technical reasons for the
scientists' vocal support of active air defense at this time.
The RAND Corporation, which had been researching and gaming
the continental air defense problem as one of its major
projects for the Air Force for several years, began briefing
this service (informally in 1952 and formally in 1953) on
its findings regarding the "Selection and Use of Strategic
Air Bases". Among its more alarming preliminary results were
116E.g., Air Force, XXXV (June 1952), p. 22.
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that "a large number of U. S. bases were too close to the
perimeter of our projected 1956 radar net to have even
marginally adequate warning against air attack"; and that
!
'a single, high altitude, mass Russian strike against
U. S . targets, including SAC, with 1956 defenses could re-
sult in attrition of 75 to 85 percent of the medium-bomber
force, Cwhereas'j with adequate warning to permit evacuation
of aircraft this could be reduced to an attrition level of
117less than 20 percent."'
In addition, as we have seen, Project Lincoln (also
operating under Air Force auspices) had been studying the
problems of aircraft detection and interception since early
1951. This research, plus new solutions to the problems
of air defense which began to emerge as byproducts of the
Project East River civil defense study in early 1952^ led
to the organization of the Project Lincoln Summer Study on
118
air defense in mid-1952. In the late Summer of 1952 this
offshoot group of Lincoln and non-Lincoln scientists re-
ported to the Air Force on the striking inadequacy of the
extant air defenses. They further submitted that new and
117Quade, "The Selection and Use...," in Quade (ed.),
Analyse s . .
. , pp. 43-44.
118See the memorandum from Lloyd V. Berkner to Honorable
R. Walter Riehlman dtd. June 29, 1954 r and reprinted in Hearings





potential technological breakthroughs promised to increase
the air defense kill-rate to as much as 70 percent. This
significant advance in expected enemy attrition was to be
achieved through a distant early warning (DEW) line far
out on the Arctic rim, and behind this, an in-depth system
of automatic communications, supersonic fighters, and im-
proved air-to-air homing missiles -- all of which would push
the air battle well beyond U. S. borders... at a cost of
between $10-20 billion.
Over the ardent objections of the Air Force, the
Truman Administration received this Summer Study report
1 1 9
in the Fall of 1952. Upon its foundations, NSC-141
was prepared for the incoming Eisenhower Administration and
"recommended an increase of some $7 billion to $9 billion
120
in defense expenditures .. .mainly for air defense...."
Shortly thereafter, the Alsops broke the story of the
Lincoln Laboratory work and thus provided the first public
recognition of the extreme vulnerability of the United
119This ploy was soon to be described widely as the
"end run" around the Air Force and was accomplished by the
National Security Resources Board which had received a copy
of the report in September 1952. The Air Force vs. Summer
Study Group positions on this issue will be discussed in
Chapter 2 below.
120Glen H. Snyder, "The 'New Look 1 of 1953," in





States to a growing Soviet air-atomic capability.
121The first indications of Project Lincoln's findings
appeared in the New York Herald Tribune/ October 22, 1952,
p. 25; but it was in this newspaper's March 16, 1953 issue
(p. 1) that the prospects of the U. S.' lieing "virtually










Post-Stalinist Signals of Strategic Offensive
Capability and Intent
Following Stalin's death in March 1953, the Soviet in-
ternal scene was dominated by the political succession strug-
gle. Propaganda for foreign consumption during this process
continued to blare the "peace" line associated with the for-
mer dictator, while the validity of his strategic doctrine
was undergoing a critical reassessment at home.. Throughout
19 54, two perspectives on "the nature of the historical epoch"
vied for ascendancy. Malenkov argued that the offensive power
of nuclear weapons meant that a general war could cause the
"destruction of world civilization"; and, hence, the Soviet
Union must mould its policies within a "mutual deterrence"
environment. Such a perspective called for the increased al-
location of resources to domestic consumer goods production
and a levelling-of f of military systems expenditures.
Khrushchev, on the other hand, argued that a future gen-
eral war would mean the destruction of capitalism only. He
urged increased defense expenditures to improve the Soviets'
strategic capacity to wage war, beyond Malenkov 's "minimum
deterrent" posture. The broad coalition of military and




line abetted his victory over Malenkov in February 19 55.
And, with Malenkov removed from power, the Supreme Soviet
(legislature) reportedly "increased the military budget
by twelve percent. ..."
While this political maneuvering was occurring, pub-
lished Soviet military writing began to evince a spirit
of objectivity which the fetters of Stalinist military
"science" had precluded. Thus, the fact that all societies
might be affected by the same laws of warfare became a
point of discussion; and, early in 1954, the USSR's official
military organ (Red Star) abruptly terminated its contem-
ptuous allusions to nuclear weapons and began a serious
assessment of their capabilities.
As an outgrowth of this assessment came a new look in-
to the importance of the (non-permanently operating) "sur-
prise" factor in an atomic attack. In September 195 3, the
Soviets' "agonizing reappraisal" began cautiously with the
publication of the idea that "surprise can bring great ad-
vantages to the aggressor and enormous losses to the victim
of an attack." By March 1955, the military innovators seemed
to have triumphed when the authoritative assertion was made
that the importance of the initiative in nuclear war dictated
Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power
and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1965), p. 27.

7 8
that the USSR must now be prepared for "pre-emptive actions
2
against the cunning of aggressors."
The long-range weapons systems needed to implement any
such pre-emptive war doctrine underwent great improvement
between 1953-56. The principal demonstration of the Soviets 1
progress with strategic offensive weapons was, of course,
their explosion of a hydrogen device in August 1953. This
event was followed up within the next nine months by a rash
of other indicators of an increasing USSR nuclear threat.
The first Soviet government allusion to its new inter-
continental weapons systems appeared in an Isves ti a article
in December 1953, as a response to Eisenhower's recent
3
"atoms-for-peace" address to the UN. Several months later
U. S. 1 Aviation Week magazine published photographs of two
new Soviet heavy bombers already in service in northern
4
Russia across the polar ice cap from North America. On
March 26, 19 54, Red Star provided the first hint of the force
of the Russian thermonuclear explosion the preceding August
when it likened the blast to the explosion caused by the
5
million-ton meteorite that fell in Siberia in 1908. On
2 See Garthoff, The Soviet Image of Future War , pp. 62, 65
3Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age , p. 186.
Cited in New York Times , February 16, 1954, p. 5.
5Cited in BAS , X (May 1954), pp. 167, 170.
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April 28th, the Soviets chose to announce that since 1948
they had been conducting a major program of Arctic research
covering conditions under and over the polar ice cap.
Simultaneously, it was reported in the U. S. that Western
diplomats were disturbed by a large unexplained residual
(nearly one billion dollars) in the Soviet budget which was
7
possibly being used to "pay for a long-range bomber fleet."
Then came May Day in the Soviet Union.
It was at this celebration's fly-by that the Russians
displayed a solitary, twin turbo-jet medium bomber (Western
designated Badger ... comparable to the B-47), and a solitary,
four turbo-jet heavy bomber (designated Bison ... comparable
to the B-52) . Several months later, at the July Air Show,
sixty Badgers flew over Moscow in an impressive formation-
flight.
Tn the 19 55 May and July air demonstrations, both Badgers
and Bisons flew by in several squadron-level numbers. Also,
it was at this time that the Soviets' new, multi-turbo prop
heavy bomber (designated Bear) made its first appearance, in
formation flight with the Bisons. And it was during 1955
New York Times , May 3, 1954, p. 24. In this connection,
the USSR was "no doubt encouraged by the successful flights
across the Polar route made by Scandinavian Air Services in
1954." Lee, Air Power
,
p. 25.
7Harry Schwartz, New York Times , May 3, 1954, p. 13.
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that the Soviet Union became the first power to detonate a
hydrogen bomb from an aircraft.
There were yet other demonstrations of the increasing
attention the Soviets were paying to strategic bomber
matters. In August 1953, it was reported that a vast pro-
gram was underway to provide Soviet long-range bomber
g
air bases with underground hangars and facilities. Ad-
ditionally, before the end of 19 54, the deployment of the
Soviet bomber fleet had been altered to the point where
"about sixty percent of the total Soviet air forces [were]
stationed on the Arctic Ocean, the Bering Strait, and the
9Northern Pacific, ready for transpolar flights.'" There
were, furthermore, indicators that the Soviets were stepping-
up their programs to improve the quality of their bomber
airmanship.
Efforts were made to increase proficiency in
navigation and bombing, both visually and by
instruments. The captured Norden bombs ight
was replaced by a crude electronic model.
Cross-country flights of progressively greater
range were ordered. Large-formation flights
were instituted, as well as over-water flights.
The techniques of in-flight refueling were ex-
plored. Day-in and day-out, Soviet pilots made
simulated bombing runs on U. S. cities across the
wastes of Siberia.10
p
Anthony Vandyk, "Bomber Output Gets Top Russian Pri-
ority," American Aviation , August 3, 1953, p. 13.
9 Soviet Long-Range Bomber Bases Near the North Pole ,
translated from German by Ewald W. Schnitzer, Project Rand
T-40, December 28, 1954, p. 1.




Now, clearly, the reliability of seme of these Western
reports of "signals" from the USSR must be scrutinized; and
the import of the "signals" themselves analysed within the
full context of official Soviet disclosures and statements.
Hence, it is important to note that
in the entire period from the Spring of 1954...
until the advent of Sputnik ilin October 1957']...,
the bomber played a subordinate role in Soviet
strategic claims. What was emphasized was
Soviet possession of nuclear means of mass
destruction; the means of delivering them
were generally left out of account or referred
to allusively. Military aviation was discussed...
but the progress they claimed was usually in
such areas as speed and altitude of flight
rather than range. Explicit mention of 'bombers 1
was infrequent . . . .The Soviet leaders were then
clearly banking on priority in the development
of a technologically new type of strategic -, ,
weapon to provide the basis for future claims.
That strategic weapon v/as, of course, the surface-to-
surface ballistic missile. As stated previously, there were
authoritative reports that before 19 53 the USSR began carry-
ing out firing trials of large rockets from submarines train-
ing in the Eastern Baltic. There was some evidence, moreover,
that around 19 53 the Soviets made a fundamental decision to
fix on the design of the IRBM/ICBM rocket and particularly
on the engine thrust requirements. Indeed, it was reported
that Russian successes in the IRBM/MRBM field in 1953-54 led





to the establishment in 1955 of the NATO radar-tracking sys-
12
tern in Turkey to monitor Soviet missile firings. Other
Western commentators suggested that it was likely that "the
most promising MRBM and IC3M programs were placed on a crash
basis in 19.55. The strongest evidence for this is the real-
location of scientific and technical manpower in 1955... Be-
tween July 1955 and December 1956 total employment in Soviet
research and development institutions increased by a star-
13tling twenty-three percent."
And, after all, there were a number of excellent a
priori considerations which argued for a Soviet concen-
tration on offensive missiles, even before the shift oc-
curred in the U. S.: Czarist Russia's early experimenta-
tion with rockets; the Soviet view- that missiles are (mere-
ly) extensions of artillery; their lack of extensive bomber
experience daring World War II; their harvest of German
missile scientists at Peenemunde; their non-involvement
with writing down a large existing investment in bombers;
their lack of overseas bomber bases; the influence of
12Bell, Negotiation from Strength
, p. 160.
13Lincoln P. Bloomfield, W. C. Clemens, Jr., and Frank-
lyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race : Soviet Inter-
ests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954-64 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1966), pp. 69, 42. The authors cited, for their sta-
tistics, the work of Alexander Korol, Soviet Research and




Malenkov who was believed to have been the political over-
14
seer of the Soviet missile program since 1947; and
finally, their race to get strategic advantage in view of
the comparative dominance of America's SAC, the incentives
offered by the U. S. failure to concentrate on a unified
ballistic missile program between 1950-55, and an apparent
perception that Soviet security "is adequately protected
if the Soviet armed forces have the finest weapons that
15
anybody knows how to build...." If it was, therefore,
not illogical to expect the USSR to "skip" the long-range
bomber stage of offensive systems evolution and "break-
through" to missiles, it became of critical importance to
U. S. defense policy to assess and respond as intelligently
as possible to the full gamut of Soviet strategic dis-
closures .
Juxtaposed to the evidence of a growing Soviet strategic
offensive capability, however, were the variegated "Spirit
of Geneva"-type signals which characterized the Soviet
government's foreign policy in 1955-56: The Austrian Peace
Treaty of May 14, 1955, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from that country; the simultaneous withdrawal of Russian
14See Rostow, The United States in the World Arena
, p. 29
15Freeman J. Dyson, "Defense Against Ballistic Missiles,"
BAS
, XX (June 1964) , p. 18.
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forces from Porkkala-Udd (Finland) and Port-Arthur (China)
;
the May 1955 disarmament negotiations "concessions"; the
establishment of formal Moscow-Bonn relations in September
19 55; Soviet rapprochement with Tito; the "peaceful co-
existence" doctrinal update to include the non-inevita-
bility of general war tenet; the step-up in Soviet foreign
economic assistance programs; the April 1956 dissolution
of the Cominform; a markedly defensive-oriented 1956 May
Day military demonstration; etc.
Finally, even, though "the priority given missiles over
bombers in Soviet strategic claims in the period from 19 55
to 1957 is striking", there was. General Nathan Twining'
s
report from his Moscow visit in June 1956 to consider:
"The Soviet Air Force is engaged in the development of a
surprisingly wide variety of aircraf t ... Cbutj ... nothing
17
was revealed to us in the important area of guided missiles."
1 r






"Report from Moscow," Air Force , XXXIX (August 1956),
p. 65.

Section B. Domestic Perceptions o f the Soviet Threat
With the death of Stalin in March 1953, "the initial
assumption that the Soviet regime was about to collapse or,
alternatively, that it would now C under MalenkovJ devote all
its energies to the welfare of its people encouraged a natu-
ral desire to limit military expenditures" within the United
18States. The quick fall from grace of Lavrenti Beria, re-
putedly the mastermind of the atom bonib project in the USSR,
led to further speculation that indeed the Russians' nuclear
19program had "bogged down." But these impressions were
starkly dispelled in August when the Soviet hydrogen bomb
explosion "broke the back of resistance to air defense within
20the Administration." As General Maxwell Taylor later wrote
with regard to this event in Russia, from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff perspective:
Although the Soviets were known to have exploded
an atomic device in 19 49, up to this time we had
belittled the achievement on the ground that it
was a mere explosion, not an operational weapon.
Now. . .for the first time there was a discussion
of the effect of the eventual loss of the U. S.
18Phillip E. Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics
(New York, 1960), p. 434.
19
"Defense and Strategy," Fortune , XLVII (June 1953),
p. 94.
20Steven R. Rivkin, "The Decision-Making Process for






atomic monopoly and of the possibility of an
era of mutual deterrence .1
Prior to a decision in late 1953 to launch a major
air defense effort, however, there had occurred in the U. S.
another year of delay and debate, with very little tangible
improvement in the country's ability to cope with a nuclear
attack. At the heart of the debate lay the intelligence
argument about Russian strategic strength.
The Alsops publicized widely in early 1953 their in-
telligence information which depicted an air-atomic threat
of more than 70 Tu-4's capable of carrying nuclear- laden
fighter aircraft under their. wings. The fighters would be
released from the Tu--4 at the American coastline for a low-
22level flight to the target.
Within the military community, the various intelligence
estimates placed the Soviet bomber capability at between
400-1000 Tu-4's. This fleet would be sufficient to in-
flict serious damage to the country, given an expanded
Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs. In - mid-1953, moreover,
official Air Force documents acknowledged the development
of the Soviets' long-range turbo-prop second generation
aircraft and estimated that they "would begin to produce
21
The Uncertain Trumpet (New Yo3:k, 1959), p. 25.
22See New York Herald Tribune, March 16, 1953, p. 17.
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modern heavy bombers as replacements for the Tu-4 at a very
23low rate in 1954." And, after Malenkov's August announce-
ment of the hydrogen bomb explosion, "there was little dis-
position in the Air Force ... to doubt that the Soviet Union
24had a substantial nuclear capability."
The perceptions of the Eisenhower Administration, how-
ever, were of a different hue. Secretary of Defense Charles
Wilson, before a Senate Appropriations Subcommittee in May
1953, chose to interpret the Soviets' overall air posture
in these terms: "American people should be reassured by the
Soviet concentration on fighter production as a sign that
the Russians intend to build an air force of principally
defensive capability." This statement was later described
as apparently representing the base of much of the U. S. 1
2 3See Hearings, House, Subc. of Coram, on Approps
.
, De-
partment of Defense Appropriations for 195 8 (Part 1) , 35th,
1st, March 1957, p. 1122. This aircraft presumably was that
of the May Day 1951 fly-by in Moscow which had been the "ma-
jor intelligence puzzle" of the succeeding two years. Cf
.
the following account of how the puzzle was solved: "It has
now been learned that the Tu-4 airframe has been 'stretched'
and modified for turboprop power but that the changes are
such that most of the jigs and tools used to build the orig-
inal aircraft can serve for the production of the new model.
...This significant news ... notably explains why Russia is
still building at the rate of some sixty a month what was
thought to be an obsolescent four-engine bomber, " the Tu-4.
Anthony Vandyk, "Turboprops Power Long-Range Red Bombers,"
American Aviation
,
August 31, 1953, p. 27.
24 Smith, The RAND Corporation, p. 225.
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military planning in the ensuing two years; and was defended
25by Wilson in early 1956 at the Airpoiver Hearings.
Clearly, this Administration view of the Soviet strate-
gic threat must be seen in relation to the major policy di-
lemma which faced Eisenhower upon taking office in January
19 53: to resolve the requirements for increased air defense
expenditures manifested by the Lincoln Summer Study Group
Report and NSC-141, with the new President's promises of do-
mestic "security through solvency" (balanced budget, reduced
taxes, etc.) and of ''liberation" (a toughness abroad which
seemed to require no diminishing of U. S. offensive power in
resource competition with CONAC ' s demands).
Resolution of this dilemma was delayed by a number of
bureaucratic and technical reasons^ which will be discussed
25New York Times , May 20, 1953, p. 1; and June 17, 1955,
P- 22; Air Power Hearings, p. 1757ff . It was remarked of
Secretary Wilson that "when the information has allowed him
the choice C he 3 has consistently put the minimum interpreta-
tion on Soviet air capabilities. He is fond of remarking
that 'the Russians' aren't all 40 feet tall.'" And his Depu-
ty Secretary, Roger Kyes , would often scornfully describe
service-produced intelligence as 'sales promotion stuff".
(Charles J. V. Murphy, "The New Air Situation," Fortune, LII
CSeptember 1955.1, p. 22]..) Wilson was no more impressed with
the Russian submarine threat to CONUS . See the views he ex-
pressed at a press conference on October 19, 1953: "Q. Is-
n't it just as feasible for them to attack with. .. atomic gui-
ded missiles launched from submarines off our coast? There
never seems to have been any discussion of that...." Ans
.
"Jules Verne was an amateur now compared to the things peo-
ple are writing about on this subject -- wonderful dream
weapons . " Department of Defense Minutes of Press Confer-
ences for 1953, p. 18.
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later. Indeed, the Cold War policies which were finally ar-
rived at by the Administration at the end of 1953 are all
too familiar to detail here. The "long-haul", the "new-
look" and "massive retaliation" became practically household
words whose implications were themselves debated widely and
vigorously for years. Nevertheless, a brief mention of them
is warranted.
The "long-haul" view of the Soviet threat (which re-
placed the former "crisis year" approach) symbolized the de-
sire for stability' in U. S. foreign and defense policy and
minimized the significance of the traditional bases for the
determination of military requirements: enemy capabilities
and U. S. commitments. The threat thus envisaged would con-
tinue essentially at the current level and would not counter-
balance U. S. strategic superiority until at least the end
of the decade. The "new look" meant basically that U. S.
military policy-makers would now be authorized to lay plans
wherein nuclear weapons (including tactical nuclears, atomic
cannon, and the soon-to-be-developed nuclear air defense wea-
pons) would be released for operational use under a wide va-
riety of contingencies. Firepower, hence, would substitute
26 See Snyder, "The 'New Look 1 of 1953," in Schilling,
Hammond, and Snyder, Strategy, Politics . .
.
, pp. 474-475; and
Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Pro-
grams in National Politics (New York, 1961)




for manpower. Finally, the "massive re taliation" doctrine
was interpreted variously, but a determined effort to im-
prove U. S. air defense would appear to be a requirement of
the doctrine if it were to be a credible deterrent and if
the U. S. wished to minimize the risks of having its inten-
tions (to retaliate massively) probed.
How did the USSR bomber fly-by "signals" in mid-19 5 4
affect these perceptions of the Soviet threat? The display
of the twin-turbojet Badger, while impressive in formation
flight, was not strategically startling. The U. S. had
known that the Soviets were concentrating thei.r nuclear de-
livery system efforts upon a 'jet light-bomber and this medium
range bomber. Even the Badger was considered a primary threat
only to Europe since, unrefuelled, it could not strike most
continental U. S. targets and return home. And U. S. officials
were confident (although puzzled) that the Soviets were quite
laggard in their in-flight refueling development to extend
27the Badger's range. However, the solitary, four-turbo- jet
,
heavy Bison bomber which v/as displayed on May Day was
27 See Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, October 11, 1953,
p. 33 and March 4, 1955, p. 10. "Not until 1955... did an
article appear in the Soviet press describing aerial re-
fueling as an essential component of an intercontinental
bombing system, and not until 1957 did the Soviet Union
demonstrate a bomber refueling capability in practice."
Herbert S. Dinners tein, War and The Soviet Union: Nuclear
Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political
Thinking (New York, 19 59)~7~P^ 2~3(K
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unheralded, unexpected, and frightening with its sleek, in-
tercontinental-range power.
The general reaction in the U. S. to this potentially
significant increase in the Soviets 1 offensive capability
was to debate on precisely the word "potentially." Was the
Bison a single prototype or did it represent the deliberate
disclosure of a major USSR investment in strategic air-atom-
ic weapons systems? Was its display intended simply to re-
assure Soviet allies and the domestic population during a
politically unsettled period in the USSR? Or was it meant
to intimidate the U. S. and its trans-Atlantic" allies who
controlled SAC ' s most important overseas bases? Or, was it
none of these reasons? Could the display basically repre-
sent a self-interested Soviet attempt to correct what was
perceived to be a Western underestimation of the state of
USSR military security? How did the Bison shape up against
the American B-52 (which was only in the production stage)
;
and should the USAF begin laying plans for a new bomber?
There were those who, remembering the unexpectedly large
numbers of fighters which the Soviets put into combat in
2 8Korea, were predisposed to exaggerate the display. There
2 8General Twining reportedly characterized this Moscow
disclosure as "a more important milestone than the knowledge
of the first Soviet atomic bomb explosion." C. J. V. Mur-




were others -- like Secretary Wilson ---- who suspected a
Twentieth Century version of Potemkin Village, designed to
scare the U. S. into reckless expenditures. There were even
those who wondered how all this affected America's air de-
fense program, just beginning to get "off the ground."
These questions were confounded by the long-range
ballistic missile factor which was being introduced into
U. S. appraisals of the air threat at this time. The U. S.
long range missile program had been essentially dropped
around 1949 because of the requirements of accuracy, guidance
systems problems, and excessive warhead weights. But the
hydrogen device test, plus other significant technological
progress in 1952, changed the picture, and research was re-
opened vigorously within all services in 1953. Despite pub-
lished reports that "the more the scientists examine the tech-
nical problems involved in intercontinental missile develop-
ment, the more distant the era of push-button war becomes in
29their minds," there were indications of real Soviet pro-
gress in this field. Hence, Soviet successes with MRBM's
in 1953-54 led to the setting-up of the NATO radar-tracking
system in Turkey to monitor their missile firings.
29Ralph E. Lapp and Stuart Alsop, "We Can Smash the Red
A-Bombers," Saturday Evening Post , March 21, 1953,' p. 86.
See also Rear Admiral D. V. Gallery, USN, "Don't Get Hyster-




There seemed to be some concern with Soviet long-range
missile development outside of the Administration, also. For
example, with regard to the 19 52 Lincoln Summer Study Group,
it was later testified that "the purpose of the Summer Study
was simply this. We knew that the Russian threat to the
continent might grow in a variety of ways ... including ballistic
missiles ... and we wanted to see whether the kind of air de-
fense planning that was going on... within Lincoln was approp-
riate to the growing threat."
As far as can be determined, there was only one major
action taken by the U. S. in 19 5 4 more or less in response
to the above Soviet bomber and missile signals. On May 14,
1954, the Air Force gave the "highest possible priority" to
the rapid development of an ICBM capability. This required
the USAF to augment its strictly limited R&D funds to the
extent that work on the advanced, long-range, all-weather
interceptor to support the investment in the DEW line had to
be immediately stopped, and that work on the DEW line and the
31SAGE system was delayed in 1955.
30
Dr. Zacharias 1 testimony, In The Matter of J. Robert
Qppenheimer
, Hearings before the Personnel Security Board,
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, April 1954, p. 923ff.
31Testimony of Trevor Gardner (Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for R&D) and Donald Quarles (Secretary of the Air




Such a decision regarding ICBM development could, of
course, have represented "not a response forced by desper-
ation but rather by an objective appraisal of the operational
. . . 32feasibilities.' 1 Further, one could already detect in 1954
an incipieiit disenchantment with bomber defense programs
(criticized as being almost "still-born") which would rise
to a crescendo in the U. S. after Sputnik. For example,
Senator Symington spoke out thusly before the Senate on
July 21, 1954:
Within a few years it will be possible to de-
liver atomic and hydrogen weapons by long-range
intercontinental ballistic missiles ... .The
elaborate and expensive .systems of radar de-
fense we are being urged to build would be
utterly useless against... a missile barrage
tand3...no workable method of intercepting or
deflecting them has been devised, even in
theory. 33
Nevertheless, what is important for our present purposes is
to underscore the fact that U. S. perceptions of the Soviet
threat in 1954 still resulted in a response made at the ex-
pense of certain approved bomber defense programs
.
This is not to suggest that the Air Force > itself,
32
C. J. V. Murphy, "Defense: The Revolution Gets
Revolutionary," Fortune , LIII (May 1956), p. 248. See,
also, General N. F. Twining, USAF (Ret.), Neither Liberty
Nor Safety: A Hard Look At U. S. Military Policy and "
Strategy (New York, 1966), p. 302ff.
33
Congressional Record, 100, 11159.
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continued to view nuclear bombs only as "one-way" weapons -~
to be used exclusively by SAC. Nor did it appear to con-
sider the present bomber threat to have been eclipsed by
the uncertain future ICBM threat. Indeed, 1954 was a year
of relative desperation within the Air Force. It was clearly
recognized that the Soviets 1 atomic stockpile was continually
growing, and, augmented by its H-bomb program, had been
magnified a thousand fold in potential destructive power.
The Air Force had also received in mid-year the completed
RAND study of its SAC basing system which formally con-
cluded that
a growing Russian defense has forced us to the
use of high-performance, short-radius bombers.
At the same time, an increasing Russian offensive
power will compell us to keep as much as we can
of the vulnerable part of our strategic complex
a long distance from the enemy's bombers. In such
a world, a system for basing our bombers at home
within the cover of our radar network and extending
range to target by means of dispersed overseas re-
fueling stations appears to be important for a
large part of our strategic task.^4
Furthermore, in 1954-55 there were published reports
that "the great interest recently shown by the Red Air Force
in developing bases on Sakhalin Island (8 have been built
there) seems to have been a sudden awareness of the utility
of the jet stream." This jet-stream "presents almost a
Albert J. Wohls tetter , et al
.
,
Selection and Use of
Strategic Air Bases (RAND R-266), April 1954, pp. 371-372.

96
tailor-made course for the enemy if he wanted to employ it
35to attack the U. S. through the soft underbelly." As. a
result of all these developments in 1954 (even though- air
defense progress was rather substantial' fhat year), hope was
given up, for the most part, of preventing enormous damage
to the continent should surprise attack come. Hence, by
January 19 55 y the "important question" the new CONAD com-
mand was trying to answer was "not how high a percentage of
enemy planes can be shot down but how much destruction com-
pressed in a brief period the country can stand and still
keep going.
It was also at about this time that the USAF "picked-
up" (if only tentatively) the long-standing Soviet signals
of a counterforce strategic targeting doctrine. As the Chief
of Staff, General Twining, stated in February 1955: "It is
rny theory that our SAC force would be the number one target
37for the Russians to attack." Yet, as will 'be shown later,
this perception did not immediately lead to the concerted
35American Aviation , October 11, 1954, p. 29; and E. M.
Miller, "Red Stars on the Jet Stream," Air Force, XXXVIII
(July 1955)
, p. 38.
BAS, XI (January 1955)
,
p. 38.
37Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Depart-
ment of the Air Force Appropriations for 1956 , 84th, 1st,
February 1955, p. 35. (Italics added.)
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deployment of active air defense protection for SAC com-
plexes. This relative inattention to the security of the
U. S. second-strike strategic force is all the more striking
in view of the concurrent Soviet doctrinal outpourings which
revealed an increased appreciation of the importance of
"surprise" and "pre-emption."
Now, admittedly, such new Russian military thought could
be (and was) disparately interpreted. On the one hand, the
increased appreciation of these factors in v/arfare was seen
as truly representing an attempted readjustment of the
Soviet military posture to its new long-range attack pos- .
sibilities, and a warning to the West that the USSR would
indeed "strike a pre-emptive blow against the cunning of
aggressors" if it had to. But the doctrine was also inter-
preted to imply simply an overconfidence in the Soviet ability
to receive warning of attack, and a lack of confidence in
38
the adequacy of its offensive force to effect retaliation.
However interpreted, it is revealing that as late as 1958
the principal effect of any Soviet "First-Blow" doctrine on
U. S. strategy could still be reported to be the increased
importance of SAC ' s overseas bases as a complicating factor
3 8For the former view, see Harry Schwartz, New York
Times, June 20, 1955, p. 1; for the latter, H. S. Dinnerstein,
nrSbviet Military Posture as a Reflection of Strategy," in
Eugene M. Emme (ed.), The Impact of Air Power: National
Security and World Politics (Princeton, 1959), pp. 559-560.

98
to a pre-emptive attack -- not the increased importance of
39
active protection for SAC ' s continental bases.
There seems little doubt that such considerations of
active air defense requirements were essentially muffled in
1955-56 by the "bomber gap" debate which then dominated U. S.
national security discussions. And it was the Moscow air
shows of May and July 19 5 5 which triggered the debate.
Both Badgers and Bisons flew-by in several squadron-
level numbers. Especially distressing to Western observers,
also, was the first appearance of a multi-turbo-prop heavy
Bear bomber. Since it flew in formation with the Bison and
revealed good tanker characteristics, the "appalling" hy-
pothesis was developed that the Bear would refuel the 3ison
and thus give the Soviets a continuous two-way intercontinental
mission capability. Furthermore, the appearance of radar
bulges on the Badgers' fuselage was an "alarming develop-
ment" which upped U. S. estimates of Soviet electronic
sophistication
.
There was very little delay in response to this signal
from the USSR. With regard to the Bison, General Twining
39 See "Why Soviets Plan a 'First Blow'", U. S. News
and World Report, February 7, 1958, p. 65ff
.
Murphy, Fortune , LII (September 1955), p. 218.




said he had now seen "enough that we have to accept the fact
42that they're m production." There was, in addition, a
sharp upward revision of American estimates of Soviet bomber
production capacities, as a result of a test problem submitted
to a group of U. S. aircraft manufacturers after the Moscow
displays. The test seemed to furnish proof that a four year
Bison design-to-production cycle was within the Soviet
4 3
capability, v/hereas the B-52 cycle had consumed eight years.
3y mid-May the Senate was preparing an inquiry on U. S. air
power and the Air -Force was ordering an increase in B-52
production from twelve to seventeen a month.
The proponents of increased U. S. air-atomic counter-
force as the principal response to the USSR threat repeated
relentlessly throughout 1955-56 that the Soviets either had
overtaken the U. S., or could overtake the U. S., in all
4 4
categories of warplanes except that of the medium jet bomber;
that with present plans and production schedules, "in 1959
they will have approximately twice the number of heavy bombers
that the USAF will have"; and that America had thus lost
42New York Times , May 20, 19 55, p. 7.
See Murphy, Fortune , LII (September 1955), pp. 87;
222-223.
44
See, e.g., statement of General Twining, Hearings,
House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department of Defens e
impropriations for 1957, 84th, 2nd, February 1956, p. 759.
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It has been suggested that the appearance of the Soviets 1
"pre-emptive" war doctrine in 1955 provided a rationalized
basis for the apparent USAF shift to a counterforce strategy
46
at this time. For it could be argued that Soviet advocates
of pre-emption required a substantial buildup of their heavy
bomber fleet (not simply the capability to do so) if it were
to be a credible strategy — and, hence, the U. S. needed
to spawn now a large second-strike force of its own.
Additionally, it should be noted that a significant
factor in the USAF ' s pleas for more offense at this time in-
volved its requirement for more tanker aircraft to serve
B-47's which, due to the advanced Soviet bombers and de-
creased warning time, could no longer be expected to be
47flown overseas to operate during war.
45Testimony of General John P. McDonnell, USAF, Air
Power Hearings, p. 174. Cf . the "rebuttal" to this latter
point that "because of our fascination with mass bombing,
insufficient attention has ... hindered progress in intelli-
gence and reconnaissance on Soviet military targets." Colonel
Richard S. Leghorn, USAFR, "No Need to Bomb Cities to Win
War," U. S. News and World Report , January 28, 1955, p. 87.
46 See, e.g., George E. Lowe, The Age of Deterrence
(Boston, 1964), p. lOOff.




And, moreover, to the commentators who pointed to the
contribution made by U. S. naval aircraft to America's overall
air-atomic strength, General Twining replied: •
If I was assured when we wanted to attack Russia
on a strategic mission that the naval carriers
were assigned to General LeMay , . . . fine . But,
that is not the case and I don't know where these
carriers are going to be... so the SAC -has to be
just as big, just as strong and just, as ready,
regardless of this Navy contribution . 48
These arguments for an increased strategic offense,
however, were based fundamentally upon quantitative compari-
sons of USAF versus Soviet aircraft, and tended to obscure
some important considerations. First, the Air Force's own
B-52 program was lagging -- not simply because of some mali-
cious distortion of the U. S.' Soviet intelligence -- but
because of an electrical system component failure which
fo.rced SAC to reject approximately 40 percent of the aircraft
49produced up to May 19 56. Secondly, the overwhelming at-
tention paid to the manned heavy bomber threat delayed general
U. S. appreciation of the rapidly growing Soviet naval threat -
50both submarines and aircraft — and missile • threat, to
48Air Power Hearings, p. 1840.
49
P. Peeters, Massive Retaliation: The Policy and Its
Critics (Chicago, 1959), pp. 135-136.
50E.g., Senator Symington at the Air Powe r Hearings:
"I only learned in these hearings that the Soviets had three
to four thousand naval airplanes." (p. 1372.)
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which an overall air defense posture must adjust. For our
immediate purposes, the most interesting aspect of the
"bomber-gap" debate in 1955-56 was its almost total disre-
gard for the effects of comparative air defense postures on
the overall air power situation (in both the pre-attack and
post-attack environments), and its minimal attention to the
present or future deficiencies in CONAD.
Why was this? Probably the simplest explanation for
the disregard of the air defense factor in the air power
equation is that the vocal debaters just did not think air
defense mattered. The Soviets had displayed forty-eight new,
supersonic day fighters and fifty new, advanced all-weather
interceptors at their July 19 55 air show to augment their
already considerable deployment of defensive systems. But
General Twining in early 1956 could still dismiss this capa-
bility with a perfunctory, "SAC continues to have the ability
51
to get through." Furthermore, even when USAF sympathizers
manifested a respect for Soviet defenses their arguments
quickly lapsed into a reinforcement of the center-stage
battle for more SAC planes: "With the Soviet advance in
fighters, the SAC might have to go back to large defensive
51Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Depart-




52formations."' For the U. S. defense posture, the GONAD
commander, at the Air Power Hearings, testified that "we
now have a good system to fight the Tu-4" but that operational
U. S. fighters had neither the speed nor altitude to inter-
cept the Bison (pp. 252, 244) . And, after all, the Bison
v/as the principal villain of the "bomber-gap"; so how could
CONAD really matter in the airpower calculation?
One other consideration which affected the role of air
defense in the 19 55-56 "bomber-gap" debate bears mentioning
briefly at this point: The bitter USAF-USA rivalry over
ground-to-air missiles which was then bubbling beneath the
surface. The Army at this time was convinced (albeit not
very vocally) that its operational Nike-Ajax missile had a
good capability against the Bison. The Air Force, however,
was conducting staff studies to demonstrate the unsuitability
of the Nike for continental defense and the greater potential
of the Talos missile which it hoped to develop in a similar
role. It seems likely, therefore, that the Air Force was
reluctant to engage in a frank and open discussion of the
CONAD posture (even if they felt it did matter) for fear
of generating Army comment on Nike, and until the Air Staff
52Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips, USA (Ret.),
"The Growing Power of the Soviet Air Force," Reporter , June
30, 1955, p. 18.
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53had marshalled all its arguments for the Tales.
Now the Air Power Hearings in the Spring of 19 56 proved
to be an important forum for illuminating some principal
U. S. air defense deficiencies, and occasioned a re-examin-
ation of the future evolution of the system. Yet it is sig-
nificant that the $900 million in additional defense funds
that were appropriated during the Hearings were intended pri-
marily for more B-52's, KC-135 tanker aircraft, and ICBM/
IRBM research. It is equally revealing to note also that
after all the months of testimony on Airpower , the Senate
report of the Hearings essentially dismissed the question of
"air defense power" with the single, hackneyed statement:
5 4
"The best defense against air attack is a strong offense.""
__
Hence, the Nike-Talos dispute did not break fully in-
to the open until May 1956. (See Anthony Leviero, New York
Times
, May 21, 1956, p. 1; and May 29, 1956, p. 12.)
—
A. fur-
ther complication here was the fact that the services were
also engaged in other, more fundamental rivalries at this
time. The Army was against the massive retaliation doctrine,
while the Air Force and Navy debated the vulnerability of the
Forrestal-Class carrier and its role in strategic bombing.
These rivalries were described as "more acute and far-reach-
ing" than any since 19 49 (A. Leviero, New York Time s, May 19,
1956, p. 1); and, once again, air defense problems took a
back seat at the services' major staff levels. Finally, Sec-
retary Wilson's extraordinary press conference in May where-
in all the service Chiefs disavowed the nasty, staff studies;
plus Wilson's later threat ("Let's see who sticks his head
up next. I think it might be a little dangerous") , must have
had the effect of dampening further the frank discussion of
air defense missile power throughout the remainder of the year
54Airpowe r, Rept. of Subc. of Comm. on Armed Services,
S. Doc. 29, 85th, 1st, January 25, 1957. p. 6.
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Throughout 1955 and 1956, a counterpoint ran uneasily
beneath the Air Force's vociferous pleas for more strategic
aircraft. The theme was a dual one: there was no bomber
gap today, but there may be a ballistic-missile gap tomorrow.
From either end, it augured poorly for any air defense ef-
fort on other than an "orderly basis with phased increases
55in forces and facilities."
A budget-minded Administration proferred the first half
of the theme. In mid-May 1955, Eisenhower professed public-
ly real doubts that the USSR had a lead in airpower; Secre-
tary Wilson, in April 1956, was "sure that the Russians
showed us purposely all Cthe Bisonsl they had"; and in be-
tween time there were continued calls to adjust the economy
56
and the military for the "long-haul."
To be precise, the Administration never explicitly de-
nied that the USSR might possibly be ahead in heavy bomber
capability and potential. Its public argument was that the.
gap evaporates when USN and Allied offensive airpower contri-
57butions are counted. Of course, the government privately
55Admiral Arthur W. Radford's phrase to describe the
modus operandi of the major air defense buildup embodied in
NSC-162 in the Fall of 1953. (Speech delivered before the
National Press Club, December 14, 1953. Reprinted in Vital
Speeches , XX CJanuary 19541, p. 172.) See pp. 128-138~below
56New York Times , May 19, 19 55, p. 1; Air Power
Hearings, p. 1761.
57See, e.g., Secretary Wilson's testimony, Air Power
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may have had real confidence in 1954-56 -- based on its
intelligence products --- that the Soviets were not intending
to build a bomber fleet nearly so large as SAC ' s alone. . There
is some evidence that this is the opinion they were receiving
5 8from the JCS . Moreover, the well-publicized USAF intelli-
gence estimates of Soviet Bison bomber production capability
were apparently known within the Administration to be up-
59
wardly biased.
The Administration, however, did not bring the "bomber-
gap" to the public by revealing to it in any detail the actual
degree of U. S. vulnerability to Soviet bomber- attack (the
oft called-for "Operation Candor"). In short, the government
did not talk extensively about USSR strategic capabilities.
Hearings^ p. 16 85ff. Note that the Administration, also,
did not publicly interject the air defense factor into the
airpower equation.
58
See the testimony of Admiral Radford, -Hearings, Senate,
Subc. of Comm. on Government Operations, Organizing for Nation -
al Security (Vol. 1, Part V) , 86th, 2nd, June 1960, p. 682.
59 .
"...the earlier estimates given to the Committee L'on
Armed Services!] by the Air Force sources deliberately took
the highest of the estimates for Soviet production of Bison
bombers, rather than the average; that is, the 'policy'
officials eliminated certain phrases with which the profes-
sional intelligence specialists had qualified their apprais-
als. ... " (Timothy W. Stanley, "Congressional Investigations
and National Security: A Study of Legislative -Executive
Relations in the Area of Foreign and Military Policies, 1947-




From one perspective, it can be said that the U. S. chose
thereby not to let the Soviets know whether they were getting
away with a bluff of their offensive strength. For there is
an old military doctrine that "security is a delaying action",
which implies that it is only knowledge of the very new
developments (e.g., Soviet hydrogen bombs, Bison bombers)
which are worth trying to keep secret. From another point
of view, it appears that the Eisenhower Administration was
deeply motivated by the desire to avoid a general American
public obsession with nuclear war destx'uctiveness . As one
commentator expressed this notion:
Eisenhower has conducted his foreign policy on
the theory that the only way of avoiding another
world war, aside from simply remaining strong,
is for the U. S. to set an example of self-con-
trol calculated to lower the world's fever... He
believes that unless the war talk stops, unless
the U. S. sets an example of national calmness,
the world may be set blindly on the path of war. 6
And, of course, there were also the Conservative Republican
domestic economic pressures and the international "Spirit-
of-Geneva" considerations which must have affected the
government's strategic perspective.
Whatever the complex of economic, military, and psycho-
political factors involved in the Administration's perceptions
C. J. V. Murphy, "The White House Since Sputnik,"





of the Soviet threat, the Basic National Security Policy
(3NSP) paper which was developed in January 1955 gave rec-
ognition for the first time to the possibility of a Soviet-
American relationship of mutual deterrence; and by 19 56 the
government had apparently accepted the concept of a "suf-
ficient deterrent."
It has been suggested that "quite possibly it was the
increasing effectiveness of continental defense rather than
the continued predominance of strategic airpower which the
Administration saw as the principal counterbalance to the
future strength of the Soviet strategic air force." How-
ever, the Administration appeared to see less clearly that
the burgeoning Soviet long-range missile program could pos-
sibly soon render these defenses essentially useless. Per-
haps the bureaucratization and interservice competition
which characterized the United States' long-range missile
R&D efforts at this time, of itself, precluded a more objec-
tive appraisal of the USSR ICBM/IRBM program. Too, it seems
Taylor, The Uncertai n Trumpet
,
p. 26; Huntington, The
Common Defense
, p. 10 Off.
r •y
Huntington, p. 78.
The U. S. missile program was described by Senator
Symington as having "the most complicated organizational
structure C he 3 ever heard of before, either in business or
in government...." Air Power Hearings, p. 655.
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that most of the warnings of such a potential Soviet threat
in 1955-56 were content to urge a step-up in the U. S.
ICBM/IRBM program in response -- and made little reference
to the missiles' effects upon the evolving American air de-
64fense posture. It was not until July 1956, henceforth,
that negotiations commenced with Canada for "joint collab-
oration in the study of methods and procedures" for dealing
6 5
with a defense against the ICBM.
In any event, Eisenhower in February 1956 "cautioned
against inflating" the importance of these ocean-spanning
monsters which cannot be controlled after the beginning of
their flight and would have to be used in large numbers."
And the Administration here again chose not to be candid
with the American public regarding Soviet offensive missile
advances. It was left to a U . S. technical publication to
break the story in late 1957 of how the government had been
using extremely powerful long-range radar and other equipment
64 iFor example, one of the most widely cited warnings
was made by Senator Henry Jackson in a speech on the Senate
floor February 1, 1956 (Cong. Rec. 102, 1763ff.), in which
he exhorted the country to give "wartime urgency" to U. S.
offensive missile programs, but made nary a mention of
anti-bomber (or anti-missile) defenses.
Testimony of Prime Minister Diefenbacker , HANSARD,
Session 1957-58, Vol. II, November 13, 1957, p. 1060.
66Quoted in BAS , XII (April 1956), p. 137.
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based in Turkey to monitor Russian missile firings since the
Summer of 19 55.
Finally, it should be noted that ~- while the Soviets'
IRBM/MRBM test center had been located by U-2 aircraft in
mid-1956 -- it was not until the eacly Summer of 1957 that
6 8their Tyura Tarn ICBM range was found. For an Administra-
tion otherwise predisposed toward stable, long-range air de-
fense programming, therefore, this intelligence "mystery"
could act to muffle any impetus for systems reorientation to
meet the new ballistic missile threat. It required, indeed,
the trauma of a Sputnik to do this.
Let us then turn at this point to an examination of the
development of the U. S. air defense posture during the early
Eisenhower years.
"How the U. S. Taps Soviet Missile Secrets," Aviation
Week and Space Technology
, October 21, 19 57, pp. 26-27.
6 8According to C. J. V. Murphy, "Khrushchev's Paper
Bear," Fortune
, LXX (December 1964), p. 227.

Section C. The Build-up of the U. S. Air Defense Posture
1. Roles and Missions
Through a series of voluntary interservice agreements,
the three service components of the U. S. air defense forces
were --- until September 1954 -- assigned to the USAF ' s Air
Defense Command for wartime operations. During peacetime
they remained under the control of their particular service
chief. Whatever recognition there may have been of the de-
ficiencies of such an arrangement, the services just could
not agree on an improved command organization. However, with
the Administration's decision in late 19 53 to build-up con-
siderably its continental defenses, pressures to reconcile
such interservice differences grew.
As a result, on September 1, 19 54, the Continental Air
Defense Command (CONAD) was established as a joint command
directly under the JCS , with the USAF serving as the execu-
tive agency. General Benjamin Chidlaw, the Air Force's ADC
commander, received a "second-hat" as CINC-CONAD. Navy and
Army officers were assigned to his staff and reported di-
rectly to him instead of to their own service chiefs. Such
an organizational change was obviously designed to give the
air defense commander maximum access to defensive weapons in
a maximum number of places, to provide essential unification
of authority and segregation of responsibilities, and, con-




The establishment of CONAD did not, however, resolve
all of the organizational problems within the air defense
community. General Chidlaw still did not have command over
the administrative, logistical, supply, training, and per-
sonnel aspects of . his component service organizations. There
was still no single commander for all of the Navy's air
defense forces. The Army's Antiaircraft Command (ARAACOM)
was still suffering the "in-house" problems that resulted
from its subordinated standing within that service. As one
colonel described it: "The anti-aircraft defense has a
tortured command structure, hard to describe and harder to
live with, which has little discernible correspondence with
any element of the Air Force, and no clearly stated relation-
69
ship with the rest of the U.S. Army." But the principal
organizational problems involved the Army-Air Force frictions
which the creation of CONAD had, indeed, exacerbated.
An Army spokesman later wrote that the Army had been
"forced to accept" the CONAD arrangement in 1954. He went
on to detail the problems generated through 1956 by the in-
creased authority of its commander, and suggested that "a
great deal of the fault for the muddle has been the Army's
69Colonel Bernard Thielen, USA, "Guardian of Our Air
Frontier," Army Combat Forces Journal, V (April 1955), p. 16.
Apropos to this problem, it is revealing to note that it was
not until January 1955 that the "Anti-Aircraft Association"
was enabled to merge with the "Association of the U. S. Army,"
the USA's journalistic medium.
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70past failure to recognize where all this was leading.' 1
The primary complaints included the filling of all key. staff
positions with Air Force officers, the pressures upon
ARAACOM to abolish AAA operations centers, the denial of
equipment -to them, and CINC-CONAD ' s attempts to throw out
the Army's Missile Master (the new Nike ground control
system scheduled for initial operational capability in
1957) and replace it with the Air Force's SAGE control
system (initial test segments of which had been placed in
71
operation in April 1956.)
From the Army perspective, its tensions with the Air
Force were explained basically by the successful deployment
of the Army's Nike-Ajax missile system (operational since
1953) and the concomitant failure of the Air Force's Bomarc
missile to develop as rapidly (the first Bomarc would not be
deployed until September 1959) . As the Army put it, "The
fighter aircraft was no longer the most effective air defense
72
weapon." Furthermore, the advances in surface-to-air
missilery complicated the basic distinction between point
70Jonathan Carmen ("pseud".), "The Air Defense Muddle,"
Army, VII (February 1957), p. 44. Carmen was supposedly











defense and area defense missions under which the services
had been implicitly operating since 19 4 8. As the Army pro-
gressed with developmental work on SAMs with ranges greater
than the Nike-Ajax's, it threatened the Air Force's area-
defense programs.
All of these issues came to a head at the close of the
1955-56 "bomber gap" debate, and Defense Department direc-
tives ensued which attempted their resolution. In June
1956, plans to integrate the SAGE and Missile Master systems
were ordered. At the same time, however, CINC-CONAD was
given authority to centralize the control of air defense
forces, including the assignment of individual antiaircraft
73batteries to designated targets. In September 1956, CONAD
and ADC split into two commands at a single headquarters,
with ADC a component command on a level with ARAACOM; and an
increase in the number of Army and Navy officers on the
.
. 74joint staffs became required.
Finally, on November 26, 1956, Secretary Wilson issued a
policy memorandum which articulated for the first time the
difference between the services' air defense missions. The Ar-
my v/as explicitly assigned the "point defense" mission which




The Army still complained in February 1957, however,
that the Air Force continued to fill all key positions. See
Carmen, Army, VII (February 1957), p. 45.
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was defined as involving a system whole ly dependent upon
the radars and the missiles located at the defended point
(AAA-Nike CTalos] -Missile Master). The Air Force was given
the "area defense" mission defined as that which involves
a system wholely dependent upon an integrated net of radars
75(fighters-Bomarc-SAGE) . According to his later Congres-
sional testimony, Wilson also included a 100 mile horizontal
range limitation in his definition of point defense. He
justified this limitation by stating: "There is a great
feeling on the part of the Air Force with its manned bombers
and interceptors that the Army may shoot our own planes down.
As will be seen later, these directives did not com-
pletely eliminate the interservice organizational/roles and
missions problems which had been haunting U. S. air defense
for years. It seems likely, moreover, that these problems
within the U. S. military served to divert attention from
the even more awesome problems of the command and control of
75The memorandum was directed to the members of the Armed
Forces Policy Council and was entitled "Clarification of Roles
and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the
Department of Defense." The text appears in the New York
Times , November 27, 1956, p. 22. In point of fact, it was the
Air Force's attempts to develop a point defense missile (the
land-based Talos) and the ensuing Congressional pressure on
DOD to choose between the Talos and Nike that precipitated
this memo. See pp. 135-138 below.
Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Depart-
ment o f Defense Appropriations for 1958 (Part 1) , 85th, 1st,





all the air defense forces of the North American continent.
As late as June 1955, the Royal Canadian Air Force had to
suggest that the problem of a unified command for all of the
77
continent's air defense forces must be confronted. General
Partridge, CINC-CONAD, at the 1956 Air Power Hearings spot-
7 8lighted this organizational deficiency; and, almost simul-
taneously, the JCS and Canadian chiefs met on May 14, 1956,
and referred the question of an integrated air defense sys-
79tem to a joint study group. It was not until the latter
part of 1957, however, that the North American Air Defense
o QCommand (NORAD) was finally established.
Finally, a few words about USAF-National Guard re-
lationships during this period. The splendid performance
77
• See Conant, The Long Polar Watch, p. 44.
78
"Canada runs its own defenses; Northeast Air Command
runs its own defenses; Alaska does; and so on." (p. 2 42.)
79Testimony of Defense Minister G. W. Pearkes , HANSARD,
Session 1957-8, Volume II, p. 1928.
80
This delay in the establishment of NORAD was also
due to domestic Canadian politics. The Liberal Party --
in power from 1935-1957 -- had been intent since 1948 on
keeping Canada closely allied to NATO and was opposed to
any excessive dependence on the U. S. within a formal air
defense organization. When Diefenbacker ' s Conservative
government v/as established in June 19 57, a NORAD agreement
was greatly facilitated. In this connection, the RCAF had
apparently been a consistently vocal proponent of a NORAD-
type organization ever since the early post-war years. See
Leslie Roberts, There Shall Be Wings: A History of the
Royal Canadian Air Force (Toronto, 1959), p. 276.
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of the ANG pilots during the Korean conflict, plus the cre-
ation in 1953 of an Air Force Division within the National
Guard Bureau, did much to soften the earlier apprehensions and
antagonisms. Moreover, the issue of the ready-availability
of the state-controlled ANG units had died by 1957. For,
at that time, "the governors of every s Late. and territory
[had] approved procedures whereby a button pushed to alert
the nation's defenses [ would] also alert the fighter squad-
O "]
rons of the... ANG."
2. Systems Resear ch, Development
,
and Procurement
The resolution of Eisenhower's dilemma of the NSC-141-
recommended air defense expenditures versus his campaign
promises of "security with solvency" and "liberation" was
hampered by various bureaucratic a'nd technical factors
.
These factors had coalesced during 1953 to preclude a de-
cision for the extensive development and procurement of air
defense systems until late in that year.
First of all, Eisenhower had been "nettled" in January
1953 to find that the NSC-141 recommendations had not been
o 2
carefully priced, nor screened and coordinated by the JCS
.
Additionally, the Lincoln Summer Study Group's report had been
8 Hatch, Air Force, XL (February 1957), p. 66.
82
C. J. V. Murphy, "The Eisenhower Shift (Part II),"
Fortune, LIII (March 1956), p. 230.
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essentially ignored within the Administration in early 1953
due to the secrecy which surrounded the projects, the budgetary
prohibitions, and even because of its distinctly academic and
o o
theoretical flavor.
There was also the growing rift in 19 53 between the Air
Force and some of the Lincoln scientists which hampered a
more timely, vigorous appraisal of the Summer Study Group's
recommendations -- a rift which had grown since 19 49 as it
moved from a debate on the H-bomb, to tactical nuclear weapons,
and now to air defense. The Gray Board's Oppenheimer Hear-
ings in 19 5 4 revealed in some detail how the UjSAF ' s chief
scientist had reportedly attempted to "sabotage" Project
Lincoln from the start, and how the "Big Bomber" Generals
propagandized Lincoln's findings as a "Maginot Line" phil-
84
osophy. • Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, also, stated later that
"many efforts were made C within the aimed force sj to suppress
the findings of the Lincoln Summer Study and. little effort
o c
was made to demonstrate how the ideas might work out."
This rift was exacerbated, so it seems, by the U. S.
journalistic emphasis on the more dramatic aspects of the
33
H. Baldwin, New York Times, June 26, 1953, p. 6.
84
.1:1 The Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer,... , pp . 75 4-
768; 926ff.
8 5Memorandum to R. Walter Riehlman cited in footnote
71 on p. 48 above.
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Summer Study proposals. For example, a widely cited
scenario appeared in the Saturday Evening Pest in March
19 53 which described in the following terms the sequence
of events to assure "85-95 percent destruction" if the
Summer Study's "$20 billion plan" were put into operation:
The very-early-warning net immediately re-
veals the first approach of the Soviet at-
tacking force. By instant and automatic
communication links, the whole American ADC
is alerted, while every major target city in
the U. S. is warned of the danger. 3y pre-
arranged plan, the whole defensive force is
then brought to bear on the invaders. The
enemy bombers are tracked by radar through-
out the thousands of miles from the Northern
warning net to the targets. Hour after hour,
the invading aircraft are repeatedly attacked
by radar-equipped all-weather fighters, firing
air-to-air missiles which twist and turn after
the invading bombers; by pilotless aircraft
which can be made, if necessary, to ram the
intruders; and by guided, target-seeking
missiles of intermediate range. Those in-
truding aircraft which survive this fatal
gauntlet are then attacked on the approaches
to the cities themselves, by missiles like the
deadly Nike, whose crews have been alerted to
their task hours before. And the planes
which do get through, hit cities whose people
have received ample warning to take cover or
even to leave the danger area. °
There was also a published account that the Summer Study
Group expected that "swarms of interceptor aircraft, nestling
in fleets of huge transports on perpetual patrol, would





presumably engage the oncoming bombers." As such reports
could obviously gull the public into believing that the
technical resources for a near perfect air defense were im-
minent, the Air Force's quite uncertain support of the Sum-
mer Study was reinforced.
Indeed, throughout 1953, Air Force magazine tried to
bring the valid, technical air defense issues into perspec-
tive by dismissing the publicized USAF-scientists ' dispute
as mostly nonsense. They submitted that "all have the same
end in view. The difference is primarily a matter of what
should be done first." Further, they asserted that
the only Summer Study Group recommendation
turned down by the Air Force was a recom-
mendation for a multi-billion dollar crash
program to implement a deep early-warning
system. ... The Air Force turned it down on the
advice of other civilian scientists, and not
for any neurotic reasons of its own. These
scientists felt that the new equipment in-
volved should be tested before being bought
in large quantities . 38
While this debate was occurring, the Administration re-
ceived in May 19 53 another report of the air defense situ-
ation by the Kelly Committee which had an essentially com-
promise nature. The report seemed to support the predominate
87
"Defense and Strategy," Fortune, XLVIII (July 1953),
p. 40.
o o
"The Truth About Our Air Defense," Air Force magazine
Staff Study, XXXVI (May 1953), pp. 34, 29. (Note the inter-
esting parallel here with the Navy's argument in 19 49 that
the B-36 was an unproven weapon and should not be procured
heavily until after sufficient tests and evaluation.)
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military view that the continued development of the U. S. 1
strategic offensive capability must have top priority. It
also dismissed the practicality of some of the more dramatic
Summer Study proposals. On the other hand, the report under-
lined the seriousness of the rising Soviet threat and em-
phasized particularly the importance of an improved and
extended radar early warning system.
On top of all this, the Administration was anxious to
have the air defense problem studied by some of its "own
people". The Bull Committee was thus formed, headed by
Lieutenant General Harold Bull, an old friend of Eisenhower's
and his wartime chief of plans. The committee was a mixed
civilian-military group whose report covered a wide variety
of issues, including means to counteract A-bombs brought
90into the country by suitcase-carrying saboteurs.
During most of 19 53, therefore, the Administration
amassed air defense study reports, but still apparently
hoped that extensive additional systems expenditures could
91
somehow be avoided. Such temporizing, if you will, was
O Q
For a discussion of this report, see BAS, IX (July




See Robert M. Loebelson, "How Much Air, Defense for the
Nation?," American Aviation , November 9, 19 53, p. 16.
See Stuart Alsop, New York Herald Tribune , November
22, 19 53, Section 2, p. 5. Cf. Alexander P. de Seversky's
account of why he had, at one point during 1953, been chosen
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furthered by the lack of real pressure for a decision from
either Congress or the U. S.' "attentive elite." Congress
seemed to regard such a decision as being of an executive
nature; and, furthermore, it had not been privy to much of
the Soviet .intelligence necessary to pursue its jurisdic-
tion. Indeed, the first significant Congressional interest
in problems of air defense occurred only after the Soviets 1
August H-bomb explosion when, on October 4, 1953, Repre-
sentative W. Sterling Cole called for an immediate increase
92
of $10 billion in air defense and civil defense spending.
The "attentive elite" during 1953 seemed divided on the
question of whether to launch a major air defense effort and
their arguments tended to cancel each other's out. Doubt-
lessly, the fact that the USSR air.--atomic threat was so ob-
scurely defined at this time (e.g., Secretary Wilson's ver-
sus the Alsops ' perceptions) largely explains this situation,
The principal general arguments in favor of an expanded air
defense system were that it would: provide a disincentive to
to be an Assistant to Secretary of the Air Force Harold Tal-
bott: "f.Talbott! had sold the Administration the idea that,
because of the confidence the American people reposed in me,
I could discredit the project f Lincoln J as being utterly im-
practical. In preventing this C$21 billion] unwarranted ex-
pense I would be performing a great service to the country





As noted by Huntington, The Common Defense , pp. 337-
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a USSR attack; reduce the opportunities for Soviet nuclear
blackmail, with a concomitant reduction in the anxiety-
level of U. S. daily life; improve America's alliance re-
93lationships; be of great relevance to possible future arms
94 95
control environments; and protect SAC for counterattack.
Opponents of a major continental defense build-up
generally cited the expense involved; the prior obstacle
posed by the lack of a Department of Defense organization
96
to synchronize its development; the attendant technical
problems; the extant protection from the American forward
97base structure; the ensuing Maginot Line psychology at
93
"... the very fact of early warning requires the
intimate collaboration of our allies, north, east and
West"; and the leadership position of the U. S. would be
"strengthened by the world knowledge that we are prepared
to repell as well as to invade." James R. Killian and
A. G. Hill, "For a Continental Defense," Atlantic Monthly,
CXCII (November 19 53)
, p. 365.
94
"...in which steps of evasion will be either far
too vast to conceal or far too small to have, in view of
the existing measures of defense, a decisive strategic
effect." J. R. Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American
Policy," Foreign Affairs , XXXI (July 1953), pp. 534-535.
95
"Almost without exception, advocates of air defense
took the view that it ranked second in American military
priorities to the maintenance of the striking capability
of SAC." Rostow, The United States in the World Arena
, p. 313
96The Kelly Report specifically pointed to this hindrance
to an air defense effort. See BAS, IX (July 1953), p. 229.
97
"(~OurD overseas bases .. .protect the continental U. S
far more surely than a radar station on Montauk Point, or
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home and Fortress America image abroad; the Soviet offensive
countermeasure potentialities (which included sabotage and
the Trojan Horse method, as well as electronic counter-
measures, chaff, decoys, etc.); and even the argument that
the Soviets would have no reason to develop a more complex
weapon if the West permitted them to do the* job more simply
98
with the Tu-4.
Included within this general public debate was the
specific and vital question of the technical feasibility
and tactical importance of a Distant Early Warning (DEW) line
along the Arctic rim. Everyone agreed that warning of attack
was of paramount importance. There was also general agree-
ment that the question of "how much, time do we need" was
not the principal issue because of. the imponderables which
precluded a specific answer: time of day of the attack,
the season, the weather, the enemy's route and speed of
attack, the varying warning times required by different military
an interceptor base in New Jersey... A part, perhaps the
whole, of the enemy's first onslaught would have to be
directed against the overseas bases." H. Baldwin, "What
Kind of Defense in the Atomic Age?," New York Time s Mag a zine
,
May 17, 1953, p. 39. See, also, General Omar N. Bradley,
"A Soldier's Farewell," Saturday Evening Post, August 22,
1953, p. 53.
98Cited in L. V. Berkner, "Science and Military Power,"
BAS, IX (December 1953), p. 363.
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forces for retaliation and by different cities for effective
civil defense, etc. The area of disagreement lay in the
answers to the question of "how much time can we get."
The Summer Study Group had submitted that the present
theoretical warning time of about one hour could be in-
creased to about six hours by means of the DEW line and
they had recommended its immediate construction. For they
were also convinced that two scientific breakthroughs in
1952 had made the DEW line operation feasible: automatic
alarm circuits that enabled radar to give an audible alarm
when a target was picked up (thus reducing the otherwise
burdensome manpower requirements)'; and VKF ionospheric
and UHF tropospheric scatter progagation techniques which,
for the first time, promised to provide reliable long-range
communications virtually immune to all known atmospheric
99phenomena. Such an increase in warning time could permit
the partial evacuation of cities — a consideration still •
close to the hearts of the liberal scientists. Also, DEW
line advocates reminded the Air Force that while the present
amount of expected warning time could possibly permit SAC
to rise up and disperse from its bases, four to six hours 1
9 9
See Charles Corddry, "Burglar Alarm," Air Force,
XXXIX (June 1956), p. 77ff.; H. LeFay, "Dew Line: Sentry of
the Far North," National Geographic Magazine, CXIV (July
1958), p. 129f£; and C. J. V. Murphy, "The Polar Watch,"




warning from DEW would enable SAC to "bombup" and launch its
counters trikes by the time the enemy force crossed the U. S.
borders
.
The Air Force was the most vocal opponent of such a con-
certed effort to build defenses " from-the-outside-in" and ar-
gued that the U. S. must instead improve systematically and
carefully " from-the-inside-out . " The USAF.- submitted that the
radar necessary for a DEW line was not far enough advanced to
permit construction on a crash basis. Another serious Air
Force objection was that the DEW line made no provision for
tracking an enemy strike down through Canada and into the U. S.
defense perimeter. And, as General Bradley suggested, an un-
reliable warning system might be worse than none at all, should
Soviet high-flying " spoofers" play "hide and seek and go home"
in the Canadian wilderness while U. S. interceptors and popu-
lations weary of the game and drop their guard. A much less
publicized Air Force objection was that the DEW line
would not be practical because interceptors
L'then could .2 fly only up to two hours before
they require Cd] refueling. Thus,' the USAF
held, we might as well get the radar line -set
See C. J. V. Murphy, "The U. S. as a Bombing Target,"
Fortune , XLVII (November 1953), p. 22. It will be recalled
that the USAF was at this time also being painfully reminded
of SAC's wasting second-strike assets by the RAND study cited
on pp. 72-73 above.
101See "A Soldier's Farewell (Part II)," S aturday
Evening Post, August 29, 1953, p. 48.
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up at a point where the enemy bombers could be
picked -up and shot down, i.e. about 600 miles
north of U. S. boundaries, and then gradually
extend both the early warning line and the in-
terception line further north. 102
Hence, the Air Force was content at this time to in-
crease the country's early-warning capability to about two
hours, by hooking the existent continental U. S. radar
system more closely into the Canadian's McGill Line along
the fifty-fifth parallel -- initial construction of which
began in late 1953. They also made plans with the Navy to
establish an interim "flying DEW line" in the form of radar-
equipped Lockheed Constellation aircraft on the continent's
s eaward f 1 a nk s
.
All of these debates sketched out above which acted to
impede a decision for the extensive build-up of continental
defenses were cast into a new light after August 1953. The
Administration's resistance to additional air defense
spending melted quickly in the heat of the Soviets' H-
bomb explosion. NSC-162 was prepared in the Fall and in-
cluded major defensive programming. In February 19 54, it
was estimated that almost ten percent of the Defense Depart-
ment's expenditures for military functions in fiscal year
102Lobelson, American Aviation, November 9, 1953, p. 16.
A.side from the light such an argument shed on the lagging USAF
fighter modernization program, this Air Force case apparently
ignored the fact that the Royal Canadian Air Force felt strongly




19 55 would bo for continental defense
.
Yet, it is important to stress that, even now, systems
development and procurement were "to continue on an orderly
] 04basis with phased increases in forces and facilities.'
This approach was in consonance with the Administration's
"long-haul" view of the Soviet threat; a view which materi-
alized during 19 53 and continued throughout the Eisenhower
years. Such a perspective portended other ramifications for
military R&D efforts. As one commentator suggested: "Under
the concept of the. C ' long-haul '] , a decision whether to con-
tinue buying an old model, to buy a new model hot yet thor-
oughly proven, or to wait until the new model had been com-
pletely tested was more likely [than the former 'crisis-year'
and performance to work effectively with a DEW line. See
HANSARD, Session 19 5 3-4, Vol. 1, November 26, 19 53, pp.
362-363.
10 3Department of Defense Statement, Hearings, House,
Subc. of Coram, on Approps
.
, Department of Defense Appropria-
tions for 1955 , 83rd, 2nd, February 1954, p. 86.
104Admiral Radford's speech cited in footnote 55, p.
105 above. Cf. the following exchange: "Q. Could you de-
velop the continental defense system any faster than you are
now doing if more money were appropriated for that purpose?
Admiral Radfo rd. No, sir." (Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm.
on Approps., Department of Defense Appropriations for 1955
,
8 3rd, 2nd, February 19 54, p. 115.) Radford's answer was ac-
cepted by Congress as a simple fact without calling upon any
outside expertise to check the Admiral's allegation. Hence,
even in 1954, Congressional pressures to speed-up the air de-
fense build-up were essentially absent. (On this point, see
Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "How Congress Strains at Gnats,
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method] to be resolved in favor of the latter alterna-
105 . .tive. With these observations in mind, let us next ex-
amine, in turn, the actual development and procurement of
aircraft control and warning (AC&W) radar, fighter aircraft,
and surface-to-air missiles between 1953-56.
Construction of the complete DEW line -system began, on
an expedited basis, only after January 1955. Prior to
that time the DEW concept and its whoiely new equipment un-
derwent extensive testing on segments of the proposed line.
Initial testing of some of the equipment in the Fall of 1952
had led to a contract with Western Electric in* January 1953
to operate a test warning system in Northeast Alaska and
Western Canada. In February 1953, agreement had been reached
with Canada for the installation of the stations, and by No-
vember the sites were completed for testing. By the Summer
of 19 54, the experimental radars and forward-scatter tech-
niques were showing better-than- expected results. And it was
at this time that the Air Force "swung behind the early
Then Swallows Military Budgets," Reporter , July 20, 1954,
pp . 31-35.
)
105Snyder, "The 'New Look* of 1953," in Schilling, Ham-
mond, and Snyder, Strategy, Politics..., p. 406.
The following discussion draws upon: Richard Moren-
us , Dew Line: The Miracle of America's First Li ne of De -
fense (New York, 1957)
,
p. 31ff.; Hearings, House, Military
Construction Appropriations for 19 56, 84th, 1st, June 1954,
pp. 5-6; and C.Tr. V. Murphy, "The Polar Watch," Fortune ,





The timing of the USAF support for the complete DEW
project is explained in part by the test-successes. Some
commentators, however, have based the decision on less tech-
nical factors. As it was later written:
When the Air Force finally decided to invest in
the DEW line, it was persuaded to do so by a fair-
ly simple proposition. This was to foreclose, in
Soviet strategic planning, the prospect of a cheap
ride into the American air. C Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force Trevor Gardner] ... bulled the DEW
line through. LHe] had been set afire by the argu-
ments of scientists and a group of Air Force officers
who had decided that the strategy of the techno-
logical power game demanded something more subtle
than the threat of SAC ' s offensive strength alone.
"The game," Gardner recalls, "was to force the
other guy to go higher, faster, and load himself
down with electronic countermeasure gear. "108
(Here, perhaps, one can detect the influence of the Soviets'
19 5 4 May Day bomber fly-by) . In any event, during the Sum-
mer of 1954, the JCS requested immediate authorization for
construction funds for the complete DEW line. The sense of
urgency which they imparted to Congress was later described
as being due to their desire to begin work before the cold
weather season set in the Arctic; and to some unanticipated
deficiencies in the Pine-Tree line which was just coming in-
109
to operation. Following a U. S. -Canadian decision on the
107 Ibid. (Murphy), p. 250.
108
Ibid. / p. 120.
10 9Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Armed Services,
Establishment and Development of Certain Military Instal-
lations, 85th, 2nd, H.R. 9738, January 1958, p. 3817.
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exact location of the DEW lino, a contract was let with
Western Electric in November 19 5 4 to proceed with the in-
stallation of all the facilities.
The Soviets' 1955 May Day fly-by may have affected
somewhat the Administration's "orderly" programming of this
project. It was reported in the Fall of 19 5 5 that there
was "gathering pressure upon Mr. Wilson to hasten the com-
pletion of the DEW line, particularly in light of the Bison
development." " When completed in the Summer of 1957, the
DEW line v/as labelled "perhaps ... the most costly construc-
tion task ever accomplished in so short a time."
While the DEW line was being developed to increase the
aircraft early-warning time, the USAF approved in January
1954, a four year program to install more than 300 small,
automatic "gap-filler" radar sites in the continental U. S.
to provide a reliable low-altitude detection capability.
As important as the achievement of such a capability would
Murphy, Fortune , LII (September 1955), p. 230. Ac-
tually, however, the real pressure may have been that which
was on Western Electric: "...the prime contractor, in an
all-out effort to meet the beneficial occupancy date, has
progressed much more rapidly than was thought physically
possible." (Testimony of General Washbourne, USAF, Hearings,
House, Subc. of Comm. on Armed Services, Military Public
Works , 34th, 2nd, H. R. 8625, March 1956, p. 6567.) That
is, the expediting of the project may have resulted more
from these commercial profit concerns than from the Soviet
displays
.





seem to be, the Air Force was unable to predict completion
of the sites" construction before 1958. One colonel ex-
plained the problem thusly to a Congressional committee;
"Siting teams go out and locate, physically locate the lo-
cations on the ground. .. C and ] we can't get the equipment,
we don't have the survey teams to physically locate them in
the field." This prompted Senator Henry Jackson to observe:
"By the time we finish the last radar site the Russians will
have the intercontinental ballistic missile ... .There ought
to be some way to step this up, except this is all mixed up
112
with the Bureau of the Budget."
The final element in the aircraft control and warning
aspect of air defense R&D during this period was the devel-
opmental work on the SAGE system. This project was designed
to apply high speed digital computers for the ground-control
of air defense operations. In February 1954, an NSC direc-
tive called for the attainment of the SAGE capability as
113
rapidly as possible. The CONAD commander testified at
the 19 56 Air Power Hearings that the introduction of SAGE
would increase the capability of the U. S. air defense
system "by a factor of something like 5 to 10." (page
254) . Yet, in April 1957, an Air Force progress report
-
Hearings, Senate, Military Public Works Construction ,
84th, 1st, S. 1765, May 1955, pp. 503-504".
113
USAF statement, Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on
Approps., Supplemental Defense Appropriations for 1958 , 85th,
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stated that "the SAGE program has not yet reached the point
where wo have scheduled operational tests against SAGE as
114
such. We continue to make tests against the radar.' 1
Apart from the obvious technical complexities involved here,
a "long-haul" view of the Soviet threat again seemed to
encourage such thorough pre-deployment explorations.
What was the situation with regard to fighter aircraft
development and procurement? When the Air Force was author-
ized in October 1951 to expand from 95 to 143 wings, the 17
operational air defense wings were planned to be modernized
and expanded to 29. The first major defense decision made
by President Eisenhower was a May 1953 cut-back of this USAF
expansion to an "interim" 12 wing program, to be in place
by January 1957. The previously planned air defense wing
expansion, however, was not to be affected by this cut-back.
Furthermore, the December 19 5 3 "new look", which called for
a USAF buildup to 137 wings, recognized the requirement for
even more fighter aircraft by including 5 more ADC wings
within the 17 v/ing increase. There was also the decision
that the modernization of the ANG's 27 wings must be expedited,
2nd, January 1958, p. 136.
114Testimony of General Pachynski , Hearings, House,
Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department of the Air Force
Appropriations for 1958 , 85th7~lst, April 1957, p. 290.
115The remainder of the 17-v/ing increase included 13
TAC wings and 2 SAC wings (3 troop carrier wings were
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Hence, while the proportion of planned Regular air defense
wings within the total USAF goal had not regained its pre-
Korean level (25 of 70; 20 of 48), Eisenhower's "new look"
appeared to see a steady, unimpaired expansion of intercep-
tor strength, within a SAC-stabilized force structure.
Actual aircraft procurement expenditures after 1953
reflected, however, a different pattern . With the Soviet
bomber and long-range missile developments of 1954-55, in-
creased U. S. bomber and offensive missile requirements in-
terjected to delay the achievement of the "new look's" air
defense goals. Work on the new long-range all-weather F-102
interceptor was "dawdling in the design stage" for almost
two years before the Air Force -- in response to the May
19 55 Moscow fly-bys -- announced i.n August 1955 that it was
drastically speeding up the F-10 2 development cycle. The
U. S. supersonic day-interceptor program also experienced pro-
duction delays. While F-101 and F-104 program acceleration
was recommended by General' Twining in June 1955, by January
deleted). Under the 143, 120, and 137-wing programs between
October 19 51 and December 19 53, SAC ' s programmed goals were
57, 52, and 54 wings respectively. On all these force levels
see American Aviation, November 9, 19 53, pp. 15-16; statement
of SECAF Talbott, Hearings, House, Department of Air Force
Appropr i ation s 19 55 , 83rd, 2nd, February 19 54, p. 2; and
statement of "General L. B. Washbourne, USAF, Hearings, Senate,
Subc. of Comm. on Armed Forces, Military and Naval Construc-
tion Authoriz ation , 83rd, 2nd, June 1954, p. 132.
116Murphy, Fortune , LII (September 1955), pp. 230, 87.
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19 56 output of these aircraft had reportedly slowed down in
117 .
the face of more pressing R&D requirements. The situation
was summed-up thusly by Trevor Gardner in February 1956:
With our existing fighters . . .we are embarked upon,
because of the funds limitation, a very cautious
program of procuring these aircraft. In general we
are applying the fly-before-you-buy philosophy. There
again this is partly for lack of funds which are
flowing into the ballistic-missile program. H8
Let us consider finally the development of surface-to-
air missile systems between 1953-56. The Array's high-
altitude-capable, fifty mile range Nike-Ajax missile had be-
come operational in 1953, v/hile R&D work proceeded on a longer-
range, higher-altitude nuclear-armed Nike-Hercules. The Air
Force in early 19 51 had let a contract for the development
of the high-altitude-capable, 200 mile Bomarc which that ser-
vice felt would be available for tactical use in the same
time- frame as the Nike. Many problems plagued the Bomarc
program, however, and around 19 55, the Air Force turned to a
land-based version of the Navy's Talos missile as a logical
R&D stepping-stone to the Bomarc. (It should be noted here
that — whereas the Air Force began installing low-altitude
gap-filler radars in 1954 -- it was not until late 1957 that
117Twining testimony, Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on
Approps
.
, Department of Defense Appropriations 1956 , 84th, 1st,
June 1955, ~p. 33; Joseph and Stuart Alsop, New York Herald
Tribune , January 4, 1956.
118
Testimony, Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps.,
Department of Defense Appropriations 19 57 ("General State-
ments"), 84th, 2nd, February 1956, p. 877.
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the Soviets' "on -the-deck" threat was perceived to be seri-
ous enough to cause the initiation of the low-altitude Bo-
1] 9
marc B program in February 1953.) As the Talos and Nike
development progressed, questions arose concerning their
comparability and possible duplication. The Defense Depart-
ment was content to conduct extensive studies on this point
in early 19 56 which "clearly showed that at this time neith-
n 12
er system Chad! a predominate advantage'.
While these studies were in progress, the fiscal 1957
military construction authorization bill was before Congress
and it contained requests for funds for both Talos and Nike
site construction. When Congress objected to the duplica-
tion, the Army stated that the Talos did not have any char-
acteristics of an interceptor and therefore should not be an
Air Force responsiblity . The Air Force responded by stating
it had been "told by the JCS that the Air Force would be
responsible for developing, procuring, and employing guided
missiles beyond the range of 50 miles Land] Talos is that
121
missile...." It was later reported that in November
13 9 . .
" Testimony of Colonel Dietrich, USAF , Hearings, House,
Department of Defense Appropriations 1961 (Part 7) , 86th, 2nd,
March I960, p. 201.
120Hearings, House, Department of Defense Appropriations
1958 (Part 2), 85th, 1st, February 1957, pp. 1340-1341.
121 •Testimony of General Taylor and General Twining
respectively, Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps.,

13 7
1954 the Secretary of Defense had indeed approved the re-
sponsibility for all three services to produce SAMs , with
the Army limited to local defense missiles not to exceed a
fifty mile range and with the Air Force to defend wider ar-
122
eas . Nevertheless, the Senate Armed Services Committee
denied the authorization for the Talos site construction and
123
called upon the Defense Secretary to decide between them.
Secretary Wilson's November 26, 19 56 memorandum ensued
and the land-based Talos was given to the Army. The Air
Force then concentrated its SAM R&D efforts on its lagging
Bomarc program. The Army soon sought funds for further work
on Talos but was informed by the Defense Department that any
such funds would have to be taken from Nike appropriations.
The JCS subsequently recommended that, due to budgetary lim-
itations, the land-based Talos not be developed. And the
Department of Defense Appropriations 1957 , 84th, 2nd, May-
June 19 56, pp. 86 and 1265.
122 . .Organization and Management of Missile Programs
,
Eleventh Report by Committee on Government Operations,
House, 86th~, 1st, H.R. 1121, September 2, 1959, p. 14. It
thus becomes unclear how the Army's Nike-Hercules work
could have been justified under such an agreement.
123 . .See Authorizing Construction for Military Depart-
ments , S.Rept". 2364, 84th, 2nd, June 26, 1956, pp. 10-11; and
Congressional Record, 102, pp . 12167-77 , 12959 , 14634 , 14884 . For
a discussion of the involvement of the Armed Services Commit-
tees in air defense construction projects during the 1950 's
--an involvement which grew out of 1951 legislation that re-
quired the military departments to "come into agreement"
with the committees on the great majority of their proposed
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Army quickly discontinued the program. "Though both the Air
Force and the Army had made broad claims for the capability
of the land-based Talos missile, and more than $25 million
had been spent on its development, the entire project was
i * ..124canceled. ...
Hence, as was seen in the case of AC&W. radar programs
and fighter aircraft, the pace and nature 'of the Eisenhower
Administration's development of continental surface-to-air
missile systems in 1953-56 was largely determined by a com-
plex of domestic bureaucratic and economic factors operating
within a framework of a "long-haul" view of the Soviet threat.
3. Systems Deployment and Operation
The United States continental air defense capability was
not materially improved during 19 5.3 while the Administration
was weighing the conflicting perspectives on systems feasibil-
ity and desirability. The only advance was that culminated in
April when the seventy-five radar stations of the Permanent
125System became fully operational in the continental U. S.
real estate transactions -- see Raymond H. Dawson, "Congres- •
sional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legis-
lative Authorization of Weapons Systems," American Political
Science Review , LVI (March 1962), pp. 42-57."
124Organization and Management of Missile Programs
,
Eleventh Report by Committee on Government Operations, House,
H.R. 1121, 86th, 1st, September 2, 1959, pp. 120-121. (Here-
inafter cited as the Dawson Subcommittee Report.)
125Even this advance occurred more than a year later than
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During this year, it was generally accepted that the defen-
sive forces could achieve about fifteen percent attrition
in a daylight attack, and less than one percent if the ene-
my came under the cover of night or poor visibility condi-
126tions.
Efforts to improve this capability were more substantial
in 1954. Even then, however, much of the air defense expend-
itures went for systems which would become operational only
in later years. Apart from such R&D efforts discussed pre-
viously, continental U. S. "inshore and offshore barriers"
were established in 1954 -- superconstellation aircraft pa-
trols, conversion of USN destroyer escorts to radar picket
ships, and "Texas-Tower" construction. In addition to these
long-range programs, by April 19 5 4 the number of active Ground
Observer Corps observation posts had been increased by some
1500 beyond the 270 posts that had been operational in April
1271953. More sophisticated test-alert exercises were run a-
gainst the system throughout the year. Also, Nike batteries
began to be phased-in in increasing numbers and Army National
planned due to strikes and radar equipment shortages. Air
Force
,
XL (August 1957), p. 253.
126
See, e.g., Alsops, New York Hera ld Tribune, July 22,
1953, p. 17.
127Testimony of General Asensio, USAF , Hearings, Senate,
Subc. of Comm. on Approps., Department of Defense Appropria-
tions 1955, 83rd, 2nd, May 1954, pp. 314-315.
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Guard units, for the first time, began to man some of the
AAA sites which remained active.
While the fighter aircraft modernization and expansion
program went forward (albeit somewhat haltingly) , there
seemed to be a growing appreciation for a more strategically
located air defense base structure. To the USAF , this meant
the requirement for a solid line of new airfields across the
12 8
northern continental U. S. periphery. And in 1955, Con-
gress approved the construction of six interceptor bases just
below the Canadian border, so that the enemy could be en-
countered as far away from important American complexes as
possible. In the meanwhile, housing shortages at or near
operational USAF bases precluded the ADC from keeping more
than four (of twenty-five) aircraft on alert at each fighter
base, with the remainder of the squadron's crew-members forced
129
to live as much as thirty miles from their station. It
was for reasons such as this that the Air Force began in
1953 to place increasing reliance on the Air National Guard
to maximize the U. S. air defense readiness capability.
See testimony of Colonel Moore, Hearings, House, Com-
mittee on Armed Services, Military and Naval Construction ,
83rd, 2nd, H.R. 8726, April 1954, pp. 4165-4166.
129Testimony of General Twining, Hearings, House, Subc.
of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department of the Air Force Appropri-
ations 195 6, 84th, 1st, February 1955, p. 16.
The following facts have been taken from Air Force ,
XXXVII (May 1954), p. 53; XXXVIII (February 1955), p. 59;
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Selected ANG squadrons took on an actual air defense
assignment for the first time, in 1953, when they were
"scrambled" on an ADC alert and controlled by active ground-
control-intercept units. Early in 1954, the ANG received
its first jet all-weather interceptors when six F-94's were
made available to them by the Air Force. On August 15,
1954, seventeen ANG units began to provide ADC with crews
and two aircraft each on a daily, five minute runway alert
from dawn to dusk. Between August 19 54 and August 19 55, these
ANG aircraft were "scrambled" 7,400 times, made 16,000 in-
tercepts and flew some 18,0 00 hours under ADC control.
Additionally, on February 12, 1955, certain ANG units re-
ceived their first major classified briefing on air defense
operations. Finally, during July 1955, seventeen ANG
wings were redesignated from "fighter-bomber" to "fighter-
interceptor" wings and relieved of their tactical support
mission. Hence, the majority of ANG pilots could now con-
131
centrate their training on air combat-type flights.
and XXXVIII (September 1955), pp. 166, 169; and Air Re-
servi st , May 19 54, p . 11.
Prior to this move, only six ANG wings were trained
simply as fighter-interceptors and "assigned" immediately
to ADC upon recall. The seventeen fighter-bomber wings
had been "earmarked" for air defense assignments for "as
long as they would be needed," after which they would turn
to tactical air support tasks for National Guard ground
forces. See Major General E. T. Ricks, "We Can Help The





3y the beginning of 19 56, fourteen different sources
were feeding into CONAD information about these and the oth-
er 30,0 00 scheduled flights (plus a great many more unsched-
uled) per day in North America -- the heavy-surveillance ra-
dars; the heavy height-finder radars; the small gap-filler
radars; the civil aircraft flight plans relayed from CAA
flight service centers; the military aircraft flight plans
relayed from the Military Flight Service; the Pine-Tree line
(to be completed in mid-19 56) ; the Mid-Canada line (to be
completed in early_1957); the DEW line (to be completed in
the Summer of 195 7) ; the radars in southern Alaska; Navy
picket ships off the east and west coasts of the continent;
Navy Constellation airborne early warning aircraft; Texas
Towers; the Ground Observers Corps; and the Air Weather Ser-
vice. ' Yet, until the SAGE system was deployed initially in
1958, all this information had to be correlated by the "eye-
ballin' and grease-pencilin ' " method.
This operational handicap and other air defense defi-
ciencies in fighter and radar high-altitude capability were
brought before the 19 56 Air Power Hearings by General Earl E.
Partridge, CINC-CONAD. It was at these Hearings, also, that
Partridge gave recognition to an apparent policy decision
that "our primary mission in the ADC is to defend the bases
from which the Strategic Air Command is going to operate."
(page 264.) Prior to such a decision, the deployment

14 3
of U. S. air defense systems in the early Eisenhower years
continued the pre-1953 pattern of major industrial and popu-
lation center protection.
Hence, Secretary Wilson testified in February 1954
that "above all things we must protect the industrial com-
plex of the North American continent. No one can finally
win a world war unless they destroy our will to fight and
132
our industrial potential here in this country." As
for the vulnerability of SAC during 1953,. the Air Force --
in order to effect economies in base structure and air-
craft availability due to manpower decreases -- had to
double-up units on its bases ,. thereby increasing the overall
133
military vulnerability of the force. During the ensuing
few years, Regular and ANG fighter squadron deployments
were made with no special attention to the question of
134
enhancing SAC's second-strike capability. Insofar as
strategic considerations entered into the ADC base selection
process, the geographical requirements for proximity to
AC&W radar sites, and for defense-in-depth in the northern
areas tended to preclude extensive protection of SAC bases,
132Hearings, House, Department of Defense Appropriations
1955, 83rd, 2nd, February 1954, p. 67.
133Testimony of General Vandenberg, Hearings, House, De -
partment of Air Force Appropriations 1954 , 83rd, 1st, p. 9.
See, e.g., the testimony of General L. G. Washbourne
and Colonel W. G. Moore, Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on
Armed Services, Mili tary and Naval Construction Authorization ,
8 3rd, 2nd, S. 3 2 60, June 19 54, pp. 133, 14 2, 14 6.
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most of which were located in. the southern half of the coun-
try. And, ANG units continued to be located by the Gover-
nors near heavily populated areas.
Nor was the Army exactly eager to deploy its Nike or
AAA batteries around SAC installations. By mid-19 56, to be
sure, a few strategic air bases were being guarded by these
135Army systems. But the vast majority of the Nike and AAA
weapons were protecting principal American cities and indus-
trial complexes.
Now the USAF had been aware, at least since 1953, of
the growing vulnerability of its SAC to a Soviet surprise at-
tack. The RAND Base Selection Study cited previously had
been distributed throughout the Air Force in March 1953 and
extensive briefings on its results* continued until November.
While the study highlighted foremostly the vulnerability of
overseas SAC bases, its recommendations for a domestic based
retaliatory force would certainly seem to generate attention
toward the necessary defensive requirements at home. Thus,
in the wake of the Soviets 1 H-bomb explosion in August, the
USAF Chief of Staff directed in November that the vulnerabili-
ty of airbase facilities should be recognized in all Air Staff
135 See Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, De-




planning and action. Also, early in 1954, Secretary of
the Air Force James H. Douglass stated, "It is of extra-
ordinary importance that Courj capability to strike back
be defended by our air defense system, with perhaps as
great attention to protecting that capability as to pro-
137tecting our important industrial capacities . as well."
And former Air Force Secretary Finletter published at this
time a book which called for a "new military strategy"
based on a well-defended and well-dispersed SAC system both
13 8in the continental U. S. and abroad. In February 1955,
General Twining "theorized" that SAC would be the number
one target of a Soviet strike; and one year later he an-
nounced that "our plan... is to disperse our heavy bomber
units one squadron, or one third of a wing to a base. We
also plan to cut down the medium jet B-47's to one wing per
k -.139base.
Despite such USAF directives and assertions, as we
have seen, SAC remained essentially unprotected and un-
dispersed for a second-strike throughout this period. In
1953-54, USAF resistance to a re-direction of its basing
136 Smith, The RAND Corporation
, p. 234.
137Hearings, House, Comm. on Armed Services, Military
and Naval Construction , 83rd, 2nd, May 1954, p. 4162.
13 8
Power' and Policy , especially pp. 19ff.; 29ff.
139Hearings, House, Department of Defense Appropriations
1957
, 84th, 2nd, February 1956, p. 764.
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and air defense policies could be explained primarily by such
factors as: antipathy toward RAND ' s civilian "expertise";
the inertia of established programs; fears of undermining
morale; fears of embarrassment before Congress; and the "big
bomber" versus "small bomber" in-house quarrel which threat-
140
ened to eclipse other strategic concerns. During 1955-56,
quantitative, "command of the air" arguments which dominated
the "bomber gap" debate acted to overshadow public concern
with SAC vulnerability on the ground in the U. S.
Furthermore, the 1955-56 Nike-Talos dispute tended to
force the USAF to push the question of missile protection
for SAC into the future; and to demonstrate that perhaps the
Air Force remained unconvinced of the seriousness of SAC '
s
ground-attrition weaknesses, even apart from the factors
listed above which retarded remedial action. Let us expand
this point. It has been reported that the land-based Talos
was originally envisaged by the USAF as a weapon to be used
141
against sea-approach attacks by enemy aircraft. When
it requested Talos construction funds in mid-1956, however,
the Air Force announced that the Talos would be tested in a
point-defense deployment at four SAC bases. The following
These points were cited by Smith, The RAND Corpora-
tion, p. 222ff.




Senator John Stennis . You are not asking for
any operational Nike I or Nike B for your SAC
bases pending the development of Talos a little ' • '
further?
Genera l Twining. That is right.
Stenni s . You don't consider it an emergency to
put them in? You are willing to v;ait until Talos
is a little further along?
Twining . Yes: that is true. We couldn't defend
all the SAC bases and everything with the Nike
available if we wanted....
Stennis . I believe that if this thing was very
urgent, the Air Force would be asking for their
part of Nike rather than let them all go to the
cities . 14 2
Placing Talos in the same role as Nike could be seen, hence-
forth, as part of the interservice grabbing for new power
and roles as new weapons were developed. Their projected
deployment around SAC bases could reflect this rivalry
as much as a fundamental concern for an enhanced second-
strike capability.
In any event,' the Senators could see no reason for de-
fending overlapping areas with rival SAMs . Their denial
of Talos construction authorization, Secretary Wilson's
giving of Talos to the Army, and that service's subsequent
termination of the project, resulted in a further delay in
142Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Depart -




achieving adequate active air defense protection for home-
based SAC forces.
If the USAF was thus not a vocal proponent of active
protection for SAC between 1953-56, what factors influenced
the Administration's preference for defensive systems
deployment around industries and cities ~- in the face of
Soviet signals of a counterforce targeting strategy? First,
it seems likely that the Administration was simply unaware
of the degree of vulnerability of its second-strike SAC
forces. The RAND Base Selection study had been distributed
only within the Air Force. Moreover, under the government's
budgetary policies, the services were loathe to publicize
any degradations of their offensive capabilities to the
advantage of a sister service. When not clamoring for
more and better aircraft, the Air Force would assert that
its lack of sufficient trained personnel and enough bases
represented its highest priority needs; thus, diverting
attention from the deficiencies of the existing force. As
Morton H. Halperin later wrote: "The s traitjacket which
has confined the military chiefs, preventing them from
admitting extensive weakness even while pressing for more
funds, has surely been an important restraint on the flow
143
of information to the White House and Congress." Secondly,
143
"The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process," World





the new Administration's shift of emphasis in 1953 from
establishing mobilization reserves to the building of an
industrial mobilization base, for extended production during
wartime, tended to generate an air defense requirement for
144the protection of this production base. Thirdly,
Eisenhower ' s previously mentioned desires to minimize U. S.
obsessions with nuclear destruction would be furthered by
offering the public the "palliative" of population defense.
And there were several reasons why active air defenses may
have been preferable to passive programs. The Soviet ad-
vances toward a hydrogen-bomb capability made bomb shelters
appear even less feasible than before. Moreover, the degree
of local involvement which would be necessitated by a
Federally-directed national shelter program would tend to
project much more governmental concern with general war than
would active systems; and, hence, would be self-defeating in
144Moreover, active air defense of the U. S.' indus-
trial mobilization capability became even more desirable and
feasible due to the type of production base which Secretary
Wilson developed between 1953-56. Given the choice of es-
tablishing (1) a broad, well-dispersed base for critical
items, minimizing the volume of orders to each production
source, or (2) a smaller base, with a larger volume of busi-
ness given to each company, Wilson opted for the latter.
He recalled the slow start of production during the Korean
War and believed that a more dependable base would ensue by
limiting production to fewer plants. See Charles H. Donnelly,
U. S. Defense Po licies Since World War II , Library of Congress,
Legislative Reference Service, H. Doc. 100, 85th, 1st,
November 1956, pp. 54-55.
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this respect. Finally, a further inhibition on such passive
defense programs may have been the Administration's desire
not to add another dimension to the East-West arms race.
The strategic arms race did escalate in October 19 57,
however, when the Soviets' launching of Sputnik caused the
acceleration of ballistic missile and anti-ballistic missile
programs. Let us then consider next the USSR offensive sig-
nals between 19 57-60, the perceptions of these signals in
the United States, and the effects of such perceptions on




AIR DEFENSE IN THE EISENHOWER ERA:
1957-60
Section A. Khrushchevian Signals of Strategi c Offensive
Capabi lity and Intent
The USSR announced the first successful test of a multi-
stage, intercontinental ballistic rocket on August 26, 1957.
In confirmation of this claim, Sputnik I was launched on Oc-
tober 4th and Sputnik II went up on November 3rd. During the
next four years, "Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders gave
every indication in their public statements that they were
indeed in a hurry to capibalize on their initial advantage
and that they were bent on acquiring a large force of first-
generation ICBM's."j
Such declaratory policy regarding ICBM's went through
2
several stages in the 1957-60 period. Between August 1957
and October 1958, Khrushchev introduced the concept of
"country-busting" into Soviet discussions of general nuclear
warfare but said nothing directly about the production of
ICBM's. The first production claim was made just before
Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power...
, p. 36.







Khrushchev precipitated a Berlin crisis on November 10,
1958. And, in the United States, the "missile gap" con-
troversy broke open in December. Until January 19 60, however,
the USSR was not inclined to claim a significant operational
ICBM capability. Moreover, their production claims were low-
keyed for the last half of 1959, possibly due to the "Spirit
of Camp David" detente which characterized the international
diplomacy of that period. It was in Khrushchev's major
policy speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14, 1960,
that the first authoritative claim was made of a considerable
operational ICBM force that "could literally wipe from the
face of the earth the country or countries that attacked
us . "
Between 1957-60, "Khrushchev's magnification of the
Soviet ICBM capability contrasted with his belittlement of
3the Soviet bomber capability." In the Fall of 1957,
Khrushchev declared that fighter and bomber aircraft could .
now be "out into museums." This line was emphasized again
in his January 19 6 Supreme Soviet speech: "Almost the whole
of the airforce is being replaced by rocket equipment. We
have now cut down sharply, and it seems will continue to








and other obsolete machinery."
Nevertheless, the Soviets' action-policy regarding their
strategic bomber force during this period demonstrated con-
tinued interest in their operational manned aircraft systems.
Upwards to forty new jet bomber bases were reported to have
been constructed in the Arctic regions of the USSR between
51955-60. A new air-to-surface missile, with a thermonuclear
warhead capable of being released outside the range of point-
defense systems became operational within the Soviet Air
Force during 1958. Bomber crew training standards contin-
7 ...
ued to improve in all phases of operation. A- significant
advance here was the first Soviet demonstration of an actual
in-flight refueling capability, when a Bison bomber con-
nected with a Bison tanker by the intricate "probe-and-
drogue" method during rehearsals for the 1957 July Air Show
in Moscow. By 1960, the Soviet long-range air-atomic
force was virtually an all- jet force, with the Tu-4 almost
eliminated from first-line bomber duties and the Bear used
for in-flight refueling and maritime reconnaissance. At that
New York Times , January 15, 1960, p. 2.
Asher Lee, The Soviet Air Force (London, 1961) , p. 137.
Described in Aviation Week, May 12, 1958, p. 26.
7See Lee (ed.), The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces , p. 19.
gSee American Aviation, June 17, 1957, p. 18.
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time, also, the Badgers and Bisons began being refitted with
9longer fuselage noses housing new radar bomb sights. The
USSR did not, however, display any new, more advanced long-
range bombers during this period.
Finally, a few words regarding strategic doctrinal sig-
nals. Beginning in late 1957, the possibility of a Soviet
pre-emptive strike faded out of their published military
writing. The concept did not reappear in an authoritative
statement until Marshal Malinovsky's address to the 22nd
Party Congress in 1961. Throughout most of the 1957-60
period, furthermore, the USSR continued to assert the im-
portance of a counterforce targeting strategy.
gLee, The Soviet Air Force
, pp. 137-138.
See Raymond L. Garthoff, Introduction to Mil i tary
Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts , Marshal V. D.
Sokolovsky (~ed.)~ (New York, 19 63), p. xix.

Section B. Domestic Perceptions of the Soviet Threat
The impact of Sputnik was indeed substantial within the
United States. General Partridge, CINC-NORAD, summarized
its potential effect on his air defense posture by lamenting:
"If the aggressor's weapon is the ICBM, the continent stands
almost as naked today as it did in 1946, for I have no radar
to detect missiles and no defense against them. " The gov-
ernment's response to Sputnik was quick.
In January 1958, the Department of Defense requested
$1,2 70 million in supplemental appropriations which were in-
tended to: accelerate the Atlas, Thor, Jupiter, and Polaris
offensive missile programs ($683 million); speed-up the op-
erational date of the Ballistic Missile Early-Warning Sys-
tem by two years ($329 million) ; create an Advanced Research
Projects Agency for anti-ballistic missile research ($10 mil-
lion) ; accelerate the dispersal of the SAC base system and
permit the more timely construction of adequate ground alert
facilities at these bases ($219 million) ; and enable the con-
12
struction of five additional SAGE centers ($29 million)
.
This response did not, however, forestall the blossoming
Quoted by Hanson Baldwin, New York Times , January 22,
1958, p. 12.
12Statement of SECDEF Neil McElroy, Hearings, House,
Subc. of Coram, on Approps
.
, Supplemental Defense Appropria-
tions 19 5 8, 85th, 2nd, January, 1958, p. 6ff.; and statement




of a "missile gap" debate which preoccupied public discus-
sions of U. S. security between 195 8-61. As with the earlier
"bomber gap" myopia, such a preoccupation tended to preclude
active national consideration of the full gamut of the coun-
try's strategic vulnerabilities. Hence, Senator Henry Jackson
observed in January 1958: "While there have been some meagre
attempts to detect Russian submarines, I know of no means by
which we hope to detect the missiles fired from these sub-
marines, and yet there is this enormous threat that everyone
. , „13seems to bypass.
In any event, it was not until early 1960 that the U. S.
government rejected the possibility that the USSR had been
engaged in a "crash" program to deploy a large first-genera-
14tion ICBM force. (Interestingly,' such an appraisal followed
on the heels of the first major USSR claim of a significant
Services, Establish and Develop Certain Military Ins talla-
tions, 85th, 2nd, H.R. 973.9; January 1958, p. 3802ff~ The
SAGE appropriations were not directly related to Sputnik.
The funds were requested to bring the construction of the
centers in line with computer production, and were supposed
to have been included in the regular 19 5 8 budget, but the re-
quest was submitted to Congress too late to get authorization.
See Douglass 1 testimony, Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on
Approps
.
, Supplemental Defe nse Appropriations Bill 1958 , 85th,
2nd, January 1958, p. 99.
13Hearings, Senate, Subcommittee of Committee on Armed
Services, Fiscal Year 1958 Supplemental Military Construc -
tion Authorization (Air Force ) , 85th, 2nd, H.R. 9739, Janu-
ary 1958, p. 21.
According to the testimony of SECDEF Thomas S. Gates,
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operational missile capability.) Projections of this USSR
capability had, however, been apparently pared down in the
U. S. intelligence estimates since early 1959. For example,
Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas White justified in
February 1959 his not initiating a SAC airborne alert capa-
bility (contrary to widespread public opinion that one-
third of the force was always in the air) on the basis of
the lack of any operational Soviet ICBM's at that time, and
the expectation that no significant deployment would be made
"within the next year or two." Hence, he testified further,
the USAF was "working rapidly toward" a fifteen minute
ground alert capability for one-third of the SAC force, in
conjunction with the two to six hours warning being provided
then by the DEW line. Indeed, by February 1960, JCS had
not even replied to COM- SAC General Thomas Power's urgent
request of March 1959 for such an airborne alert capability;
the request being held "until fJCSJ went through the normal
budget cycle...." And, in March 1960, General White testi-
Jr. , Hearings, Senate, Subcommittee of Committee on Armed
Services, in conjunction with Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences, Missi les , Space, and Other Major Defense
Matters , 86th, 2nd7~Feb"ruary "i960 , p. 442.
Hearings, House, Subc . of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department
of Defense Appropriat i ons 1960 (Part 1) , 86th, 1st, February
1959, pp. 862,~866.





fied that the manned bomber would remain the dominate threat
17
for another three or four years
.
Such perspectives on relative Soviet bomber and missile
strengths should naturally have been of the utmost importance
to the evolving US air defense posture. While ICBM's would
seem to negate completely the population and industrial de-
fenses systems which had been deployed through 1956, the use-
ful life of these CONAD programs would of course be extended
with the collapse of the "missile gap." Additionally, the
maintenance or expansion of a modernized bomber force would
provide the Soviets with weapons systems whose greater
accuracies than those of ICBM's made them the logical choice
for counterforce strikes against SAC. Hence, the post-1956
bomber threat was important to any re-direction of America's
air defense deployment pattern toward reducing the vulnera-
bility of SAC to surprise attack --• a vulnerability which
represented the major danger facing the country, according,
to the Gaither Committee Report to the Administration in
the Fall of 1957. 18
17Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department
of Defense Appropriations 1961 (Part 7) , 86th, 2nd, March 1960,
p. 174.
18There were also published accounts which "leaked" the
Report's dire warnings to the public. On this Report, see





What then were the U. S. estimates of the Soviet long-
range air-atomic threat between 1957-60? It was revealed
in February 19 5 7 that as early as the preceding August the
"bomber gap" had begun to dissolve within the USAF . During
that Summer (which was also the period of the first U-2
overflights) , the Air Force felt that the Soviets had pro-
duced a quite fewer number of Bisons and Bears than expected,
and that they probably could not build-up to the previously
19 .predicted 1957-58 levels. Its Soviet production-capacity
20
estimates for the post-1958 period, however, were not reduced.
By November 19 57, U. S. national intelligence estimates
had reduced the August 19 56 Soviet heavy-bomber strength
figures by over one- third; and by December 19 58, the August
21
1956 estimates had been reduced by 75 percent. Further-
more, in January 1959, it x^as felt that the USSR now had
19Testimony of General Twining, Hearings, House, Subc.
of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department of Defense Appropriations
1958 (Part 1), 85th, 1st, February 1957, pp. 911, 1063, 1108-
1109, Cf. Allen Dulles' remark about the Soviets' July 1955
fly-by: "Later it was surmised that the same squadron flof
heavy bombers J had been flying around in circles, reappearing
every few minutes." Craft of Intelligence (New York, 1963),
p. 149.
20Twining testimony (p. 1063) cited in footnote 19 above.
This latter forecast may have been related to the USAF desire
to forestall criticism of its expenditures on the SAGE system
which was expected to be operational in 1959-60.
21According to Senator Symington, "Where the Missile Gap
Went," Reporter, February 15, 1962, p. 22.
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only one-half the estimated capability for bomber production
22
of that which was presented in early 19 57.
During 1959 there was a good deal of Congressional con-
cern about "excessive" air defense expenditures in the face
of such a declining heavy bomber threat, which was then being
estimated at between only 100-125 operational aircraft. An
extensive study of the entire air defense program was com-
pleted by the Department of Defense in the Summer of 19 59
and various cut-backs were proposed. In January I960, na-
tional intelligence estimates again reduced the strength of
the Soviets' operational heavy bomber force. This decrease —
reinforced by Khrushchev's expressed intentions in his Supreme
Soviet speech regarding future bomber production -- occasioned
a further re-evaluation of the air defense system by the Air
Force in February-March I9 60, with subsequent additional pro-
gram cut-backs and re-directions.
The principal explanations offered in the U. S. for the
apparent lack of a Soviet heavy-bomber build-up are pertinent
to note at this point. (The a prioristic arguments for the
Soviets' early post-war concentration of their military R&D
efforts on ICBMs/IRBMs at the expense of bomber development
22Testimony of General Twining, Chairman of JCS , Hearings,
House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department of Defens e Appro-
priations 1960 (Part 1), 86th, lst,~Tanuary 1959, p. 185.

161
have already been mentioned in Chapter 2.) First, there
seemed to be some feeling within the Air Force that USSR
disappointment with the performance characteristics of the
23Bison was a major contributing factor. Secondly, it was
known as early as 19 5 8 that the USSR was developing a su-
perior follow-up medium bomber, which undoubtedly diverted
budgetary allocations from the Bison/Bear apart from the
obvious resource-competition from Soviet missile pro-
24grams. Thirdly, General Thomas Power, SAC commander,
testified in 19 60 that, in his opinion, the principal rea-
son why Khrushchev "definitely decided to place his chips
on missiles" was that the risks of pilot-aborted missions
were eliminated with missiles where "no one leaves Rus-
25
sia." Finally, other non-military commentators empha-
sized the constraints on bomber production posed by the post-
1957 secular decline of the Soviet economy and Khrushchev's
23Such Bison performance deficiencies were strongly im-
plied by General Twining in his February 1957 testimony (pp.
1022-1023, 1030-1031 and 1124) during the Hearings cited in
footnote 19 on p. 159 above.
24 . .See the January 1959 testimony of General Twining
(pp. 18-19) during the Hearings cited in footnote 22 on page
160 above. Cf. Asher Lee's suggestion in 1958 that "the
chief indication that the three existing Soviet long range
bomber air armies are not likely to be expanded for the next
year or so is the present emphasis on long-range jet trans-
port planes." ("The Future of Soviet Air Power," in Lee
Ced.]
, The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces
,
p. 292.)
25Hearings, House, Department of Defense Appropriations
for 1961 (Part 7), 86th, 2nd, March 1960, p. 113.
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increasing attention to the expansion of the USSR consumer
goods sector.
It is also important to note the arguments which were
not being put forward. That is, no authoritative U. S.
spokesman openly suggested that the Soviets might possibly
have been also deterred from deploying a large bomber-
fleet between 1956-60 due to the air defense systems that
the U. S. developed during this same period. And these
systems had supposedly been designed in part to discourage
Soviet saturation-raid tactics. With reference to the Genie
nuclear air-to-air missile in operational use since January
1957, General Partridge stated: "Formation-flying in the
face of an atomic-warhead-equipped air defense force is just
out of the question, so the enemy must come in one airplane
2 fi
at a time." The Army's Nike-Hercules nuclear surface-to-
air missile, operational since June 1958, was also credited
with the ability to destroy many bombers in a close-formation
raid and hence induce the USSR to separate widely its attack-
27ing force. While the Air Force's Bomarc A missile was not
9 (-\
"For Sneak Attack: Two Hour Warning", interview with
General Partridge, U. S. News and World Report , September 6,
1957, p. 77.
27See e.g., Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
,




equipped with a nuclear warhead, William M. Holaday, Special
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Guided Missiles,
asserted for it, too, in mid-1959 (as it v/as becoming opera-
tional) , that "one of its greatest advantages is against a
mass raid against us . . . . We can launch 30 missiles at one time,
all right together .... If this is a concentrated raid I am
2 8
confident the Bomarc would tear it to pieces...."" The SAGE
system's ability to handle far more enemy attacks than could
manual control methods also made saturation tactics much more
difficult. And, even if half of the SAGE centers should be
disabled, the rest of the system v/as designed to take over
and absorb practically all of the hostile raids in the ad-
joining knocked-out area. Hence, from this perspective, the
USAF built twice as many SAGE centers as were really needed,
29in order to preclude saturation bombing.
Now, of course, formation flying and saturation bombing
are not perforce the tactics of a large bomber fleet. The
Soviets could have recognized these capabilities of U. S.
air defense systems and still produced many Bisons and Bears
for multiple, low-altitude, ECM-equipped attacks in a single
2 3Hearings, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,
National Defense Plan Briefing, 86th, 1st, June 1959, p. 304.
29 See Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Depart-




or "buddy" aircraft profile. Indeed, given the traditional
Russian "long-war" view of nuclear hostilities and their re-
jection of the decisiveness of an atomic blitzkreig, such a
policy would seem entirely logical. In other words, the above
U. S. air defense "signals" were speaking more to the Soviets'
wartime bomber tactics than to their pre-war bomber production.
Yet, the fact that dispersed formation tactics are much more
difficult technically to execute than a mass raid evolution
would seem to imply that Soviet calculations of the desirabi-
lity of extensive bomber expenditures should have at least
considered these effects of the U. S. air defense posture as
much as, say, the political reliability of their attack pilots.
In any event, it is revealing that U. S. discussions of the
absence of a Soviet bomber-fleet in 1957-60 demonstrated the
same real subordination of the air defense factor in the U. S.-
USSR strategic dialogue as was evident in 19 55-56 when the
U. S. was discussing the presence of a Russian air-atomic ar-
mada .

Section C. I lie Development of a Mature Air Defense System
1. Roles and Missions
The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was es-
tablished in August 1957 under the operational control of
General E
. .
.E . Partridge, who continued as CINC-CONAD. By
early 19 59, air defense forces in the U. S .
',
Canada, Alaska,
and Greenland were operating under the same procedures and
operational practices. Yet, between 1957--G0, problems of
roles and missions still plagued the air defense organiza-
tion within the continental U. S. General Partridge's re-
sponsibilities continued to be limited to the broad planning
statement of air defense systems requirements and the estab-
lishment of the tactics and techniques that were to be
followed in the wartime operation .of these systems. The ad-
ministration, logistics, supply, training, and personnel as-
pects of his forces remained the responsibility of the compo-
nent service commands. As such, CINC-CONAD had no direct
budgetary function in systems procurement. In General Par-
tridge's words in March 19 59:
I submit to the JCS plans for the future and re-
quirements for forces.... CAfter the JCS decides
on a program for all services] , the various portions
of the program are then suballocated to the three ser-
vices in the U. S., and the three services then budget
for the necessary funds, procure the real estate, do




ready they are turned over to me to use. . . . [This
is] an involved and time consuming process.
And it was also a process whose "laissez-faire" aspects
were supposed to have been eliminated by the Department of
Defense Reorganization Bill of August 1958. There are indeed
strong indications that air defense organization was the most
important single headache that the White House hoped to cure
31by this legislation. The Act established CONAD as a
strengthened unified command reporting directly to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, rather than
through the Air Force as executive agency. The Act was also
intended to increase the administrative control of the Secre-
tary within the Defense Department, partly to overcome the
previous apparent reluctance at the Secretary level to elimi-
nate or redirect duplicative weapons systems -- particularly
those associated with air defense missiles.
A unified CONAD, furthermore, would give the decisions
of its commander more of the authority of the Defense Secre-
Testimony, Hearings, Senate, Subcommittee of Committee
on Armed Services, Milita ry Construction Authorization Fiscal
Year 1960 , 36th, 1st, S. 1086, "March 1959, pp. 32, 42.
31See, e. g., the testimony of SECDEF McElroy and SECAF
Douglass, Hearings, House, Committee on Armed Services, Inves -
tigation of National Defense Missiles , 85th, 2nd, H. R. #67,
January 1958, pp. 4068 and 4724 respectively; and Hearings,
Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense
Reorganization Ac t of 1958 , 85th, 2nd, H. R. 12541, June 1958,
pp. 85, 406ff., 416ff.
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tary and the JCS and, hopefully, eliminate the type of doctrinal
dispute which erupted between the Army and Air Force during
1958. The dispute centered on the Army Air Defense Command's
alleged general war policy of "shooting ' everything down and
sorting out. (the friendlies and the hostiles) on the ground."
As one Army colonel stated in January 1958:* "As between the
risk to friendly aircraft and the certainty of destruction
of unidentified, the entire priority must be given the latter,
even though the probability of the former may approach 10
percent because of the weapon selected." He went on then to
argue that each anti-aircraft battery should be considered
an autonomous unit with exclusive jurisdiction over the use
of the airspace within range of its weapons, since it was
32the unit which could engage the enemy most rapidly. The
Air Force asserted that this "terrifying" doctrine which
"disowned identification as any part of the Army air defense
mission" was, moreover, being taught at the Army Air Defense
33School contrary to the intent of CONAD. The implications
of these problems of meshing effectively various air defense
weapons led the Air Force to establish in 1958 the Air De-
fense Systems Integration Division, with the MITRE Corporation
32Colonel W. M. Vann, "Antiaircraft Defense", Military
Review , XXXVII (January 1958) ,p. 63.






as its management consultant.
This dispute did indeed die down after the creation of
a unified GONAD in August 19 58. In October, it was as-
serted by Army magazine that "Army air defense units attack
only those targets which tCINC-CONAD.1 wants attacked, and no
34
others." And, in March 1959, when Air Force Chief of
Staff, General White, was asked, "Do you have any concern
about the Nike shooting down SAC planes because of lack of
proper means of identification?"; he replied, "No, I do not.
35We have that very well ironed out."
Yet, the Reorganization Act was by no means the panacea
for air defense organizational problems as they were viewed
from the CONAD perspective. General Partridge's early
retirement in May 19 59 was attributed to his feelings that
CINC-CONAD's powers were still not commensurate with his
authority, especially in the JCS determination of the
ratio of Nike-Hercules/Bomarc procurement. His successor,
General L. S. Kuter, continued to suffer from an uncertain
relationship with the Navy. An example of this was the
34Volume IX, (October 1958)
, p. 62.
35Hearings, Senate, Subcommittee of Committee on Armed
Services, Major Defense Matters with Emphasis on the Fiscal
Year 1960 Mi litary Budget and the Berlin Situation , 86th,
1st, March-June 1959, p. 104.





Navy's withdrawal and decommissioning of nine radar picket
ships from the seaward extensions of the DEW line in November
19 59. This move was made unilaterally over the objections of
CINC-CONAD who asserted that the WV-2 aircraft which would
remain flying airborne early warning patrols would not have
so good a detection capability as would the' ships. And
the USN justification of the withdrawal was hardly designed
to pacify General Kuter: "The ships having the least effect
on the fighting capability of the Navy were selected to be
37decommissioned.
"
Nor were CONAD ' s relations with the Air force made any
smoother by the elimination of the latter 's executive agency
capacity in air defense matters and. the raising of CONAD to
the same organizational level as S.AC. As 1960 wore on, there,
appeared' to be signs of increasing USAF --CONAD friction occa-
sioned by the persistent attempts of CONAD to use . its newly
authorized direct line to JCS to plead for the closest
38
possible attention to the requirements of air defense.
37CNO memorandum OP-03:jec of 8 March 1960 (Subj : "With-
drawal of radar picket ships....") submitted to the House
Armed Services Committee and reprinted on pp. 455-456 of the
Hearings cited in footnote 14 on p. 157 above.
3 8
See, e. g. , Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps .
,
Department of Defense Appropriations 1961 (" . . .Reappraisal of
Air Defense Programs"), 86th, 2nd, March 1960, pp. 26-27.
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2. Syst ems Research , Development, and Procurement
With the incipient collapse of the "bomber gap" and
the orbiting of Sputnik, fears began to be generated within
the United States that its air defense posture would be
obsolescent before it was completed, and pressures grew
for a re-direction of the systems programming policies.
In the face of such a domestic reaction to the changing
Soviet threat, Administration and military spokesmen pro-
ferred reasons in 1957-58 for continued bomber defense ap-
propriations, Secretary of the Air Force Quarles rejected
the obsolescence fears by arguing that, without bomber de-
fenses, manned aircraft would be the preferred way for the
Soviets to do their strategic bombing even if they had an
39ICBM or submarine-launched missile capability. General
LeMay objected to Congressional concern about future missile
attacks when the American population could "be killed a lot
easier by a bomber today....", and asserted that the country
40had not done enough yet to meet this present threat. Gen-
eral Partridge highlighted the magnitude of this job which
39Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations 1958 (Part 1) , 85th, 1st,
February 19 57, pTTO 8 9 .
40
Hearings, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Sup -
plementa l Defense Appropriations Bill 1958 , 8 5th, 2nd, H. R.
1014 6 , Janua ry~T95 8 , p. 113.
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remained in building an adequate bomber defense system. He
estimated that 1950-65 costs would cumulate to about $61
billion; and stated that "unfortunately only a small portion
of this has been spent already, and the big expenditures
41lie ahead of us." General James M. Gavin, the Army's
Chief of R&D, offered real dividends from such expenditures:
"We are after 100 percent effectiveness in defense. And
with the nuclear Hercules, and the Talos...and the (.low-
altitude SAM.} HAWK systems, in a mixed complex, very little,
42if anything, is going to get through...." These missiles,
along with the Bomarc, would be controlled by the vastly
more advanced SAGE/Missile Master - system which was expected
to be fully operational in the 1959-60 period when the
Soviet bomber-production capability was expected to be sig-
nificantly greater than the 1957-58 estimates.
Other specific bomber defense expenditures were justi-
fied as involving mandatory improvements upon existing pro-
grams in order to save the investment in them. Thus, the
eastward and westward extensions of the DEW line were neces-
sary to preclude the out-flanking of this early-warning net.
U. S. News and Wor ld Report interview, September 6,
1957, pp. 31-32.
42Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps, Depart-




Also, the "White Alice" radio communication system in Alaska
was vital to overcome the magnetic storms, which had report-
edly caused the DEW line radar stations there to be out. of
touch with CONAD headquarters about 7 percent of the time
43in 1957-58. The air surveillance system within the U. S.
would be rendered essentially useless unless a "frequency
diversity radar" program were initiated to cope with the
smaller radar reflecting areas, higher operating altitudes,
and increased electronic countermeasures capability of the
newer Soviet bombers and their expected air-to-surface mis-
44
siles. Funds for the expedited construction* of five SAGE
centers were needed, moreover, to bring the lagging building
construction in line with the computer production ---- a situ-
ation which had forced the accumulation of the hardware in
45
costly air-conditioned storage. In addition, one-half of
the entire fiscal year 1958 ADC construction program involved
necessary expenditures for storage and improved check-out
43Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Depart-
ment of Air Force Appropriations 19 58, 85th, 1st, April 1957,
p~. 6 2 2; and Hanson Baldwin, "Communique from Our Alaskan Out-
post, " New York Times Magazine, March 15, 1959, p. 101.
44Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps., Depart -
ment of Defense Appropriations 1959 (Department of Air Force)
,
85th, 2nd, March 1958, "p. 383.
45 See footnote 12 on p. 156 above, and the testimony of








Furthermore, when the Eisenhower Administration proposed
in the fiscal year 19 5 8 budget to reduce the USAF force
structure from 137 wings to 128 wings (in order to create
an offensive missile force) , no ADC wings were cut-out, and
the interceptor- force modernization program was to go forward
as planned.
Finally, of course, the belated recognition of the vul-
nerability of SAC to a surprise air-atomic attack would seem
to have given real impetus to new air defense expenditures,
apart from the SAC dispersal and ground-alert facilities
programs launched in 19 57. That is, there would appear to
be an increased need for air defense programs which would
ensure that S/aC had maximum warning time to get airborne,
active defense protection on its bases, fighter-interceptor
support on its outbound flights, and assurances that its
planes would not be shot down enroute home.
Funds were indeed appropriated and obligated for each
of the specific bomber defense programs mentioned above
which were requested in fiscal year 1958. The Administra-
46 Hearings, House, Committee on Armed Services, Military
and Nava l Cons truction, 85th, 1st, H. R. 7130 and H. R. 8240,
May 1957, p. "1991.
47
Testimony of SECAF Douglass, ibid . , pp. 1965, 1968.
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tion's fiscal 19 59 construe Lion requests, however, were re-
ceived much more critically by Congress. By that time, as
we have seen, national intelligence estimates had further
reduced the Soviets 1 operational heavy-bomber strength.
Moreover, the budget estimates for continental defense in
fiscal 1959 had increased substantially to some $4.6 billion
(eleven percent of the Department of Defense total) which was
48
more than ever before planned. This prompted the Senate
Armed Services Committee to state in its construction autho-
rization report of July 1958 that "the effort and resources
the country is putting into continental defense systems is .
tremendous and a little bit frightening." The report went
on to complain that
in classified briefings, overlays shown of ex-
isting and planned defensive systems indicate
the eventual deployment of at least four systems
superimposed upon each other and blanketing the
entire continent. While each system has its
own special characteristics, these overlays clearly
indicate areas of overlap where one system might
well perform the function of its neighbor .... (T) he
committee's experience is that such programs have a
habit of being approved by default through the medium
of piecemeal submission on an annual basis without
regard to the accumulation of long-range contingent
liabilities. (In fact, the committee suspects that
in some instances where the JCS cannot agree on du-
plicating systems, it slightly reduces each in scope
4 8Page 293 of the Senate Hearings cited in footnote 35




and proceeds to develop both.)
The focal point of this Congressional criticism v/as
the potential duplication of surface-to-air missile pro-
grams embodied in the Air Force's Bomarc and the Army's
Nike-Hercules. It appeared to the non-technical person
that both of these systems would do the same thing at dif-
ferent ranges --- destroy high altitude enemy aircraft.
Their differences became even less clear as the Nike was
improved so that its range might extend beyond 10 miles
and shade it, hence, into the "area defense" category.
Such rapidly-changing weapons improvements tended also to
make Secretary Wilson's 1956 memorandum appear unrealistic
in its attempt to distinguish SAM systems' roles and missions
by the nature; of their radar guidance information. Further-
more, as General Partridge had stated in the Fall of 1957,
"It is meaningless, almost, to talk about point defense or
local defense,. . . .When it is a city you want to defend, you
put these NIKE batteries all the way out here like this,
49Military _ Construction Authoriz ation Fiscal Year 1959
,
Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 85th, 2nd, S. Rept. 1982
on H. R. 13015, July 28, 1958, pp. 20, 22-23. Cf. the obser-
vation that the services' "experience under General Eisenhower
has taught them that he expects one rule to be followed. It
is that if a service really wants a new weapon system and can
make a convincing case for it, that service can have its wea-
pon, but only if something else is dropped from its catalogue."
C.J.V. Murphy/,, "Defense: The Converging Decisions", Fortune ,
LVIII (October 1958), p. 120.
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and you are covering maybe 125 miles across the area".1
After a detailed review of these two systems, the Mili-
tary Construction Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee was content to make a 2 percent reduction in the
total funding requested for them; and they authorized the
Secretary of Defense to construct such Army and Air Force
51
missile sites as he deemed essential to U. S. security.
With the procurement funds available, the Army began to
replace its Mike-Ajax missiles with the Hercules during
1958 and laid plans for the introduction by mid-1959 of
its Hawk low-altitude, point-defense SAM. The' Air Force
continued to experience difficulties with its Bomarc A
5 2test program which was in its seventh year. For its
contribution' to the low-altitude SAM field, the Air Force
initiated in February 19 5 8 the Bomarc B program on an ac-
50
U. S. News and World Report interview,' September 6,
1957, p. 83.
Page 26 of Senate Report 1982 cited in footnote 49
on p. 175 above. This action was substantially concurred
in by the Horase Armed Services Committee.
52Along with the technical problems, this program
suffered from an intense quarrel between the Air Force's
Air Research and Development Center and its Air Defense
Command regarding who was in charge; plus the red-tape
from the four different command channels involved in the
program's management which did not meet at a single point
short of the Chief of Staff. See Colonel Q. J. Goss, "Early
Combat Capability With New Weapons", Air University Quarterly
Review
, XIII (Summer 1962), pp. 32, 38.

17 7
celerated schedule. The Bomarc B, furthermore, was to have
a 400 mile range, in recognition of the Soviets' advances in
ASM's capable of being released several hundred miles from
53the target.
The Department of Defense fiscal year 19 60 budget esti-
mates for continental defense programs continued at a $4.3
54billion level, a full ten percent of the Department's total.
Included therein were authorization requests for the initial
construction of fifty additional Hercules sites and thirty
Bomarc batteries. However, the offensive "missile gap" debate
in 1959 generated even more American public pressures for a
step-up in the ICBM, Polaris, and anti-ballistic missile pro-
grams and increased fear that the U. S. bomber defense pro-
grams were obsolescent; while the collapse of the "bomber
gap" made such major additional air defense expenditures
appear more unwarranted. Such pressures were compounded by
the "finite deterrence" versus "counterforce" strategic doc-
trinal controversy which reached a peak in the U. S. early
in 1959. The Navy and Army, among others, asserted that the
U. S. had developed an air-atomic "overkill" capability and
should redirect its resources toward achieving a small, in-
53See p. 201 of the House Hearings cited in footnote 119
on p. 13 6 above.
54Page 293 of the Senate Hearings cited in footnote 35
on p. 16 8 above.
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vulnerable nuclear deterrent force and a modernized, mobile
ground force. The Air Force was compelled to deny the "over-
kill" argument and stepped-up its pleas for additional B-52
wings and increased numbers of B-53's to replace the aging
B-47's. This controversy placed the Air Force in the un-
comfortable position of admitting that the U. S. was spending
too much money on air defense (hence, redirect toward SAC),.
while arguing for continued authorizations for its Bomarc/
SAGE. And as a reflection of the Air Force's position on
these issues, consider the practically unprecedented justi-
fication for air defense expenditures which Ge'neral White,
Chief of Staff, gave at this time: "You may be sure that
the Russians are spending ... just about the same proportion
of their military budget on the same kind of defense as we
are, and that they are going out as fast as they can with a
55SAGE system that is copied or at least similar to. ours."
Moreover, the Defense Department, under ' Congressional
pressures to reduce air defense funding, shifted markedly
from its 1954-56 arguments and became in early- 1959 the
leading forecaster of an improved Soviet air-atomic force --
supersonic bombers equipped with advanced ASM's — and a
principal proponent of the requirement to push the air battle






To bolster their arguments for the Bomarc, the Defense Depart-
ment and the Air Force highlighted the report of an ad hoc
technical panel (the Furnas Committee) convened by DOD in
December 19 5 8 to determine whether the low--altitude--capable
,
extended-range Bomarc B could become an active part of NORAD
by 1961. The report confirmed the feasibility of the pro-
56gram and recommended that initial deployment be expedited.
(The Air Force then shifted the emphasis of its Bomarc pro-
ject by proposing to build only five !'A" sites with the re-
57inamder to be manned with the ,; B" model missiles. ) The
Defense Department also justified the Bomarc program on the
basis of a February 19 59 decision by Canada to cancel its
5 8CF-105 interceptor development and buy Bomarcs instead.
Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Ccmm. on Approps., Depart-
men t of Defense Appropriations 1 960 , 86th, 1st, May 1959, p. 20*





There are indications that the Air Force "pressured"
the Canadian government into this decision (despite the grave
uncertainties of the Canadians regarding Bomarc) by its Decem-
ber 1958 determination not to procure the CF-105 for its own
forces (after over a year of encouragement that such action
was likely), and its magnification of the USSR's long-range
ASM threat. Hence, one of the reasons for DOD ' s support of
Bomarc might have been the Administration's concern over the
political implications in Canada if the program were "can-
celled" by Congress. See HANSARD, Session 1959, Vol. II,
March 2, 1959, pp. 1499ff. and 1514; Melvin Conant, "Canada's
^ole in Western Defense", Foreign Affairs , XL (April 1962),
p. 4 37; and Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps.,
Department of Defense Appropriations 1961 (Part 7) , 86th,
2nd, March 19 60, p. 254.
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Finally, the Air Force pointed out that Bomarc ' s reaction-
time permitted the launching of a battery's thirty "A"
missiles or twenty-five :, B" missiles within two minutes or
thirty seconds respectively; while only one-quarter of a
Hercules battery's eighty-four missiles could be launched in
59fifteen minutes, with all of them requiring three hours.
The Army responded to these arguments by stressing that -•
whereas the Bomarc had been tested for some eight years at
a cost of over $2 billion without achieving an operational
capability -- Hercules missiles were already sited at sixty-
two locations with trained crews. Furthermore, they asserted
that the Hercules had been successful in tests against super-
sonic targets while the Bomarc had yet to shoot one down.
The Army also reiterated how the deployment of Nikes demon-
strated that system's area defense capability by providing
a "continuous protective blanket" covering vital continental
complexes for many square miles.
These questions regarding the proper mix of U. S. surface-
59New York Times , May 24, 1959, p. 7. These unfavorable
Nike reaction times were based on a TOP SECRET test which the
Air Force made public, according to the Dawson Subcommittee
Report, p. 123.
60New York Times , May 24, 1959, p. 7.
fi 1
See, e.g., the testimony of Secretary of the Army W. H.
Bruckner, Hearings, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations
I960, May 19 59, p. 74.
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to~air missile programs (as well as the larger question of
offensive versus defensive systems expenditures) came to a
head during the Congressional Hearings on the fiscal year
1960 budget. Secretary of Defense McElroy testified frankly
that this was an area where his Department had not done very
well in arriving at a decision. Indeed this was for McElroy
"the most difficult matter" which confronted him; and he
eventually confessed: "As far as I am concerned, it would
not bother me if you held our feet to the fire and forced us
in connection with this budget." The Armed Services Commit-
tees reacted quickly to the offer.
The Senate Armed Services Committee in May 1959 deleted
over $17 million of the $22.4 million in Army requests for
initial construction on the fifty Nike-Hercules sites. It
asserted that the Nike was "virtually obsolete" since it
could be outflanked by Russian bombers, and that greater
emphasis should be placed on area defense systems. Almost
simultaneously, the House Armed Services Committee reported
its bill which severely reduced the Air Force's Bomarc autho-
rization requests. This Committee was more impressed with
the fact that Nike was already operational and somewhat less
Ibid
. , pp. 31, 33. See also p. 331ff.
Military Construction Authorization Fiscal Year 1960,
Senate Report 296~T~S~6th, 1st, May 29, 1959, pp. 13-14; New




costly than the Boniarc system.
The sharp difference between these May 19 59 bills
brought the SAM controversy more into the open and increased
the interservice acrimony which surrounded the debate. With-
in a month, the Department of Defense was presenting to Con-
gress an air defense "master plan" which attempted to clari-
fy and integrate in one document all of the defensive systems
requirements. Significantly, the plan called for the re-
65tention of each system, although most were reduced in scope.
The Nike-Hercules program was reduced by $469 million over
the life of the program, which represented a 30 percent de-
crease in the number of contemplated b^itteries. Bomarc re-
quirements were reduced from thirty to eighteen batteries,
effecting a program-life savings of $750 million. SAGE
centers construction was reduced by $49 million. Prime
radar sites were also reduced by $274 million, with an in-
crease of $9 4 million for gap-filler radars. The Nike-Zeus
anti-ballistic missile program received a proposed increase
of $137 million. Finally, none of the approximately $1.3
64Dawson Subcommittee Report, p. 123.
The following is taken from the testimony of M. H.
Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, on pp. 294, 306-
307 of the Senate Hearings cited in footnote 35 on p. 168
above; and Hanson Baldwin, New York Times , June 21, 19 59,
Part IV, p. 7. The systems deployment concepts in the
"master plan" will be discussed in subsection 3 below.
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billion thus saved v/as proposed to be added to offensive
systems so far as the "master plan" was concerned.
The military construction bills which were subsequently
passed accepted this "master plan" in the sense that they
gave full authorization for its fiscal 1960 requests. In
addition, air defense funding in the Administration's fiscal
1961 budget was prepared on the basis of this plan. But,
as another Congressional committee was to report in Septem-
ber 19 59, with reference to the formulation of the plan:
Since the JCS... could not come into agreement, they
had to defer to CSECDEF'sJ non-military advisors.
The decisions were military only to the extent that
the Joint Chiefs had to re-arrange their assessment of
the air defense requirements;- the decisions were fis-
cal in part, political in part, and in some respects
they were based upon considerations of precedent in
the allocation of resources among the separate servi-
ces. 66
The "master plan" did not direct itself to fighter-
interceptor requirements and accepted the USAF plans for these
systems. The Defense Department, however, did direct the Air
Force to decide whether its new MACH-3 aircraft was to be
the B-70 bomber or the F-10 8 interceptor; but not both.
Despite an investment of $150 million, the Air Force chose
to cancel the F-108 program in September 1959 -- a decision
based upon, according to General White, "What would worry the
Dawson Subcommittee Report, p. 152.
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Russians most.... 1'^' Other important changes to fighter
systems development programs arose from a further re-
evaluation of future air defense requirements which the
Air Force conducted unilaterally in January and February
I960. 68
...
At this time, intelligence estimates had made still
another reduction in the Soviets ' operational heavy bomber
strength and Khrushchev had strongly implied that few, if
any, future bombers would be produced. While the Admini-
stration had begun to reject the "missile gap", there
seemed little doubt that the IC3M would become the pre-
dominant threat in the 1963-65 period. The Air Force's
air defense study in early 19 6 determined that, as then
presently contemplated, U. S. bomber defense programs would
achieve full operational capability just about that same
time. Further analysis disclosed that many new features
would have to be added to the bomber defense programs if
C 1
Page 126 of the Senate Hearings cited in footnote 14
on page 157 above.
6 8
The below discussion of this Air Force study draws
upon testimony of Major General H. M. Estes, Jr., Assistant
Chief of Staff, USAF, Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on
Government Operations, Organization and Management of Missile
Programs (Part 2), 86th, 2nd, May 1960, pp. 46-49, 66;
and the March 24, 1960 report of the study, entitled
"Revisions in 1960 and 1961 Air Force Programs: Reappraisal
of Air Defense Programs," Appendix to Hearings, House,
Subc. of Comm. on Approps., Department of Defense Approp -
riations 1961, 86th, 2nd, passim.
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they were to be retained and were to survive an ICBM
attack; e.g., more hardening of SAGE combat centers, harden-
ing and dispersal of Bomarc, and "positive provisions " for
fighter- interceptor survival. Such features were obviously
expensive and to implement them would delay still further
the achievement of the system's full operational capability.
The USAF thus decided in March 19 6 to go beyond the
Department of Defense's "master plan" and reduce further
its bomber defense programs by concentrating on those systems
improvements which could be completed most quickly; and to
redirect the other released funds toward an acceleration
of Air Force ICBM and anti-ICBM programs. Therefore, the
construction of eight super (hardened) SAGE combat centers
was cancelled, and the SAGE ' s other twenty-five center-
program was re-arranged to effect completion in calendar
1962 rather than 1964. The number of planned Bomarc B
batteries was further decreased from eighteen to ten, with
69
a more timely completion date of mid-19 61. The Air Force's
existing supersonic fighter force was to receive more im-
mediate modernization, increased all-weather capabilities,
69The repeated test-failures of the Bomarc missiles
doubtlessly contributed to this decision, also. Ironically,
the first successful Bomarc B interception of a supersonic
target (after seven failures) occurred only three weeks
after the Air Force decision to cut-back the program. See
Air Force, XLIII (September 1960), p. 264.
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and more extensive nuclear arming. Finally, a new fire-
control system and an advanced air-to-air missile for inter-
ceptors was to continue under development "as an insurance
policy against the possibility of an increased bomber threat
4-t c 4. -.70-in the future
.
3. Sys tems Deployment and Operation
During 1957-58, the U. S. bomber defense capability was
markedly improved as major systems came into initial oper-
ational use. The main DEW line was turned over to the Air
Force in August 1957. The line's westward extension was on
limited operational status in late 1958 and work on the east-
ward extension began during the 1958 construction season.
The thirty-four "White Alice" tropospheric scatter radio
stations in Alaska were all transmitting by March 1958, and,
during that year, communications from the DEW radar chain
to Anchorage and Fairbanks were effective about 99.4 per-
71
cent of the time. Progress with the low-altitude gap-
filler radar program enabled the Ground Observer Corps to
be put on a ready reserve status in January 1958 and to be
completely eliminated in January 1959. Also, in 1958 the
70General Estes 1 testimony on p . 4 8 of the House
Hearings cited in footnote 68 on p. 184 above.




U. S. went from subsonic to supersonic aircraft in the ma-
jority of its interceptor force. Moreover, many of the
fighter squadrons had been equipped with conventional • air-
to-air missiles (AAM's) and an increasing percentage of them
were capable of employing the nuclear Genie AAM. The sixty
Nike-Ajax battalions which had been deployed between 1953-58
began to be replaced in June 19 5 8 by the nuclear Hercules
missile. The first of the new ground control radar units
for these Army missiles -- the Missile Master -- was in-
stalled in January 1957. 7md the first SAGE control center
was opened at MacGuire Air Force Base in June 1958.
That these systems were welcomed additions to the air
defense community is unquestioned. General Partridge de-
scribed the Genie AAM as being "as. important to the air de-
7 2fense business as radar was in World War II. NORAD ex-
perts proclaimed that "one modern interceptor armed with nu-
clear weapons L"could3 now -in effect-do the job formerly done
73by about sixteen of the old conventionally armed F~86's."
The ability of SAGE to handle about 10 times the amount of
information that had been handled on a manual basis was
described by one Air Force general as "the answer today to
Interview in USNWP , September 6, 1957, p. 77.





the air defense problem. !l
Such exuberance must be placed, however, in a fuller per-
spective. First of all, despite the widespread deployment of
air defense systems within the continental U. S. by 1959 (and
the projected plans for additional overlapping coverage) , the
entire Dominion of Canada had no surface-to-air missiles and
only nine squadrons of subsonic, CF-100 fighters deployed
upon its territory to handle initially the Soviet first-
strike bombers -- with the newer CF-105 not expected to be
75
operational until 1962. Besides, even these limited forces
were greatly reduced in their potential effectiveness by the
political obstacles in both the U. S. and Canada which had
precluded their being equipped with nuclear weapons.
Secondly, NORAD air defense officials were still
quite mindful of the inherent tactical advantages that
accrued to the offense -- advantages which were complemented
by the continued advances in the Soviets 1 air-atomic capa-
bilities. Referring to the expected NORAD attrition-rates,
General Partridge analogized: "It's like shooting down all
the birds in a flock of ducks. If the conditions are good,
74Testimony of General Friedman, Hearings, House,
Department of Defense Appropriations 1959 ("Department of
Air" Force"), 85th, 2nd," March 1958, p. 656
.
75




we would get most of them. If they're bad, or the ducks
are exceptionally adept, we might miss a good many."
This question of NORAD ' s attrition capability was answered
more specifically by an Air Force colonel who cautioned in
February 1958: "I would not like to leave the impression
77in anybody's mind that it would be more than 50 percent."
In this connection, Herman Kahn made an interesting ob-
servation on "the general feeling of hopelessness held by
even the protagonists of air defense" at this time. He
pointed to a motto of NORAD which affirmed: "We believe that
the defense of North America is so vital, not *only to the
people of the U. S. and Canada but to the whole Free World,
that we must build the best air defense that seems possible,
because it might work -~ not fail /to build it because it
might not." Kahn then suggested that "a military organiza-
tion that is worried about its morale would be extremely
loathe to raise the question 'might work' unless it felt that
this view would improve morale; that is, unless it felt that
the 'might work' position represented a more optimistic
7 8point of view than that held by the audience."
7 6
USNWP interview, p. 76.
77Hearings, House, Department of Defense Appropriations
1959 ("Overall Policy Statements"), p. 144~
7 8




During 1959-60, the deployment of the newer radar,
missile, and fighter-interceptor programs increased —
>
while pressures grew to reduce the perceived excesses of
overlapping coverage of America's bomber defenses. The
western extension of the DEW line (from the Aleutians to
Midway Island) was completed during 19 60. The radar im-
provement program ("frequency diversity 5 ') became initially
operational in 1959. Its radars were credited with being
better by a factor of two in range and three to four in
altitude than the previous radars, against a Bison- type
target; and, furthermore, they would prevent any substantial
79degradation of the radar coverage against Soviet ASM's,
During 19 59, SAGE coverage of the northeast United States
was completed, as well as a substantial portion of the north
central region. The north central and northwestern areas
v/ere covered with a SAGE capability during 1960. By June
1960 the last 90 and 120 millimeter AAA unit in NORAD had
been phased-out, and a substantial number of the Army's
surface-to-air missile battalions had been converted to the
Nike-Hercules. The Hawk low-altitude point defense missile
became operational in mid-1959. The modernization program
79Testimony of Colonel Woods, USAF, Hearings, House,
Subc. of Coram, on Approps
.
, Military Construction Appropri-
ations 1960, 86th, 1st, May 1959, p. 454.
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for the over 1,500 U. S. fighLer interceptors was expedited
in 19 60 to approach a 100 percent all-weather, missile-
armed force. Further, the number of U. S. -based fighters
on a five and fifteen minute alert status was increased
by almost 20 percent during 1960. By mid-1959, three
ANG squadrons were being equipped with Sidewinder AAM's and,
as of July 19 60, nineteen ANG squadrons were standing a




To what extent were these improvements in U. S. air
defense systems directed toward reducing the vulnerability
of SAC to a surprise bomber attack between 1957-60? As
mentioned above, this vulnerability had been painfully de-
tailed to the Administration by the Gaither Report of late
19 57. It seems evident, however, that both the Administra-
tion's biases and the domestic inter-service problems which
continued throughout this period acted to impede the specific
and widespread deployment of active defense systems in pro-
tection of SAC's second-strike capability.
8 Testimony of General Agee , USAF, Hearings, House,
Subc. of Coram, on Approps
.
, Department of Defense Appropri-
ations for 1962 (Part 2), 87th, 1st, March 1961, pp. '805,"
958. However, the sharply reduced fiscal 1961 defense bud-
get necessitated the dropping of eight squadrons of older
fighter-interceptors from the USAF inventory. See Ai r Force
,
XLIII (September 1960), p. 262.






Throughout the 1957-60 period, various Congressional
committees would object to the continued high-priority ef-
forts of the Administration to "palliate" the public through
the active defense protection of their industries and cit-
ies. For example,, a Senate report in mid-19 58 expressed con-
cern about "the heavy deployment of missiles requiring stock-
piles of nuclear warheads immediately adjacent to heavy cen-
ters of population", and objected to "the attendant publici-
ty implying that the deployment of these weapons at such lo-
cations constitutes no hazard and provides complete security
82from attack." In March 1959, Senator Jackson referred to
this situation and stated: "I would hope that the Joint
Chiefs would really look at this on a cold-blooded basis and
stop all this nonsense of soft-soaping the people and saying
that we have a defense because they have installations a-
-i
•
. ii 83round a city.
Additionally, the acrimonious Ilercules-Bomarc inter-
service controversy, which' replaced the earlier Ajax-Talos
dispute, created further obstacles in 1957-58 to the re-
direction of the Army's surface-to-air missile deployment
toward SAC bases. For legitimate budgetary reasons, more-
8 2




Page 127 of the Senate Hearings cited in footnote 35
on p . 16 8 above.
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over, the Army was concerned to utilize its Hercules ini-
tially on existent Ajax city-ringing sites, as replacements
for these older missiles. By early 1959, however, the fifty
additional Hercules sites which the Defense Department re-
quested were reportedly scheduled to protect about twenty-
five SAC bases. But, when the "master plan" reduced the
program by 30 percent, only about sixteen SAC bases could
84be provided with point-defense missiles -- and only after
a lengthy construction period had transpired.
Of course, the Air Force could have recognized the
need to protect its strategic aircraft and still have
rejected the need for point defense systems, even if they
had been made available to SAC after 1956. Indeed, the
many efforts which the USAF made to distinguish its area
defense or "defense-in-depth" philosophy from the Army's
point-defense or "building-block" preferences are in-
8 5
structive here. Long-range interceptors and Bomarcs
deployed all along the northern periphery of the conti-
nental US, (and on newly constructed USAF bases!) were,
84Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, May 28, 1959, p. 13;
and June 21, 19 59, Part IV, p. 7.
8 5
As late as March 19 60 -- two and one half years
after CINC--NORAD had described such distinctions as vir-
tually "meaningless" — General White still took pains
to detail the differences in these concepts. (Hearings,




henceforth, more vital to SAC than obsolescing Nikes, Yet
even the interceptors and Bomarcs appeared to command a low-
er priority in this regard than did the continental radar
warning net. As General LeMay emphasized at the 19 56 Air
Power Hearings
:
Alert time is more important than anything else.
It does not matter whether you shoot .down zero
percent or 3 percent of the bombers coming in.
That is not so important. But alert time is.
That is the factor that will give us the abili-
ty to save more of our force. (page 204.)
It seems plausible, therefore, that the Air Force viewed its
SAC base dispersal program, coupled with its attempts to a-
chieve a fifteen minute ground alert capability for one-
.
third of SAC, as a sufficient response to the RAND • Base Se-
lection Study, Gaither Committee Report, etc. But even
these programs (initiated in 19 56-57) had not been completed
by 1960.
One must conclude again that, at bottom, the Air
Force remained skeptical that an air-atomic attack could
significantly cripple SAC -- no matter what defensive
measures were taken; bomber gap or no bomber gap. For
example, General White could still submit in March 1959:
"I do not think Cour SAC bases 1 are very vulnerable at
this time to a low-level bombing attack, because it is
going to be very difficult for the Russians to make a






If active air defense systems played a subordinate
role in reducing the vulnerability of SAC to a Soviet
counterforce bomber strike, the question of the vulner-
ability of the air defense system itself to a Soviet ICBM/
SLBM strike was also subordinated. Despite the vociferous
"missile gap" discussions in the U. S., it appears that not
until about 1360 was serious attention given (by the USAF)
to the question of the capability of American bomber de-
fenses to survive a missile attack. And it was not until
1962 that programs to increase this capability were effected
Before that time, there were no plans for the quick dis-
persal to additional pre-equipped bases of Regular and ANG
fighter-interceptor squadrons in a post-attack environment.
The Bomarc program (unlike the U. S.' ICBM program) was a
"soft" one and was to be concentrated on fewer than a doz-
en bases. None of the SAGE ' s twenty-one control centers
was hardened, seven were co- located with SAC forces, and
q c
Page 103 of the Senate Hearings cited in footnote
35 on p. 16 8 above. And recall again that General LeMay
was still asserting in 19 6 4 that since the USSR had no real
wartime bombing experience, their pilots remained deficient;
and they would catch-up with U. S. strategic bombing ex-
pertise only when all the World War II-experienced SAC
officers retired. Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Coram, on
Approps., and Committee on Armed Services, Department of
Defense Appropriations 1965 (Part 1) , 8 8th, 2nd, March
1964, p. 7 2 5."
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two were in close proximity to largo cities. Furthermore,
the NORAD headquarters in Colorado was located above ground
o n
in the end of an old hospital.
Part of the explanation for this situation was simply
the lack of a sense of urgency to redirect programs which
came only when the potential ICBM threat materialized in-
to a significant operational threat after 1960. There was
also, of course, the Administration's ceilings on defense
expenditures. As General LeMay later reported: "When we
built the SAGE system, we were pressed for funds as always,
and instead of putting them out in isolated places we put
88them on bases that we already had. :i Furthermore, it
seems likely that the interservice SAM dispute which
dominated air defense polemics during this period (i.e.,
each 'service asserting that its missiles could kill more
bombers) obscured both the issues of system survivability
and system obsolescence in the face of a growing ICBM/
SLBM threat.
O "7
On these points see p. lOOff, of the Senate Hearings
cited in footnote 35 on p. 16 8 above.
8 8Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps., and
Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Ap-




AIR DEFENSE IN THE BALLISTIC MISSILE AGE;
1961-66
After the IC3M "missile gap" collapsed publicly in' the
U. S. in late 1961, manned bombers and missile-launching
submarines -again became prominent in Soviet strategic claims
The Russians at this same time began to emphasize their de-
velopment of 50-100 megaton super-bombs. To support their
bomber claims, the Soviets displayed at the July 19 61 air
show their new supersonic, medium jet bomber, the Blinder,
in a ten plane fly-by. Additionally, they displayed a new
stand-off cruise missile with an estimated range of about
twice that of their older ASM's. Such missiles would give
the USSR the capability for a bomber-launched 'attack outside
the effective zone of present U. S. air defense weapons.
These qualitative improvements in the Soviets' air-atom-
ic force were not, however, matched by quantitative increases
in their inter-continental-range bomber strength after 1960.
In early 1965, the USSR was credited with the capability of
striking the continental U. S. with only "approximately 100
bombers on two-way missions, plus perhaps another 150 medium
bombers on two-way missions over Alaska, portions of Canada








and a very smaall segment of northwest U. S." By that
time, the USSR had built-up its operational long-range
offensive missile force to about 150 ICBM's, plus a hand-
ful of SLBM's.
Henceforth, there remained a definite bomber threat
after I960, and, accordingly, the need to remain defended
against it. The U. S. ' principal bomber defense concern
between 19 61-66, however, was to reduce the vulnerability
of the extant system to a prior, surprise ICBM/SL3M attack;
while simultaneously reducing NORAD ' s operating costs to
a level more commensurate with the changing overall threat.
The foremost effort toward increasing the air defense
system's survivability was directed at the aircraft
surveillance, warning, and control program. For, as we
have seen, the SAGE direction center system was "soft"
and was concentrated on or proximate to probable Soviet
missile targets.
It had been determined in 19 60 that to attempt to
"harden" SAGE would be too expensive in view of the de-
clining bomber threat, and furthermore, a Super-SAGE would
not have sufficient hardness against expected ICBM nuclear
yields. President Kennedy's changes to the Eisenhower
2SECDEF Robert MacNamara, interview in U . S . News &
World Report, April 12, 1965, pp. 54-55.
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fiscal 1962 budget thus included $23 million to establish
an interim, manual, back-up ground-control -intercept capa-
bility (BUIC) at twenty-seven prime radar sites estimated
3to have a high survival potential. Work was also begun
that year on a more effective back-up system of thirty-
four semi-automatic BUIC-II stations co -located with the
prime radars. In addition, all the U. S. prime radars be-
gan to be linked together with a new communications system
designed to operate even if SAGE were destroyed. This
system entailed fallout protection and shielding measures,
as well as emergency power facilities, to enable the crews
to function in the post-missile attack environment. By
October 1962, this manual back-up phase had been completed.
In November, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed
a phasedown of six of the twenty-one SAGE direction centers
and seventeen of its associated heavy radars. This phase-
down was completed by mid-19 64; and in 1965 the BUIC-II pro-
gram was re-oriented by programming its hardware into nine-
teen BUIC-III control sites rather than thirty-four BUIC-II
sites. These enlarged BUIC-III stations were also planned
to be integrated with twelve SAGE direction centers, with
each integrated sector internetted with ten to fifteen radars.
3Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department




Thus, any of the SAGE * s or BUIC-III's could handle the
entire sector even if the others were destroyed. The
twelve sectors would feed into four combat centers which
in turn fed into the projected underground NORAD Combat
Operation Center. This entire conversion program was .
... 4
expected to be completed by rnid--1970.
The dispersed BUIC programs cost approximately $132
million to construct, whereas the total investment in SAGE
by early 1965 was approximately $2 billion. Moreover, the
BUIC was considerably less expensive to operate. Its
capacity, of course, was significantly less than that of
the SAGE and yet more commensurate with the actual bomber
5threat.
The second principal effort made after 1961 to enable
the U. S. air defense to survive a missile attack as well as
4On the evolution of this program, see the statement of
SECDEF MacNamara, Hearings, Senate, Subc. of -Comm. on Approps
.
,
and Committee on Armed Services, Military Procurement Authori-
zations for Fiscal Year 1967 , 8 9 th , 2nd, February 19 66, p~. 71;
and Hearings, Senate, Subc. of Comm. on Approps., Department
of Defens e Appropriations 19 64
, 3 8th, 1st, April 19~6T7~PP^ 4 8-
49; and the statement of General Friedman, USAF , Hearings,
House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps., Department of Defens e
Appropriations 19 65 (Part 2) , 88th , ;2i7dV~^nuaTy~19TT7~ p • 421.
5Testimony of General Crow, USAF, and General Gerrity,
USAF, Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps., Depart-
ment of Defen se Appropriations 1966 (Part 4) , 89th, 1st,
March 1965, pp. 407 and 394 respectively; and testimony of




fight bombers pertained to its interceptor force. By the
end of 196 3, one third of the interceptor force was being
maintained on alert at all times. Also during this year,
2 5 percent of the fighter aircraft had been dispersed to
additional existing bases, and support facilities thereon
were constructed in 1963-64. This program had "permitted
ADC to disperse approximately 173 interceptors to 17
dispersal bases within three hours at the beginning of the
7
L19 62J Cuban crisis." The Air Force was less happy, how-
ever, with the steady decrease in its active fighter in-
ventory since 1959 and the attendant increase in its re-
liance on some 500 ANG interceptor aircraft. Moreover,
the USAF was unable to convince the Defense Department
throughout this period of the need to procure a new "follow-
on" manned interceptor to counter the Soviet advances in
ASM's. Secretary MacNamara apparently made such procurement
Statement of SECDEF MacNamara, Hearings, Senate, De~_
partment of Defense Appropriations 1965 (Part 1) , February
1964, p. 99.
7Testimony of General LeMay , Hearings, House, Subc. of
Comm. on Approps., Department of Defens e Appropriations 1964
(Part 2) , 88th, lst~ February 19 6 3",
-
p. 434". The Cuban
crisis also led to the reinforcement of the skimpy radar,
fighter, and SAM defenses which had been previously de-
ployed in the southeastern U. S. Such a reinforcement had
also been recommended by a House Committee Report of
September 17, 1962 which included among its arguments the
IFR capability of Soviet bombers that the U. S. "must now
concede." (Report of Special Subcommittee on Defense of




dependent upon the Soviets' deployment of a new, heavy
bomber (the Blinder had only a one-way intercontinental
range capability) ; and was otherwise content to study the
"cost-effectiveness" aspects of the alternative new inter-
g
ceptor configurations. The Administration did initiate
in early 1964, nonetheless, the F-12 aircraft test program
which continued with three planes beyond 1966. This new
interceptor was to have a MACH-3 speed and a long range
capability at both high and low-altitudes.
With regard to surface-to-air missiles, no attempt
was made by the Defense Department after 19 6 to harden or
disperse the sites. Both Bomarc and Hercules control
capability was, however, placed in the BUIC program. In
19 63, Secretary MacNamara had justified the retention of
the almost 400 Bomarc missiles by pointing out that they
cost only $20 million a year to operate and that their
concentration on eight soft bases would probably induce
the Soviets to target missiles against them. The phase-
out of Bomarc A missiles began nevertheless in 1964 with
9
the 188 "B" missiles redistributed then among six bases.
o
See e.g., MacNamara's testimony, Hearings, Senate,
Department of Defense Appropriations 1964 (Part 1) , 8 8th,
1st, February 1963, pp. 102-103.
9Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps . , Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations 19 64 (Part 1) , 88th, 1st,
February 1963, pp. 512-513; also, "Hearings , Senate, Depart-




Also, the Nike-Ajax force was completely phased-out by mid-
1965; and in early 19 6 6 it was decided to remove the twenty-
two Hercules batteries which had been deployed to defend
soft SAC bomber bases in the U. S. and Greenland. In an-
nouncing this decision to remove the Hercules, TlacNamara
reasoned that since the affected SAC bases would be :'high
priority targets for early enemy missile attack, it no longer
Cmade] sense to maintain their relatively costly anti-bomber
defenses." At this same time, I-IacNamara proposed the con-
tinued development of the SAM--D program as a possible re-
placement for the Hawk and Hercules in the 19 70 's.
Finally, the U. S. responded to the Soviets' offensive
Statement during Hearings, Senate, Military Procure-
ment Authoriz ations Fiscal Year 19 67 , February 1966, p. 73.
Such reasoning appears inconsistent, however, with Mac-
Namara's arguments for the retention of U. S. manned bombers
earlier in this same statement:
"They can force the enemy to provide defense
against aircraft in addition to defense against
missiles. This is particularly costly in the
case of terminal defenses. The defender must
make his allocation of forces in ignorance of
the attacker's strategy, and must provide in
advance for defenses against both types of at-
tack at each of his targets . The attacker,
however, can postpone his decision until the
time of the attack, then strike some targets
with missiles alone and others with bombers
alone, thereby forcing the defender, in ef-
fect, to 'waste' a large part of his re-
sources." (pp. 55-56. Italics added.)
11 Ibid., p. 74.
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missile threat by preparing to make a transition to a new
type of air defense which would be much less dependent on
a complex, ground-based command and control environment.
Accordingly, in 1966, MacNamara proposed to undertake the
contract definition phase for development prototypes of
a highly survivable airborne warning and cpntrol system
(AWACS) aircraft and its complementary overland radar.
It has cost the U. S. on the order of $2 billion a
year to support the above bomber defense programs between
1961-66. These expenditures assume special significance
in the context of the other specific anti-baLlistic missile
(ABM) programs which were (and were not) being pursued in
America at this same time. While this is not the place for
an extended discussion of ABM questions, it seems appro-
priate to juxtapose briefly the U. S. ' "whither ABM?" de-
bate of the early 1960's with the "whither air defense?"
issues of the early 1950' s.
Now, considerable funds had been expended in the
United States since 1953 on various programs to provide
warning of a ballistic missile attack. Three Ballistic
Missile Early Warning Sites (BMEWS) had become operational
by 19 63 to give NORAD a fifteen minute warning capability.
A missile defense alarm satellite system (MIDAS) had also
been developed to increase this warning time to thirty
minutes. In addition, some of the U. S. 1 coastal radars
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were modified between 1964-6 6 to give them a limited capa-
bility to detect a short-range SLBM a few minutes prior to
impact
.
Further,, the Defense Department's Advanced Projects Re-
search Agency had, since 1958, been extensively studying the
full range of missile phenomenology with special emphasis on
the ABM problem. And the "problem" centers on the question
of whether to deploy the Army's Nike Zeus/Nike-X anti-mis-
sile missile system which has been under active development
since November 1956.
The principal U . S . arguments for the deployment of an ABM
system seem to be that it would (1) save lives, (2) protect a-
gainst accidental missile firings, (3) discourage nuclear pro-
liferation, and (4) discourage Chinese Communist ICBM develop-
ment. It can be noted that (2), (3), and (4) are justifica-
tions that were not particularly relevant to the 19 50-53 air
defense debate. Moreover, even the argument that defensive
systems would reduce the number of deaths was not the primary
focus for the earlier air defense proponents. To be sure, Hi-
roshima and Nagasaki were still vivid events at that time, and
the hydrogen bomb's capacities had opened the age of threat-
enable national destruction. Yet, it seems that the air de-
fense proponents (i.e. liberal scientists, scholars) were
most concerned to demonstrate the "wrong-headedness" of their
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domestic detractors who maintained "it couldn't be done" or
who urged more nuclear offense instead. In other words, ev-
eryone knew then (as now) that a deployed defense in itself
could reduce deaths. Against a very limited threat, however,
a cogent argument for defense had to move on and address it-
self to domestic questions of timing, feasibility, cost, etc.
When the threat became significant, the saving of lives be-
came equated with the saving of the nation as an entity ~-
and technical questions and cost-effectiveness considera-
tions became subordinated in the perspective of those who
supported an ABM.
One further justification for extensive ABM expendi-
tures — which has been quite vocal in the U. S. after 1963
-- is the reported initial deployment of such a system in
the USSR. Again, no significant similar arguments can be
found for air defense programs in the early 19 50 's, despite
the more overwhelming evidence then of superior Soviet bomb-
er defenses. In short, it seems that a basic difference be-
tween the arguments for air defense in 1950-53 and for ABM
defense in 1960-63 is explained by the intervening develop-
ment of a perceived East-West strategic "balance of terror"
whose very "delicacy" calls for greater attention now to the
international systemic implications of major national secur-
ity decisions.
Hence, the principal arguments against the deployment
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of an ABM system have been that it (1) might induce a Soviet
preventive strike or, failing that, would (2) lead to a re-
newed "arms race" via a quantitative acceleration of the
USSR ICBM program, (3) costs more to deploy than it would to
negate it via qualitative improvements in Soviet bomber or
ICBM penetration aids, (4) is really not needed anyway due
to the thaw in the Cold War. Arguments against bomber de-
fense development in the early 1950 's, on the other hand,
tended to emphasize the domestic des tabilization which would
ensue: the budgetary diversions from preferred offensive
systems; the sharp break with U. S. traditions and service
doctrines; the difficult reconciliation of the demands of
the disparate activities to be protected; the resultant "Ma-
ginot Line" psychology; etc. When the detractors of air de-
fense voiced the possible undesirable Soviet or allied re-
actions to a defensive build-up, their positions seemed far
less realistic.
Now, to be sure, even the current ABM detractors' argu-
ments about undesirable Soviet responses to the deployment
of an American anti-missile system seem rather strained.
Jeremy J. Stone observed in late 19 65, for example, that no
Soviet spokesman "has made any attempt to deter our procure-
ment of an anti-missile system by suggesting that the Soviet
Union would give high priority to neutralizing its effects
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12j_by more offense] " . That is , there remain unmistakable
domestic factors which also account for the U. S. resistance
to major ABM expenditures.
The $20 billion price- tag estimate for the fully
deployed system has been, of itself, even more of an
impediment than the similar price-tag put on an air de-
fense program by the Lincoln Summer Study Group in 19 52-
53. In addition, the questions of technical feasibility
(missile reaction speed, traffic handling capacity, decoy-
discrimination capability, etc.) have haunted anti-missile
as well as anti-bomber defense programs. Also, until the
very recent development of an "exoatmospheric" area de-
fense capability for an ABM, the political question of
"whom to defend" and the burdensome economic requirement
for a complementary national fallout shelter program were
important obstacles to the system's deployment. Further-
more, the vocal supporters of ABM have tended to be con-
centrated only within segments of the military and Congress
who, by themselves, have been unable to "break the back of
resistance" to ABM within the Administration. The liberal
12Stone goes on to suggest that "this interesting
lapse probably reflects Soviet interest in their own
ballistic missile defense; it is psychologically and
politically difficult to urge or warn your adversary
to refrain from action you are yourself advocating and
planning." ("Containing the Arms Race," BAS , XXI [Sep-
tember 1965J, p. 18.)
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scientists -- unlike their 1952-53 counterparts -- have been
essentially opposed to ABM, perhaps because of their percep-
tion that the "balance of terror" is, after all, a balance.
And the USAF {which had stopped all its ABM research in Jan-
uary 19 5 8) has remained even more skeptical of the attrition
capability of an anti-missile missile than they had been
13
with regard to the kill-rate of air defenses. Indeed, ABM
R&D work has been, in a sense, even more ignoble in Defense
Department/Air Force eyes than the previous air defense ef-
forts, in that a principal justification for its existence
has been that it has advanced U. S. understanding of its
14ICBM penetration aids problems
.
Finally, let us consider again the question of the U.S. 1
$2 billion per year bomber defense expenditures between 1961-
66. Secretary MacNamara has submitted that
the requirement for air defense is more a
function of the number of targets to be
13For example, General LeMay described the Air Force s
pre-1958 research thusly: "The best scientific brains that
we in the Air Force had been able to get hold of did not
know how to do an effective job of shooting down the mis-
sile. They saw ways that could be explored, but even the
most optimistic said that they might get 10 percent of the
missiles." (Hearings, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Supp lemental Defense Appropriations Bill 1958 , 8 5 th , 2nd,
January 1958, p. 114.) Such USAF statements were retained
throughout the 1960's.
14 . .
See, e.g., Hearings, Senate, Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty , 88th, 1st, August 1963,
pp. 780ff. , 859ff.
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defended than of the number of attacking bombers.
Since the enemy would not know in advance which
targets our bombers would attack, he would have to
defend all of the targets ... .That is one of the
major arguments, if not the major argument for our
heavy manned bombers. -L 5
And General Thomas S. Power has written that "it is entirely
conceivable that bombers someday may have to serve as pene-
tration aids for our missiles by attacking an aggressor's
missile defense system. " 3y reversing the national roles
in these arguments, it is interesting to ponder whether the
ultimate significance of air defense in the ballistic mis-
sile age might have been its contribution to the retardation
of widespread ABM systems deployment in both the U. S. and
USSR, with the attendant unpredictable ramifications upon
the international strategic balance.
15Hearings, Senate, Department of Defense Appropria-
tions, 1966 (Part 1), 39th, "Tit, February 1965, p. 49; and
Hearings, House, Department of Defense Appropriations 1966
(Part 3) , p. 139.
16
Design for Survival (New York, 1964), p. 170.

PART II




AIR DEFENSE IN THE STALINIST ERA:
1946-52
Section A . U. S . Signals of Strategic Offensive Capability
and In tent
Between 19 45-47, United States demobilization policies
had cut its long-range operational bomber force to a fraction
of its wartime strength. Despite this action, there is a
growing body of scholarly Western opinion which holds that
President Truman was ready to begin the Cold War as early
as mid-1945. As one U. S. commentator has recently written:
"It is now evident that, far from following his predecessor's
policy of conciliation, shortly after taking office Truman
launched a powerful foreign policy initiative aimed at
reducing or eliminating Soviet influence in Europe...
[and that'] the atomic bomb ... determined much of Truman's
shift to a tough policy. ..."
Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and
Potsdam (New York, 1965), p. 13. For an essentially con-
curring perspective,, see Dana F. Fleming, The Cold War and
Its Origins (Vol. 1) (London, 1961), pp. 263-270' and 332;
and for the related perspective which argues that America's
"'Open Door' imperialistic bombast" in 1945-47 precluded a
rapprochement with Stalin, see William A. Williams, The
Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, 19 6 2) , passim.
See, a 1so, Martin F. Herz, The Beginnings of the Cold War




Moreover, various U. S. military leaders began in 19 45
to argue publicly that air-atomic forces should be the pri-
mary component of the American defense establishment.' For
example, General James Doolittle urged: '."We must have stri-
king power and striking power in mass and at long range.
It must be a power that knows no barriers of land or water.
2It must be air power." And in mid-1946, the requirement
for a U. S. doctrine of "massive retaliation" via strategic
air power was proclaimed when General Spaatz asserted that
American strength should lie in "our ability to strike back
quickly with a counter-offensive, to neutralize the hostile
attack at its source... by striking at the vitals of the ag-
3 . .gressor." The authoritative Finletter Commission reinforced
these sentiments, in its 19 4 8 publ-ished report, by submitting
that America's national security posture should place princi-
pal reliance on strategic aviation . capable of destroying the
enemy's industrial base.
While U. S. strategic doctrinal pronouncements contin-
ued to underline heavily the air-atomic delivery potential of
2 ...Hearings, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, De-
partment of Armed Forces; Department of Milit
a
ry Security





Hearings, House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Military





American bombers within the context of a "containment" poli-
cy, previews of such "Armageddons " with the USSR began to
appear frequently in U. S. mass media after 1947. As one
article reported in mid-19 48:
The U. S. planes would go out from England in
very small groups -- perhaps in twos and threes.
Flying at more than 3 5,00 feet they would seek
to slip into Russia unnoticed .... Russian radar
is extremely bad.... Their targets: first, Mos-
cow -- Moscow, above all. Then the other cities
of European Russia -- Kiev, Leningrad, Kharkov,
Odessa.
4
During this 1946-52 period, U. S. "air power rattling"
was complemented by a barrage of public talk from government
voices (in and out of uniform) which proposed its early use
in a preventive war.
In late 1949, the U. S. 1 Unification and Strategy Con-
gressional Hearings ("B-36 versus Supercarrier " ) provided
more strategic offensive signals. At its most basic level,
the issue that developed during these Hearings was to deter-
mine which military service
4Newsweek magazine, May 17, 19 48, pp. 30-31. The arti-
cle was reportedly based on a speech by General G. C. Kenney,
COM-SAC. See, also, General Spaatz, "If We Should Have to
Fight Again," Life, July 5, 1948, pp. 35-44; and J. and S.
Alsop, "If War Comes," Saturday Evening Post, September 11,
1948, pp. 15-17, 178-183. ~~
5For a discussion of such proposals see Vagts, Defense




could carry out best a strategy which equated threats
to our national security interests with the necessity
of inflicting maximum devestation on the heart of
the Soviet Union. I.Thusl ... although the Navy could
have drawn from its traditional strategic doctrines
of sea power to suggest an alternative strategy of
peripheral warfare, emphasizing its flexibility,
selectivity and restraint ... [it ] chose to argue in-
stead that the Navy could handle the massive air
strikes at the heart of Russia better than could the
Air Force."
Whether the attack would take the form of the Navy's "pin-
point" low-altitude bombing of military targets, the Air
Force's high-altitude mass area strikes on industrial
complexes, or -•- which was more likely -- both, the U. S.
strategy which was gropingly being formulated Clearly
had implications for the Soviet air defense posture.
To assess just how capable this posture could be
against varying U. S. offensive deployments was another
fundamental aspect of these 1949 Hearings. The Navy, for
its part, termed the B-36 bomber a "billion dollar blunder"
because USN fighters and, therefore, presumably, the Soviet
defense could outmaneuver it in its "lumbering" flight.
Admiral Radford and his group argued at length that the Air
Force was not justified in neglecting fighter protection by
concentrating on obtaining an intercontinental bombing capa-
bility, and urged a redirection of U. S. resources toward
Hammond, "NSC-68...," in Schilling, Hammond, and
Snyder, Strategy, Politics..., pp. 2 81-282.
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small, fast bombers and high performance fighters which
would operate from a network of forward land bases and
7
supercamers. In this way, the argument ran, the enemy's
air defensive capability could be degraded by swift, low-
level attacks from many directions. Further, by implica-
tion, such a strategy would require the enemy's air defense
to counter U. S. forward-based fighter air cover capabilities,
whereas an alternative posture of essentially home-based
forces would permit the Soviet defense to be geared more
primarily to bomber aircraft characteristics.
Now, during these Hearings, there was general U. S.
agreement on the importance of an overseas bomber base
structure. For a variety of reasons, however, the Air
Force desired to develop an intercontinental attack capa-
bility. A principal factor was its concern about for-
ward base denial. If adequate overseas bases were available,
the B-36 would indeed operate from them and thus increase
appreciably the "lumbering" aircraft's altitude and speed
performance to compound further the Soviet defense problem.
If "forced" to operate from the continental U. S., the
bomber's range capabilities (plus those of aerial refueled
7Hearings, House, Committee on Armed Services,
National Defense Program -- Unification and Strategy
,
(Hereinafter referred to as Unification and Strategy Hear-
ings) , 81st, 1st, October 1949, pp. 46, 139, 181", and 510.
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medium bombers) would still complicate the enemy's air
defense as it would require him to "look around a global
8
circumference for any approaching attacks."
These Hearings, of course, revealed clearly the
U. S. 1 lack of an integrated strategic doctrine and the
obstacles to such integration posed by the
i
current inter-
service debates and defense budgetary ceilings. Neverthe-
less, to the Soviets, the Hearings must have reinforced
the signals that the U. S. was relying exclusively on air-
atomic power for its security and was seeking to build a
force of both medium and heavy bombers and modern fighters
which would be deployed for numerous "close-in" strikes,
against a full spectrum of targets, by a choice of tactics,
and along a wide variety of axes. Another disturbing aspect
of the U. S. signals during this time must have been their
utterly confident forecast of the success of bomber missions
no matter what final form the "blitzkreig" strategy took.
And then, of course, there was the January 1950 announce-
ment by President Truman that the U. S. would proceed to de-
velop the hydrogen bomb.
gGeneral Bradley's testimony, Unification and Strategy
Hearings, p. 525. See also SECAF Symington's testimony, p.
431ff. General Vandenberg's testimony on pp. 455 and 510-
511, comes close to submitting that the B-36 threat would
cause the USSR to exhaust its resources in preparing a
defense, and provides an interesting parallel to the then
fashionable U. S. perception of Soviet motivations, i.e.
U. S. bankruptcy via large defense outlays.
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Against the background of the above polemics and
statements were the actual development and deployment of
the U. S. 1 strategic offensive capability. While the
buildup of SAC did not begin in earnest until 1949, the
U. S. demonstrated its interest and expertise in air-
atomic matters early in the post-war period. In Septem-
ber 1946, three B-29's flew non-stop from Japan to Chicago
to prove the feasibility of long-range strategic bombing.
Two months later the U. S. dispatched six B-29's on a
diplomatic mission to the American zone of Germany. The
Soviets 1 natural inclination to focus their initial air
defense efforts in Central and Eastern Europe were doubt-
lessly fortified by this move which, also, probably created
Soviet speculation that the U. S. would seek to fill the
power vacuum in Europe with permanent American bomber
bases -- speculation which was soon to be confirmed.
During the 1948 Berlin crisis, the U. S. sent two
3-29 groups to England -- within unrefueled striking range
of Moscow -- and in August 19 4 8 SAC was operating from four
9bases in Great Britain. Concurrently, the U. S.' Berlin
9
It is revealing that The Forrestal Di aries (edited
by W. Millis, New York, 1951, p. 457), in outlining the
considerations which affected the decision to send B-29's
to England, mentions the effects on the American public,
the USAF, and Great Britain ~~ but says nothing about what
such a move would, could, or should do to the USSR.
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Airlift was demonstrating clearly the powerful efficiency
of the USAF which could just as easily carry nuclear
bombs as foodstuffs. Then, during February and March
1949, a U. S. B--50 made the first non-stop flight around
the world with four successfully executed in-flight re-
fuelings from KC-29 tankers. Several months later a B-47
set a speed record by flying non-stop across the U. S. in
three hours and forty-six minutes.
The principal USAF expenditures during the 1950-51
U. S. rearmament went for strategic aircraft systems. In
addition, the Korean War had caused the U. S .. to speed up
the acquisition of rights to an overseas base system
moulded to the capabilities of the B--47. By 1953-, SAC
could be seen operating from airfields in Greenland,
Britain", Morocco, Spain, and throughout the Far East.
As a further consequence of the Korean War, the U. S.
Congress, beginning in 1951, had authorized, the building
of a series of large aircraft carriers. The Soviets had
therefore to consider the prospects of an even more com-
plex air defense task which would have to confront the
variety of attack tactics and penetration routes open to






naval strikes launched within the expansive Mediterranean
and Pacific Ocean areas.
Furthermore, the U. S. demonstrated the increases in
its nuclear stockpile when atomic bombs
were fired off helter-skelter during 19 51.
More than 18 atomic blasts were officially
acknowledged (from 1945 to 1951 only eight,
including the two that were dropped on Japan,
were fired) . There was suddenly enough
fissionable material in the nation's locker
for such devices as atomic-powered submarines
for which the Navy let a contract in September
1951.11
Then, too, the USSR could but wonder when U. S. offen-
sive air forces would become equipped with thermonuclear
weapons , since the first hydrogen device had been exploded
by America on November 7, 19 52.
It might be mentioned, finally, that -- if the So-
viets' defensive tasks were complicated by the widely de-
ployed U. S. offensive forces -- Soviet defensive systems
deployment decisions were not made any easier by inconsis-
tent U. S. targeting doctrine "signals." That is, it seems
practically impossible to discern which Soviet targets
were planned to be retaliated against first by SAC air-
craft during this period. At a press conference in August
19 51, General Vandenberg announced that an Air Force re-
assessment of its job now required that "the emphasis,





in point of time, must go first to destroy the enemy's a-
bility to smash us and then to wreck his warmaking poten-
12tial." Yet, in 1954, former Secretary of the Air Force
Finletter wrote that "the old counter-industry concept for
] 3the strategic air should be given up." And, later still,
an Air Force colonel stated, with reference to the Air Force
targeting doctrine in 1950-53:
We switched C-from Delta-Destruction of will and
ability to wage war; Bravo-Blunting of offensive
forces; Romeo-Retardation or interdiction, in
that order of priority 1 to Romeo, Delta, Bravo
when the infancy of NATO demanded, at General
Eisenhower's insistence, that the solidarity of
the newly born NATO community required predomi-
nant emphasis -- even by' strategic offense forces
-- upon the retardation task, L i.e. destruction
of short-range enemy air strength in order to-
isolate the battlefield] in light of the fact
that the strategic force alone possessed a nu-
clear capability .... It was ne'eessary to demon-
strate to our new allies that this capability was
directly committed to their support. 14
Finally, there were even hints in the U. S. of a
quasi-" flexible response" targeting philosophy in 1953.
U. S. News and World Report reported then that: "Ready
in the Pentagon ... is a whole series of atomic-attack plans,
each with a different combination of targets to fit a
Cited in Ai r Force , XXXIV (October 1951), p. 45.
13Power and Poli cy, pp. 5 4-55.
1 4Colonel R. E. Kirtley, USAF , "National Military Plan-
ning Requirements," Center for International Affairs Seminar
Paper, Harvard University, January 1960, p. 69.

221
different war situation. Counterattack... might avoid the
Ukraine entirely, if that area shewed signs of rebelling
15
against Communist war planners." If considered at all
valid by the Kremlin, such "signals" could inject further
uncertainty into Soviet systems deployment calculations
and could call for greater attention to the requirements
of defensive mobility and rapid reaction-times.
150ctober 23, 1953, p. 22.

Section B. Dome s tic Perceptions of the U. S. Threat
Air-atomic defense was a pressing concern of the USSR
in 1946. It has even been suggested that "the first pro-
ject faced by Soviet air-power planners after World War II
was to establish a modern air defense system...." " It is
important to note, however, that there were some Soviet
domestic considerations at that time which would seem to
have argued against a rapid air defense build-up. Marxist-
Leninist-Stalinist dogma and Russian history had converged
to cause a continued public deprecation of the general
strategic importance of the enemy's air offensive force
and the specific role of surprise attack. Marxism, of
course, emphasized the fundamental importance of the
socio-economic structure in charting a nation's historical
path. .Lenin, for his part, did not show much interest in
reassessing this doctrine on the basis of the introduction
of military air power during his lifetime. Furthermore,
the basic Marxist perspective was reinforced by Stalin's
doctrine of the "permanently operating factors" which he
formulated in 19 42. Accordingly, any war in which the USSR
was involved would be victorious due to the stability of
Russia's home-front, the morale of her armed forces, the
ability of her commanders, and the quantity and quality






of her army divisions. This doctrine remained intact pub-
licly throughout Stalin's lifetime. As such, no amount 'of
"blitzkreig" atomic offensive power could alone enable a
Western aggressor to triumph in wartime. ' Indeed, insofar as
the U. S.' atomic stockpile was actually a primary deterrent
to Soviet aggression in the early post-war-years, the aspect
that probably gave Moscow pause was its possible ultimate
effects in a prolonged war of attrition which would enable
the small American production of bombs and bombers to be ac-
celerated.
Similarly, the early warning of surprise attack was not
a basic theoretical concern to the Soviets since the unex-
pectedness of the aggressor's blow .could in no wise prove
decisive. To be sure, the USSR had undergone the traumas of
Germany's "surprise" attack in 1941. Yet, as in Czarist
times, Russia had achieved a long, slow, and bloody salva-
tion. It can be argued, furthermore, that the "surprise" in
1941 involved more the unexpected superiority of German
forces rather than the timing of the attack. And, while
with regard to the available information on the quantity and
quality of American forces, the Russians may suffer from (in
Voltaire's phrase) an '"'embarrassment of riches", there seems
little doubt that the Soviets felt confident in their U. S.
"order of battle" intelligence.
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In addition, the Soviet leadership during World War II
had lost the control and use for a time of approximately 40
percent of their people, many of their greatest cities and
much of their richest natural resource area. As a result,
Russian ideas of an acceptable (survivable) level of damage
may have been different from Western ones.
More tangible and formidable considerations were those
of geography. The Kremlin faced in 19 4 6 the weighty task of
defending the largest national land mass in the world, with
air approaches along a boundary of about 20,000 miles.
These borders could, of course, be viewed with equal cogency
as being essentially impregnable to air-attack. Such a view
seems especially applicable to the USSR whose appreciation
of the techniques of long-range air navigation was unsophis-
ticated to say the least. There were, henceforth, the ice-
filled waters and tundra of the Arctic North *with its dearth
of air-navigational check-points and frequent magnetic
storms; the frozen wastes of the Siberian East; the world's
most rugged mountain ranges and arid deserts of the South;
and the quickly developed, unbroken tier of satellite states
to the West. Closely associated with these geographical
factors was the aura of impregnability which could have
been generated by the nature of the Soviets' closed society.
Thus, their forces' locations were "hidden"; their natural
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and man-made barriers to low-level overland air navigation
were unknown to the foreigner; adequate maps were unavail-
able to the enemy for effective high altitude bombing; etc.
From the above standpoints, a major allocation of scarce re-
sources by .the Soviet government toward fighter aircraft and
radar defense programs would appear unwarranted -- especial-
ly in the context of the leadership's apparent need to re-
cover first from the ravages of war and to reestablish tight
political control over the country.
Furthermore, Soviet published military doctrine through-
out the Stalinist era limited its air forces to the tradi-
tional role of supporting ground troops; and the organiza-
tion of air power in the USSR Defense Ministry seemed to pre-
vent the Soviet Air Force from achieving political parity
17
with the Soviet Army and Navy. Thus, any attempts by the
military elite to refashion publicly its forces in consider-
ation of the new requirements of air-atomic defense would
face bureaucratic obstacles, even apart from the pervasive
stagnation of Soviet thought which otherwise characterized
the Stalinist period.
Related to this, of course, was the fact that there
were no effective pressures for air defense brought to bear
upon the totalitarian regime by any "anxious" domestic
17
See Lee, The Soviet Air Force, pp. 246, 258.
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population. Indeed, through Stalin's mass media controls,
"the Soviet public had to wait for nearly 10 years to
1
8
find out precisely what the atom bomb was." In fact,
such lack of atomic "candor" on Stalin's part could in
itself be considered a defensive-ploy of sorts. "By
feigning a near indifference to the sorrow that atomic
weapons can cause, one can perhaps deny other nations the
] 9
clues needed to press their advantage in crises."
It can be noted finally that "there Chad beenj little
need to develop a. large, modern air-defense fighter Cand
radar warning and ground control 3 force in rear areas during
World War II as . . . the Luftwaffe was unable to embark on a
2
systematic strategic air offensive against the USSR" ; and
"Japanese preoccupation with the campaigns in the Pacific
and South East Asia virtually eliminated any threat of long-
1
8
Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy (Garden City, N. Y. , 19 57T7"p. 84. Moreover, Stalin
had "decreed" that, in any event, the long-range genetic
dangers from nuclear fallout would present no problem for
the Soviet people since the "Lysenko Theorem" had enabled
the genetic endowment of the species to be changed by
external treatment, including proper nutrition!
19George H. Quester, "On the Identification of Real
and Pretended Communist Military Doctrine," Journal of
Conflict Resolution , X (June 1966), p. 173.
20
Ki lmarx , A History of Sovi et Air Power
, p . 19 7.
None of Germany's four-engined heavy bombers built prior




range air attack on the USSR." Thus, the few conventional
air defense programs and techniques which the Soviets devel-
oped prior to 19 45 went largely untested and, as such, could
provide no wartime operating record as an impetus to their
continued development in peacetime.
However, all of these domestic considerations to
support, if you will, air defense non-action were subordi-
nated to a single factor in the Stalinist international
perspective: his implacable conviction that the fundamental
"contradictions" between capitalism and socialism would in-
evitably erupt into general war at the initiative of the
West. For this principal reason the USSR had to improve
its international power position through territorial ex-
pansion, and prepare a defense of the Motherland against
such an opponent who was nuclear armed and effectively be-
yond the reach of the USSR's ground-air combined support
team. Henceforth, the Soviet people must be prepared for
an eventual retreat into the great spaces of the interior,
wearing down the enemy as they go. Total mobilization via
the "permanently operating factors" would be effected and
the enemy would be defeated by a massive ground counter-
offensive which would overrun Europe. The role of the air
defense system was to be an essential one: to operate
21
Lee, The Soviet Air Force, p. 109.
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more or less independently to help bring order out of chaos
during each phase of the drawn-out encounter of attrition,
by reducing the effects of localized bomber raids on Soviet
industrial and population complexes, and exacting as high
22
a toll as possible of the enemy bomber forces. The'
harassment of U. S. B-29 overseas bases by
>
Tu-4's would
also contribute to limiting the damage to' the USSR. Such
a strategic doctrine was held in 1946 and was maintained in-
tact -- at least publicly — throughout .the Stalinist era.
The importance of this ideological framework to Stalin's
decision in 1946 to launch a full-scale air defense effort
seems unquestionable. But there also appear to be some
other, more pragmatic considerations which bore upon this
decision. First, Stalin and his top officers had been very
much impressed by the damage caused by British and American
heavy bombers to German and Japanese cities and industries,
which clearly argued for greater attention to strategic air
defense problems.'
Secondly, it was a well-known fact of World War II
bombing offensives that — while they were generally ef-
fective — the attacker's losses did rise rapidly (much
faster than lineally) with the depth of enemy territory
22
See, e.g., Herbert S. Dinnerstein, The Soviet Military
Posture as a Reflection of Soviet Strategy, Project RAND
Research Memorandum RM 2102, March 24, 19 5*8, p. 5.
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inlo which they penetrated. Hence, considerable importance
could be attached to the potential effectiveness of the
military "defense-in-depth" concept for which the Soviets 1
great land spaces were quite well suited. Also, the rele-
vance of a "defense-in-depth" program was enhanced by the
Russians' concerted shift of their western-located heavy
industries to the more secure regions of the Volga and
the Urals -- a move which would greatly increase an ag-
gressor's required penetration distances. This dispersal
program had been begun by the Soviets in the mid-1930 's,
was accelerated during the war, and became one of the
country's major enterprises during the immediate post-war
period. There was, moreover, the seemingly evident impor-
tance of a build-up in anti-aircraft artillery strength for
widespread, deep deployment within the USSR to protect
retreating ground forces preparatory to a counter-offensive.
And as artillery had been traditionally the Russians'
military forte, the Soviets were naturally predisposed to
exaggerate the potential efficacy of such a defensive
technique
.
Thirdly, Stalin's perceptions of the feasibility of
an air defense effort were greatly affected by the large
technical legacy in defensive military equipment and




In all the main fields of strategic air defense
weapons the Soviet air debt to Germany .. .was
most marked. The first
'
generation of jet fighter
planes such as the Ci-lig-15.1, the early-warning-
radar equipment, the radar guidance of fighter
planes both from the ground and in the air, the - .
prototypes of most of the first ground-to-air
and air-to-air guided weapons, these are what the
USSR owes in whole or in part to German scientific
and technical engineering genius. 23
Fourthly, it could be argued that an element in the
initial Stalinist perspective on air-atomic defense was
the demobilization of the West in 19 45-47. This policy,
from a pragmatic standpoint, appeared to reduce the de-
fensive problem for the USSR to more manageable proportions.
Or, in Marxist-Leninist terms, since "tottering capitalism"
was propped up only by military spending, demobilization
forebode severe economic crises in the West and could
hasten the onset of its conflict .with the socialist states.
In 19 46, therefore, all of these factors had coalesced
into a decision to prepare defenses against the inevitable
attack. There seems little doubt that the verve with which
the Stalinist regime approached the implementation of this
decision between 1946-52 resulted in some measure from the
previously discussed U. S. strategic "signals." For example,
The Forrestal Diaries make note of Soviet fears in mid-1943
generated by the U. S.' "overexcitable statements" proposing
23
Lee, "Strategic Air Defense," in Lee (ed.), The
Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, p. 12 4.
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24preventive war; and Andrei Vishinsky made a particularly
vituperative U.N. speech in September 19 4 8 denouncing U. S.
mass media articles which "reproduce detailed plans of at-
25tack. Such public utterances in the U. S. assume special
importance when one considers how difficult it is to con-
vince a Russian that U. S. individuals often express views
which are at variance with their government's policies.
Related to the effects of the overt U. S. preventive
war talk was the possible effect on the Soviet military ef-
forts of the U. S.' "Baruch Plan" for the control of atomic
energy proposed early in the post-war period. As suggested
by one respected British commentator , the most unfortunate
aftermath of this abortive plan was.
the credence it gave to the practicality of
waging preventive war against a great power.
For this is just what is meant by the infliction
of "instant and condign punishment" C of any
transgressors of the control arrangements] by
atomic bombs. j~ The Soviets.! reacted in a per-
fectly predictable way by energetically starting
their own atomic energy programme and making
sure that their effective frontiers were pushed
as far as possible away from their cities and
essential industrial areas to get greater depth
of terrain for air defense. 26






Vital Speeches , November 1, 1948, pp. 38-41.
2 6
P. M. S. Blackett, Atomic Weapons and East-West Re-
lations (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 91-92.
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which urged the expansion of the Korean War effort and
even the use of atomic weapons against Communist China may
well have forced upon the Soviet leadership a heightened
reassessment of how exposed their own country remained ho
an air-atomic attack. In this connection, it is known
that the USSR's State Planning Commission Chairman, Saburov,
told the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 that the "dis-
persal of Soviet industry, making it less vulnerable to air




Let us speculate, finally, upon the possible effect
on Soviet air defense developments of the U. S.' "the
bomber will always get through" signals. That these
signals had been received clearly in the USSR is evident.
The Soviets' Major General Khlopov wrote, in June 1950,
that "the bankruptcy of the ^"American! plan for future
war ... consists in the fact that they almost all proceed
from the extremely favorable conditions in which the
enemy Lthe USSR] will be so weak in the air that it will
be possible in the first phase of the v/ar to complete, with
2 8impunity, flights to targets selected by Americans."
27New York Times , October 9, 1952, p. 9.





This operative USAF assumption made SAC less sensitive
to Soviet air defense developments which would logically
have called for improved U. S. countermeasures -- and> thus,
from this point of view, gave the effectiveness of Soviet
air defense systems a more "on-going" character in the USSR.
Additionally, the low USAF regard for Soviet air defenses
furthered SAC ' s rejection of one-way bombing missions. This
meant that the USAF was not reluctant to plan flights whose
withdrawing aircraft retraversed threatening USSR flak areas
and fighter base territory. Such U. S. tactics would seem
to give added importance to deployed air defenses, especial-
ly in the context of a war of attrition. Moreover, the USAF
emphasis on multiple bomber missions launched from overseas
bases meant also that it would pay. the USSR to plan its de-
fenses to cope with departing bombers as well as just the
invading force. It remains then to discuss specifically the
development of the Stalinist air defense posture.

Section C. The Development of the Stalini st Air Defens e
Posture
During 1946, the first improved radar early warning u-
nits were set up along the Baltic coasts and over the fron-
29
tiers of Central and Western Europe. In 1947, Soviet pro-
duction of its first jet fighter, the Mig-15, was speeded up
in order to build a nucleus of trained jet- pilots while the
captured German research data was being evaluated. Mig-15'
s
were seen that year in increasingly large numbers over Mos-
cow and East German skies. The initial post-war emphasis on
this fighter program may have been due in part to the fact
that 6 8 percent of all German, aircraft shot down by the So-
viets in 19 4 4 were accounted for by fighters. It also
seems likely that the Soviets viewed this aircraft as repre-
senting the quickest counter to the high-altitude B-36. It
is evident in this regard that the Mig-15 was designed pri-
marily as a high-altitude interceptor. Its phenomenal rate
of climb (by early, post-war standards) , excellent perform-
ance from 30,000 to 50,000 feet, and heavy armament all
point in this direction.
29
Lee, "Strategic Air Defense," in Lee (ad.), The So-
vie t Air and Rocket Forces
, p . 121.






In 1948, the Soviets made their first attempts at
producing jet all-weather fighters. This model ---• the
SU-15 -- never progressed beyond the experimental stage,
however. Also during that year the USSR received a supply
of British turbo-jet engines (the Rolls-Royce Nene) which
saved the country about two years' research in its fighter
31
aircraft development programs.
The secrecy which shrouded these Stalinist military
developments is, perhaps, exemplified by the following
divergent U. S. perceptions of Soviet air defense capa-
bilities during 1948. According to General Kenney, Com-
mander of SAC, in Hay 1948:
Russian radar is extremely bad and the country's
radar defenses are spotty. It would be relatively
easy for American pilots to get across the border
undetected. But in view of the excellence of the
Russian fighters and fighter pilots they would ,.„
face hot and heavy going once they were detected.
The Alsop brothers, on the other hand, reported in September
19 4 8 that
now and in the foreseeable future, radar inter-
ception of attacking aircraft need be expected
only at the border and in the immediate vicinity
of important targets ... .The Russian fighters of
the last war did not even provide oxygen for the
pilot, and it will be a long time before the
31
W. Green, "The Development of Jet Fighters and




Newsweek, May 17, 1948, p. 30.
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Soviets can Leach their raw manpower the more
complex branches of the fighter art.... 33
By 1949 the USSR had broadened the scope of its air de-
fense effort and was far along in the development of sur-
34face- to-air missile systems to defend Moscow. During that
year, also, the Soviet artillery arm was considerably
strengthened and improved by the deployment of hundreds of
radar-controlled heavy anti-aircraft guns of up to 12 mil-
limeter calibre; and the USSR simultaneously expedited the
work of developing a continent -wide early warning system.
At the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-19 50 the Soviet air
defense force consisted of over 1,500 operational jet fight-
ers, and "the radar stations had expanded to the Far East-
ern Maritime Provinces, including the vital Magadan Region
opposite Alaska, as well as to the coastal areas of the
35Black Sea from the Crimea down to Batum.
"
Indeed, the Soviet-built Mig fighters which were put
into action in Korea were in much greater numbers and
performed with much higher sophistication than had been
anticipated in the West. Further, the "Soviet radar Cgave'J
the Chinese and North Koreans adequate and consistent
33 Saturday Evening Post, September 11, 1948, p. 180.
34Kilmarx, A History of ...
, p. 235.
35
Lee, The Soviet Air Force, pp. 118, 114-115.
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early warning of the approach of UN bomber and fighter
planes, both by day and night, over a period of three
years...." Soviet radar-armed anti-aircraft ground
artillery performed quite admirably also, and accounted
for approximately 8 7 percent of the U. S. air losses in
37Korean action.
The value of the Korean War to the Soviets as an air
defense testing and training ground appears obvious . An-
other pertinent benefit which accrued from this encounter -•
fought mainly over .Communist-controlled territory -- was
the opportunity it gave to acquire and exploit Western
military hardware. For "there was little USAF equipment
committed in Korea that was not compromised .... This gave
the Russians a rich harvest of modern electronic equip-
3 8
ment , including airborne radar and advanced gun sights."
The airborne radar acquisitions were particularly
important as a supplement to what the Germans had contri^
buted some six years before. /apparently the lack of enough
understanding of this equipment had retarded the Soviets'
development of guided air-to-air missiles for their inter^
ceptors . (Perhaps, too, the Russian military tradition
3 6
Lee, "Strategic Air Defence," in Lee (ed.), The
Soviet Ai r . .
. , p . 12 2.
37
H. Baldwin, New York Times, July 21, 1952, p. 4.





had caused them to place exaggerated faith in the lethal-
ity of an interceptor's aerial cannon.) There were, also,
reports that the Soviets were concentrating on a piloted
rocket-fighter program at this time, rather than air-to-air
39
missiles .
A more important effect of the essential lack of
modern airborne radar, however, had been 'to delay a
significant Soviet all-weather fighter capability. Thus,
"there was no sign that this [radar J equipment had been
used on any scale in the Korean War when it would have
been invaluable on night fighter operations against United
40Nations B-29 bombers...."
The information regarding the effects of the Korean
War on the capabilities of the USSR-based air defense
system is quite inconclusive. For example, it is difficult
to determine whether the Mig-15's which were sent to
Korea "stripped" vital home defenses or whether they were
considered "surplus" by the USSR. There is some evidence,
however, that Mig-15 production stopped in 1952, at which
39 See John T. Dodson, "Russia's Rocket Fighter,"
Flying, XLVI (January 1950), pp. 12-14; and American Aviation,
November 10, 1952, p. 2. This latter report stated that
one of the reasons for the apparent Soviet preference for
piloted rocket fighters over guided missiles was the
"traditional Russian belief in hand-to-hand fighting
(coupled with an inherent distrust of robots)."
40
Lee, The Sovie t Air Force
,
p. 116. This point will
be returned to in Chapter 6 below.
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time the improved Mig-17 was put on the assembly line.
It was during 19 52, moreover, that initial production of
the all-weather Yak-25 interceptor began in Russia. This
would lend credence to the position that the Korean Migs
were perhaps "surplus" to the Soviets' needs.
As to the quality of the Soviet-based radar v/arning
and control network during Korea, the available information
is again ambiguous. The Alsops wrote in mid-1953: "The
first interception of an American reconnaissance aircraft
on the Soviet air. borders occurred off Siberia, as long
ago as 19 49. Since then, interceptions have been fre-
quent; and... some American planes actually have been shot
down." But several months later, Hanson Baldwin reported
that "U. S. planes have flown frequently near Soviet
42frontiers apparently without detection."
In any event, Stalin died in March 1953; his son,
Vassily, was ushered-out as the Commander of the key Moscow
Air Defense District; and a new era for Soviet air defense
was generally ushered-in.
41See, e.g., Phillips, Reporter, June 30, 1955, p. 18.
42Saturday Evening Post, June 27, 19 53, p. 66; and
New York Times, October 11, 1953, p. 33.

CHAPTER 6
AIR DEFENSE IN THE POST-STALINIST ERA:
1953-60
Section A. U. S. Signals of Strategic Of fe ns i ve Capab i 1 i ty
and Intent
Tests in the United States with a droppable hydrogen
bomb during 19 53 signalled the imminent introduction of
these weapons into America's operational strategic inven-
tory. The USAF at this time also pointed-out that such wea-
pons should not alter USSR defense problems in the sense
that they would reduce the U. S. requirement for many manned
bombers. As General Vandenberg emphasized, the U. S. may
still have to dispatch thirty conventional bombers along on
the thermonuclear mission so that the interlocking fire-pow-
er of the whole formation could protect all the planes.
Furthermore, if the Soviets were beginning to see results in
their diplomatic and propagandistic efforts to increase the
political vulnerability of SAC ' s overseas bases, the U. S.
military stressed that the B-36 had been considerably im-
proved; and that, for the B-4 7, "air refueling L had 1 become
2
a commonplace..." , as hedges against such a contingency.
See New York Times , June 6, 1953, p. 7.
2




Such statements were reinforced by the Administration's
signals in 1953-54. Whereas Eisenhower had chosen not to
be candid to the American people regarding the Soviets'
growing nuclear offensive threat, the government con-
tinually sought to make it clear to the USSR that the
U. S. intended to remain well-ahead in the air-atomic
power race and would indeed use that power if necessary.
Thus, in his address before the UN on December 8, 19 53,
Eisenhower's "decision to present only the facts he knew
' incontrovertably ' led to a one-sided recital of strength
3that could be interpreted as sabre-rattling...." Also,
at this time, Bernard Brodie suggested that the U. S.
'
eagerness to demonstrate its power (which exceeded the
restraints against waste) could be manifest by the of-
ficial public knowledge that America had already exploded
4
more than forty nuclear devices.
In January 1954, the Administration publicly adopted
the "New Look" in military planning. This policy gave the
Defense Department more money and an explicit fiat to do
what the country had been doing essentially since 1947:
place principal reliance for U. S. national security on
3Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , X (February 1954),
p. 45.
4
"Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical?," Foreign
Affai rs, XXXII (January 1954), p. 220.
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air-atomic power --- now tactically as well as strate-
gically conceived. Furthermore, Secretary Dulles' "massive
retaliation" speech that month represented an attempt to
integrate America's superior nuclear capability into a
strategic doctrine which would deter the broad spectrum
of possible Soviet expansionist moves.
During 19 5 3-56, the Air Force was being built-up to
an authorized strength that had been greatly increased
during the Korean War. The "bomber gap" controversy ex-
pedited this build-up that included the extensive intro-
duction of the new B-52 intercontinental bomber to replace
the B-36's. There were also frequent demonstrations of
SAC's sophisticated aerial refueling capabilities which,
by 1956, enabled the B-47 to reach two-thirds of all key
targets in the Soviet bloc from North American bases and
5the B-52, similarly refueled, to reach any place on earth.
At the height of the Suez and Hungarian crises in 1956,
"more than 100 B-47's were on non-stop combat training
missions averaging 8000 miles each as they ranged the North
American and Arctic skies." Simultaneously, the USAF
unveiled its Low-Altitude Bombing System (LABS) techniques
5See Melvin Conant, "Canada's Role in Western Defense,"
Foreign Affairs
,
XL (April 1962), p. 432.
New York Times, December 19, 1956, p. 23.
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which would enable "on-the-deck" attacks without the plane's
7getting caught in the bomb blast. And, in February 1957,
the Air Force announced that such increased offensive capa-
bilities in its strategic force permitted the elimination of
the handful of SAC strategic fighter wings that had been
8previously retained to assist the older B-.36 missions.
These signals of the U. S. 1 attention to the develop-
ment of an improved air-atomic deterrent force continued af-
ter Sputnik. Indeed, "the main American response L to a pos-
sible 'missile gap'"] was directed at refuting the Soviet
contention that ICBM's had rendered the manned bomber obso-
9lete. !1 In late 1957, therefore, the Air Force announced
that it was arming its bombers with the 75-mile supersonic
Rascal air-to-surface missile which would permit nuclear at-
tacks beyond the surrounding air defense zones. There were
also frequent disclosures after 1957 of Air Force progress
with its 20 -mile, supersonic, jam-proof Hound Dog ASM which
became operational in late 1959.
7See New York Times , October 12, 1956, p. 31.
o
Testimony of General Twining, Hearings, House, Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations 1958 , 85th, 1st, February
1957, p. 918.
9 Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power..., p. 46.
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The USAF bomber force itself underwent considerable
qualitative improvement between 1958-60. The range of the
B-52 was increased by 15 percent when its "H" model was
equipped with a new turbofan engine in late 1959. With
these engines, the B-52 could attack many USSR targets
from the U. S. without aerial refueling. Moreover, the
new B-5 8 was coming into the USAF operational inventory in
limited numbers at this same time. This aircraft had a
supersonic-dash low-altitude capability which would give
it the unique ability to outrun USSR fighters. Also, the
B-58 frame had been designed with an exceptionally small
radar-reflective area so as to confound further the Soviet
defenses." To complement the B-52 (which could approach
the USSR from any direction) and the 3-5 3 (supersonic,
low-altitude) , the USAF also planned -- beginning in late
1959 — to produce a MACH 3, extremely high-altitude B-70
bomber. To counter this aircraft, the USSR would reportedly
have to produce a whole new family of defensive systems
whose metals and fabrication processes could meet the
" Testimony of Dr. Herbert York, DDR&E, Hearings,
House, Department of Defense Appropriations 19 61, (Part
6), 86th, 2nd, February I960, pp. 9-10.
See Hearings, House, Department of Defense Appro-





strains of a 2,000 mile per hour cruising speed. ' In ad-
dition, it was reported in early 1960 that one of the major
programs in all of the U. S.' aircraft weapons systems --
B--52, B--58, B-70 -- had been the development and the supply
13
of electronic countermeasures for these bombers.
Of course, a principal American national security endeav-
or between 1957-60 was to increase the second-strike capabil-
ity of these SAC bombers through the dispersal of their U. S.
base structure and the attainment of a fifteen minute ground
alert capability for a full one-third of the force. Also,
note should be taken of the decision in the mid-1950 's to in-
troduce short-range atomic weapons into the NATO environment.
This decision led quickly to the equipping of several hundred
fighter-bombers with a nuclear capability at scores of Euro-
pean bases for the purpose of interdicting Soviet airfields
and communications facilities. There was, further, the man-
ned bomber threat from U. S. naval aircraft carriers which
increased after 1957 to the point where, in 1962, the Soviets'
12
'Air Force, XLIII (March 1960), p. 27. According to
this article, such a Soviet endeavor would be "backbreaking"
and would "almost certainly stagger C Khrushchev 3 in his pro-
gram to provide more consumer goods for his public" (p. 27).
Cf. General Vandenberg's justification of the B-36 in 1949!
(footnote 8 on p . 216 above.)
13
Dr. York's testimony on p . 79 of the Hearings cited
in footnote 10 on p. 2 44 above.
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Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii wrote: "One of the most important
tasks of our navy, from the first minutes of the war will be
14
to destroy enemy carrier attack forces .
"
•
The strategic doctrinal signals as • to how these U. S.
forces would be utilized in wartime were grounded funda-
mentally in the 1954 "massive retaliation" policy which re-
mained essentially unchanged until 1961. There were, how-
ever, during this period, renewed outbursts of preventive
war proposals. For example, Arthur Krock publicly inferred
in December 1957 that the Gaither Committee Report to the
15
Administration had recommended a "first-strike'" strategy.
And during 19 59-60, the "missile gap" fears in the U. S.
engendered much open advocacy of preventive or pre-emptive
warfare.
Additionally, specific U. S. forces' targeting
strategies underwent an evolution during this period. The
USAF seemed to shift around 1955 to a predominant counter-
17force philosophy. This shift v/as given an impetus in the
Soviet Military Strategy , trans. Dinnerstein, Gourd',
and Wolfe, p. 42 0.
New York Times , December 20, 1957, p. 26.




See T. F. Walkowicz, "Counterforce Strategy," Air
Force , XXXVIII (February 1955), p. 26ff.; and Leghorn/ "No
Need to Bomb Cities to Win Wars," USNWP, January 28, 19 55.
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ensuing years by the advent of the ICBM/SLBM which —
being essentially invulnerable to population-defense sys-
tems -- generated much American talk of a U. S. "overkill"
capribility by proponents (e.g., the Navy and Army) of the
policy of a "finite deterrent" force targeted against only
major Soviet cities and industries (contra USN targeting
concepts in 19 49) . The Air Force was led, henceforth, to
solidify its arguments for a strategic counterforce capa-
bility based upon an increased number of modern long
range bombers
.
All of the above signals would appear to argue for no
diminishment of the USSR's air defense effort in the early
post-Stalinist era. What about the indicators of U. S.
long-range ballistic missile development? On balance (at
least until 1958) ., the signals clearly were not designed
to cause a significant redirection of Soviet resources
toward anti-ballistic missile expenditures.
It was well known that the U. S. long-range missile
program had been essentially dropped in 1949 because of
the requirements of accuracy, guidance system problems,
and excessive weights. With the U. S. 1 thermonuclear
explosion and other important technological progress that
changed this picture, research was re-opened vigorously
within all services in 1953. Yet between 1953-57 the U. S.
continued to stress the development of a greater manned
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bomber force and consistently downgraded the potential effec-
tiveness of any first-generation (U, S. and USSR) long-range
1
8
ballistic missile. Then, too, the U. S. ICBM/IRBM/MRBM
programs in the mid-1950 's were characterized by a high de-
gree of bureaucratization and interservice competition which
tended to foster -- within the prevailing strategic concept
of a "floating D-Day" -- a procrastination in missile produc-
] 9tion through the "testing-to-death" phenomenon. The Eisen-
hower Administration, indeed, seemed reluctant to assign a
substantial strategic role to long-range offensive missiles.
Regarding the ICBM, Eisenhower, in February 1956, "cautioned
against inflating the importance of these ocean-spanning mon-
20
sters. . .''; and referring to the IRBMs/MRBMs , Secretary of
the Air Force Quarles submitted that their deployment in Eur-
ope by the USSR "would not materially affect the balance of
power between the two blocs" and, hence, would not of itself
21
require a similar deployment by the U. S. Perhaps the
only significant U. S. signal before 1958 which could have
led directly to a step-up in Soviet ABM research was the
18 See, e.g., General LeMay ' s testimony at the 1956 Air
Power Hearings, p. 107.
19 Ibid.
, pp. 624ff., 655, 1112, 1140-1141.
20Quoted in BAS, XII (April 1956), p. 137.
21Air Power Hearings testimony, x^P • 1603, 1003.
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authorization in J.956 for the USN to begin development of
the Polaris missile for submarine delivery.
Sputnik, of course, caused a significant acceleration
of U. S. long-range missile development. The first official
disclosure of a target date for the Atlas 1 initial opera-
tional capability came when Air Force Secretary Douglass
said in December 19 5 7 that one would be ready for combat
22
"within two years." ' This first-generation Atlas missile,
as well as the Thor, Jupiter, and Polaris programs, were
greatly expedited in January 195 8. In February, the USAF
was directed to accelerate the Titan development and to pro-
ceed with the R&D on the second-generation Minuteman solid
propellant ICBM. By September 1959, a SAC combat crew had
successfully fired its first operational Atlas; and Eisen-
hower, in his January 1960 State of the Union Address,
stated that the Atlas had proven equally successful in its
last fifteen test launches, with an accuracy of less than
tv/o miles. By January 1960, also, Titan had an impressive
five out of seven test-launch successes, Thor was deployed
in Great Britain, and Jupiter was being deployed in Italy.
On July 20, 19 60, two successful firings occurred of a Pola-
ris missile from an underwater launching site; and on Janu-
ary 1, 1961, two Polaris-equipped submarines v/ere on-station,
22New York Times, December 18, 19 57, p. 1.

Section B. Domestic Perceptions of the U. S. Threat
There is a real question whether the minimum re-
quirements of credibility had been fulfilled by America's
:,
rnassive retaliation" doctrine. Certainly the human costs
and risks involved were enormous in view of the Soviets'
burgeoning offensive nuclear programs. Furthermore, the
doctrine did not appear to set so easily with the U. S.
Administration's attempts to balance the budget, reduce
taxes, and build an industrial mobilization base for pro-
ducing equipment over an extended wartime period. There
was also the critical state of Allied and domestic Ameri-
can opinion that ensued from the doctrine's pronouncement,
which must have raised some Soviet doubts about U. S. re-
23
solve to retaliate (initiate?) massively. * On the other
hand, it can be argued that the very ambiguity of the
doctrine's implications behooved the Soviets to ensure that
their air defense preparations were adequate to meet the
23
It was even said of the doctrine that it "required
the tacit assumption on the part of our allies, our enemies
and our own people that we didn't mean a word of it". BAS
,
XVIII (March 1962), p. 18. On criticisms of the doctrine's
credibility see William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of
Deterrence," in Kaufmann (ed.), Military Policy and Nationa l
Security (Princeton, 1956), p. 24ff
.
; J. D. Singer, Deterrence
,
Arms Control, and Disarmament (Columbus, 19 62), pp. 5 8-61;
and P. Peeters, Massive Retaliation: The Policy and I ts
Critics (Chicago, 19 59)
,
passim . For a discussion of the
"signals" which were sent during 19 5 4 in an attempt to






gamut of attack possibilities -n from a tactical barrage
of atomic weapons in an initially limited European encounter
to an all-out surprise attack in a general nuclear war.
Thus, Khrushchev later reflected that the doctrine was
"barefaced atomic ' blackmail , but it had to be reckoned
24
with at the time. ..."
Tightly meshed with these 1953-54 signals from the
U. S. was the strategic doctrinal re-evaluation which char-
acterized Soviet published military thought in the early
post-Stalinist era. At the center of this re-evaluation
was the recognition of the destructive power of- nuclear
weapons. With such a recognition it became "legitimate to
argue that capitalism might be deterred from making war,
irrespective of its chances for victory... [i.e.l the con-
stant 'preoccupation with impending disaster was no longer
25 . .justifiable." Indeed this was precisely the position of
Georgi Malenkov in the USSR's political succession struggle.
His argument in its broader "mutual deterrence" form implied
a reduced military budget and a concomitant slow-down in air
defense programs.
Khrushchev, however, opted for the position that
nuclear war, albeit vastly destructive, could still be
24
Pravda , August 12, 1961. Cited in Horelick and Rush,
Strategic Power. .
.
, p . 3 0.
25Dinners tein, War and The Soviet Union, p. 13.
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"won" by the USSR. The broad coalition of Party and mili-
tary leaders which sided with him facilitated his ascension
to political primacy in early 19 55. With Malenkov's removal
from power, the Supreme Soviet apparently "increased the
o c
military budget by twelve percent...," ' and presumably
air defense programs would be increased and refined.
Moreover, with a newly invigorated appreciation of the
characteristics of nuclear weapons came a re-evaluation of
the importance of the "surprise" factor in an atomic attack.
3y early 19 55 such an "agonizing reappraisal" of how wars
are won had been presumably concluded with the. assertion
that the importance of the initiative required that the
USSR must be ready for "pre-emptive actions against the
„27
cunning of aggressors.
•The doctrine of pre-emptive warfare which appeared
thusly in the USSR may have been simply a reflection of
Soviet confidence in its intelligence network and its
appreciation of the requirements of a democracy preparatory
2 8
to engaging in hostilities. ' Further, if the Soviets
c
Horelick and Rush, S trategic Power ...
,
p. 27.
27See G artho f f , The Soviet Image of Future War ,
pp. 62, 65.
2 8
Thus it is interesting to note that the Soviet civil
defense system, as it developed after 1954, is "clearly
based on the assumption that Soviet leaders will receive
considerable advance warning of danger." Leon Goure, Civil
Defense in the Soviet Union (Berkeley, 1962), p. 145.
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were not convinced that they would receive unequivocal
warning of an air-atomic attack, "pre-emption" in the
bomber era would still be credible and practical, in that
"fail-safe" missions could be launched upon receipt of
even ambiguous warnings
.
However, the Soviets' pre-emptive warfare writings
in the mid-1950' s may have been grounded most fundamentally
in the rising expectation of a surprise U. S. air-atomic
attack; and, hence, may have represented a doctrine of
desperation designed to protect their emergent, extremely
limited long-range bomber force. To be sure -- the "Spirit
of Geneva" notwithstanding -- there were various U. S.
signals in 1953-56 which could have elicited such fears.
There was , for example, the extensive buildup of SAC ' s over-
seas
. base structure.
Soviet commentators have always construed
the development of U. S. air bases around
the periphery of the USSR as an indication
that the U. S. and NATO in general count
heavily on surprise attack. These bases,
the Soviets maintain, can be quickly neutral-
ized in war by Soviet strategic retaliation
and many of them rapidly overrun by Soviet
ground troops . They consequently reason
that these bases could be of only limited
use in the prolonged type of war which they
(the Soviets) envisage. Therefore they
contend that these bases are designed with
only one purpose in mind -- a surprise attack
on the USSR. 29
2 Cyril E. Black and Frederick J. Yeager, "The USSR and
NATO," in NATO and American Security, Klaus Knorr (ed.),

25 4
Also, the USAF shift in 1955 to a predominant counterforce
targeting strategy would logically seem to have given the
USSR a rising expectation of surprise attack. In addition,
the American U-2 flights (of which the USSR had knowledge in
mid-1956) could definitely have implied a U. S. need for
sufficient information regarding the Soviet 'air power "order
of battle" to make possible a successful surprise attack on
those forces.
It is in this context that the Soviets' extensive dis-
armament concessions of May 1955 regarding inspection and
control can be understood. To secure observers at U. S. o-
verseas bases would be to secure more early warning of at-
tack. And it could thus also be reported that during 19 55
President Eisenhower and his principal advisors had formed
the impression at Geneva that "the Kremlin's failure to bran-
dish the bargaining power that goes with air supremacy ^wasj
a convincing sign that the Russians themselves [did] not be-
lieve the U. S. i* had J lost the capacity for decisive retali-
„30
ation.
One further consideration with regard to this doctrine
of pre-emption needs to be discussed. It seems plausible
(Princeton, 1959), p. 43. Note, also, that the existence of
these bases would greatly complicate the timing problems of
a pre-emptive attack -- which further indicates the "desper-
ation" motives in the doctrine's genesis.
30Murphy, Fortune , LII (September 1955), pp. 86-87.
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that the doctrine also may have grown out of a belated So-
viet awareness that only if the weight and effectiveness of
the opponent's blow could be reduced by a pre-emptive attack
would the active air defense system such as the USSR had
been developing appear justifiable. That is to say, the So-
viet air defense program prior to 1954 -- although actively
developed -- had been oriented to a "strategic defense" per-
spective and had been conceived essentially in World War II
terms: point defenses concentrated around individual indus-
trial and population complexes; single-engined, day--only
fighters and AAA organized locally to deal with the full
brunt of an enemy first strike and to destroy empty depart-
ing bombers as well as attacking planes, etc.
The post-Stalinist doctrinal revisions, however,
gave an impetus to a broadened appreciation of the stra-
tegic and technical requirements for defense against nu-
clear bombing. Air defense could no longer be v i ewed as
"guaranteeing" order out of chaos in a long war of attri-
tion. Its operation during the (brief) initial phase be-
came the paramount consideration; and even here its tasks
should be reduced to manageable proportions through the
pre-emptive actions of the Soviet offense. Thus, the
rapid completion of extended radar early-warning nets,
all-weather fighter and missile development, and a high-
ly integrated national defensive organization came to
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be perceived as increasingly urgent tasks between 1954-56.
There was another potential inadequacy, however, which
seemed to be pursued with much less urgency by the Soviets
through mid-1956: the defensive systems, protection of their
strategic offensive capability itself. For, whereas "in
19 5 7 the Soviet military press expected an "air attack upon
the Soviet Union to concentrate mainly on airfields and air
31installations", the USSR's published statements revealed
only minimal appreciation of measures such as base hardening,
aircraft dispersal, camouflage, increased readiness, etc.,
to improve the force's chances of surviving a 'surprise at-
tack.
Now, with any amount of confidence in a pre-emptive
strategy --- plus the inherent "pre.-U-2" protection af-
forded Soviet strategic forces by the nature of their
closed society -- one could argue that further such de-
fensive measures would be of only marginal tactical sig-
nificance. Yet, in addition, it seems noteworthy that
the Soviets did not even evince a keen awareness of the need
to reduce the vulnerability of the USSR economic war poten-
tial. As R. L. Garthoff has written, "Soviet discussions
of the conversion and mobilization of the economy for war
and the role of the 'military economy' which were published
31Dinnerstein, War and The Soviet Union, p. 242.

257
in the period through 1955 failed to raise the problem of
vulnerability -- and hence even the question of the full a-
32
vailability ~- of: the economy in time of war."
To be sure, Soviet doctrine held that the offense could
overpower the defense in nuclear war. The Russians quite
realized that a very few nuclear bombs could wipe out even
the most carefully hidden airfield or the largest metropoli-
tan complex. Thus, the USSR press warned in 1955 that "not
a single enemy plane must be allowed to get through the ac-
tive defenses"; and that "the slightest mistake of an anti-
aircraft unit in conditions of atomic warfare can lead to
33
very serious consequences." Yet, one is left with the
definite impression that the Soviet perspective on air de-
fense as it evolved through mid-1956 was, at bottom, an op-
timistic one. The USSR might not succeed in fully blunting
the enemy's strategic offensive capability at its bases --
but the Motherland's active defense forces would indeed be
at "hair-trigger" readiness to deal effectively with the at-
tacks from residual U. S. air-atomic forces.
Pre-emption faded out of open Soviet military writing
in 1957. Presumably the USSR did not need the doctrine to
32
The Sovie t Image of Future War , pp . 4 9-50.




"protect" its emergent missile force as it did with regard
to its bombers. Besides, of course, the doctrine's practica-
bility diminished with the diminished warning times associa-
ted with ICBM strikes. What seems more important, however,
was the apparent post-19 56 acceptance by the Soviet leader-
ship of Malenkov's "mutual deterrence" philosophy. This was
reflected in their limited deployment of long-range offen-
sive nuclear systems; their "peaceful-coexistence" doctrinal
innovations; their increased attention to "Third World" mat-
ters and Soviet domestic welfare concerns; etc. The constel-
lation of factors which caused the "nature of the historical
epoch" to be thus defined in the USSR needs no detailing
here. Suffice it to say, the continued quantitative and
qualitative improvement of the U.S.' bombers and air defense
forces throughout this period, and the swift achievement of
a superior ICBM capability after 19 57 confronted the Soviets
with an offensive "arms race" which was probably not worth
attempting to "win" . Major military efforts were henceforth
directed toward the modernization of the air defense system,
under the continued impetus of the post-Stalinist strategic
doctrinal musings and the distressing American U-2 flights
between 1956-60.

Section C. The Deve lopment o f the Post-Stalin i s t Air
Defense Posture
The Soviet radar warning and "defense-in-depth" posture
was strengthened in early 1954 by the integration of the
European satellite air forces into an efficient organiza-
tional structure -- a move which culminated in the Warsaw
Pact in mid-1955. By 1956, the Soviet early warning radar
system could be termed "reasonably comprehensive", and in-
cluded "fairly reliable radar for ground-control inter-
..34
cept ....
To operate within this radar network were the SAM--I
surface-to-air missiles which- became operational during
1953. These missiles were deployed extensively in ; the
ensuing years around such key centers as Moscow, Leningrad,
and the atomic weapons development complex at Ulan-Ude.
Some of the batteries were reported to have "an infra-
red detection system as well as a radar-tracking target
35
system linked by c.omputor to missile tracking radar."
The new Mig-17 fighter was also operational by 1953,
and several thousand augmented the Mig-15 force within the
next few years. By 1955, moreover, the Soviet Fighter
34
Lee, The Soviet Air Force
,
p. 12 0; Kilmarx, A
History of Soviet Air Power
, p. 2 66.
35Asher Lee and Richard Stockwell, "Soviet Missiles,"
in Lee (ed. ) , The Soviet Air and... , p. 153; Kilmarx, A
History of . .




Air Army had "absorbed most of the elite fighter pilots
and fighter planes the bulk of which had been previously
allocated to the tactical air forces...." Then, at the
May 1955 Air Show, the USSR displayed forty-eight new
Mig-19 day, supersonic fighters. More significant was the
display at this same time of fifty Yak-25 all-weather, sub-
sonic fighters, which indicated that the USSR was finally
deploying an all-weather interceptor in operational numbers
To be sure, the USSR had by 1955 deployed upwards to 20,000
subsonic, day -only fighters -~ not including the planes
and equipment sent to the other Bloc nations. But these
aircraft were essentially obsolescent in coping with the
U. S.' improved B--3G high-altitude night-flyer and the
speedier B-4 7 all-weather bomber which were both opera-
tional in large numbers by 1953.
Several reasons could be advanced as to why the
Soviets were so tardy in equipping their defense forces
to meet this all-weather threat. In all likelihood, the
basic causes for the delay could be found in the sundry
bureaucratic, fiscal, and technical problems which sur-
rounded the USSR all-weather fighter program. Particularly
3 fi
Lee, "Prologue," in Lee (ed.), The Soviet Air...,
p. 9. For an informed discussion of Soviet fighter capa-
bilities and air defense tactics at this time, see M.




(March 1955), p. 25ff.
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important, of course, was the failure mentioned above to
develop technically effective airborne radar interception
equipment. Involved here, also, may have been some un-
foreseen production bottlenecks in the early 1950 's; for
it was reported that "between 65 and 70 percent of the
...radar instruments used by the Red Air Force [were] being
37built in the Soviet zone of Germany."
Doubtlessly, a further contributing factor was the
lack of "the sense of urgency that a fuller appreciation of
3 8
the role and power of nuclear weapons later produced."
On the other hand, a "Machiavellian" approach might suggest
that the USSR -- impressed by the bombing accuracy degrada-
tions of Allied nighttime missions in World War II and con-
scious of the fact that "flash blindness" problems for
bomber pilots are significantly greater at night -- initially
wanted to encourage the U. S. to divert its resources toward
developing an all-weather, high-altitude bomber capability.
And a pragmatically calculating Russian might well have
determined that there was some reason to think that Soviet
all-weather fighters would be of only marginal tactical
importance in any war which the Soviets were "forced" to
37Aviation Age, June 1953, p. 11. Indeed, June 1953
was the month of the portentous East German proletariat
uprisings
.
38Dinnerstein, War and The Soviet Union, p. 238.
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initiate. That is, as U . S. analysts discovered in the
early 1950' s:
The task of destroying Russian strategic
targets in a summer operation was found to
be much more difficult and several times
more costly ... than in winter. A large
proportion of the target system is then in
daylight adequate for the operation of
CSoviet] day fighters. Moreover, the time
of outbreak may very well be decided by
the enemy and he has a comparative ad-
vantage in choosing the summer. Strategic
targets in the U. S. are in much more
southerly latitudes, making Russian night
attacks feasible in summer as well as in
winter . 3 9
In any event, the large number of new fighters which
appeared in 1955 clearly highlighted the Soviet talent for
short lead-times in aircraft production once the various
pre-production obstacles had been overcome. Moreover, one
year later, at the 1956 Air Show, the Soviets revealed four
advanced, supersonic fighter prototypes each with either a
full or limited all-weather capability.
Of all the air defensive efforts which were under-
taken by the Soviets between 19 5 4-56, however, "perhaps
40
the most significant development was organisational."




" in Quade (ed. ) , Analyses for Military Decisions ,
p. 34n. In summertime, also, the USSR's post-attack agri-
cultural problems and fallout protective measures would be
less difficult than in winter.
40
Lee, The Soviet Air Force, p. 120.
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In 1955, for the first time, the Soviet Air Defense Force
came to occupy an independent position of rough equality
with the ground, naval, and offensive air forces, and
embraced in one national command all the components of
the active air defense system. The facilities and equip-
ment of the USSR tactical and naval air forces were also
more closely integrated into the over-all air defense of
41the homeland.
Thus, by 1956, it could be written that ''certainly...
the Soviet air force had all the major elements of a first-
42
class strategic air defense organization." Furthermore,
General LeMay could then state that due to the increased
sophistication of Russian air defenses, the U. S. would
need to assign missions to attack the defenses directly
and to step-up markedly the development of air defense
43penetration systems for SAC aircraft.
Yet, despite the significant advances that had been
made, and the more than 500,000 personnel engaged in the
effort, there remained glaring inadequacies in the Soviets'
air defense system in 1956. The 20,000 mile early-warning
4] See R. L. Garthoff, "Soviet Air Power: Organisa-
tion and Staff Work, !l in Lee (ed.), The Soviet Air and... ,
p. 178; and Kilmarx, A History of
.
.
. , p. 265ff.
42
'Lee, The Soviet Air Force
,
p. 12 0.
Air Power Hearings testimony, p. 145.
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fence around the Soviet periphery was far from complete
according to an article in a Soviet military journal
44published in 1957. There were apparently no indica-
tions that the Soviets were as far along with either a
SAGE-type ground control system or a nuclear AAM as was
45the U. S. by that time. The system had practically no
capability against low-flying bombers and still did not
function well at night and in poor-visibility conditions.
And, of course, there were the air defense dilemmas which
the long-range ballistic missile promised soon to usher in.
Then on July 1, 1956, an American U-2 reconnaissance
aircraft flew a mission over the USSR as far as Kiev,
some 250 miles from the frontiers of the East European
Communist states. Soviet radar was iible to detect and
track this and succeeding such flights -- but their
weapons could not reach the U-2's extremely high altitude.
Khrushchev later stated that from such actions, "ViQ drew
46
the conclusion: to improve rockets, to improve fighters.' 1
The considerable expansion of the Soviets 1 long-range
44Cited in Lee, "Strategic Air Defense," in Lee (ed.),
The Soviet Air and...
, p . 126.
45
See, e.g., the USNWP interview with General Partridge,
September 6, 19 57, p. 35; and Hanson Baldwin, New York Time s,
February 1, 1953, p. 44.




bomber base structure in the latter 19 50's suggests that






Accordingly, developmental work on
'
a more capable
high-altitude SAM-:I surface-to-air missile and an advanced
SAM- 1 1 was expedited. Also between 1957-60', the supersonic
Mig-19 was gradually replaced by the MACH--2 Mig-21 which was
generally fitted with new infra-red homer AAM's. In addi-
tion, the Soviet all-weather interceptor force began to re-
ceive a supersonic successor to the Yak--25 which was equip-
ped with liquid-fueled auxiliary rockets to provide a "zoom"
capability for high-altitude intercepts. Even more advanced
fighter prototypes underwent extensive flight • testing during
this period. As these modern aircraft became operational,
the East European satellite air forces v/ere, augmented with
Mig-19 ' s and Yak-25's to improve the Bloc's "defense-in-
depth" capability.
These efforts which the USSR had made to improve its
high-altitude air defenses led to a shift in SAC training
tactics in the U. S. In late 19 59, the SAC and the FAA
established seven special air routes within the U. S. for
There are indications that the introduction of these
AAM's was accelerated after the 1958 Formosa Straits air
battles in which U. S. Sidewinder missiles were used with





. . . . 43low-altitude training missions by B--47 and B-52 aircraft.
And a quite significant dividend from these Soviet
efforts came in early May 1960 at Sverdlovsk when a U-2
49
mission was "shot down" for the first time. For the
remainder of the 'year,
the most far-reaching Soviet claims ... stressed
the effectiveness of Soviet air defenses. In
his initial treatment of the U--2 affair,
Khrushchev restricted himself to boasts that
Soviet air defenses could now prevent high-
altitude reconnaissance aircraft of the U-2 type
from overflying the Soviet Union with impunity....
Soon. .. Khrushchev extended his claim to cover
not only U- 2 ' s but SAC bombers as well. 50
Of course, the publicity attendant to the- U-2 affair
threw some international light upon Soviet defensive weak-
nesses in the latter 19 50 's. Moreover, President Eisen-
hower's open justification of the flights as being essen-
tial to U. S. security was undoubtedly disconcerting and
perhaps frightening in its implications regarding a possible
U. S. counterforce attack. Naturally, however, Khrushchev
48Air Force , XLII (December 1959), p. 24.
49There still seems to be no firm consensus on the
exact circumstances of the downing of this U-2. See, for
example, David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The U-2 Affair (New
York, 1962), pp. 258-259, which cautiously accepts the con-
clusion (attributed to the CIA) that Powers' aircraft was
disabled at 63,000 feet by a near-miss Soviet SAM.
50Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power..., p. 74. See
ibid
.
, pp. 74-75 and 80-81" for references to various of
Khrushchev's statements at this time which asserted that,
e.g., "not a single bomber could get through to its target."
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did not need to reveal the incident if he were really con-
cerned about such an aftermath.
The U-2 affair thus revealed the strides which the
USSR had taken between 1956-60 to improve its "hair-
trigger" readiness to deal with an aggressor's air-atomic
attack. It seems plausible that such air defense programs
went forward, also, without too much Soviet concern re-
garding their obsolescence or re-direction in the face of
the prospective long-range ballistic missile threat. Indeed
there are no indications that any USSR anti-ballistic mis-
sile programs went beyond the research stage during this
period. The "first prominent allusion to the Soviet ABM
development Ldid not occur until j ...September 1961, when
Khrushchev told a Western journalist that at the same time
that Soviet scientists and engineers began work to develop
intercontinental missiles, another group had been asked to
51
work on means for countering such missiles." Certainly
the competing resource demands of other military and non-
military programs, to say nothing of the technical problems
involved, dictated in large measure the pace of the Soviet
ABM project. And, while it would be quite difficult to
assess the impact on this Soviet effort of U. S. signals
51
W. F. I-Iahn and A. J. Cottrell, Ballistic Mis sile
Defense and Soviet Strategy , Institute for Defense Analyses
Research Paper"~P-140 , October 1963, p. 15.
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of ICBM/IRBM capability and intent during this period, the
signals clearly were nob designed, on balance, either to in-
crease the pace of the Soviets' ABM development or decrease
their bomber defense expenditures.
Finally, a few words about Soviet air defense systems
deployment between 1953-60. The post-Stalinist military doc-
trinal re-evaluations had caused a shift away from the older
"strategic defense" concept of wartime operations. Thus,
rapid-reaction times, integrated organizational structures,
and other capabilities for attriting the enemy's attack at
the very onset of the conflict were stressed. 'Yet, in de-
ploying its weapons, the USSR retained the "cold-blooded"
Stalinist concept of an "island" system of heavy defense a-
round the most important Soviet complexes ~- principally
population and industrial centers. Other areas were only
52lightly guarded, if at all. As an indicator of the USSR's
intensive deployment of systems in protection of vital areas,
consider the following CIA report of the air defense network
which the Soviets had established on the small -island of Cu-
ba by late 1962:
There are 2 4 operational SAM sites, each with
52
See, e.g., the USNWP interview with General Partridge,
September 6, 1957, p. 60; Hanson Baldwin, New York Times ,
May 11, 1960, p. 4; and Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii (ed.), So-




6 launchers. There is probably a total of
about 500 SAM missiles in the system.... To
supplement S-A-missiles , the Soviets brought
in additional MIG fighters, reaching a total
of about 100, including 42 MIG-21 aircraft....
About 200 modern Soviet radars were installed
to tie the system together. 53
In this connection, it seems interesting to observe
that such a Soviet pattern of concentrated air defense de-
ployment made good sense in view of the lack until 1961 of
an integrated strategic target plan in the United States -
a situation which made it extremely likely that the effect
of American air-atomic mission planning by the disparate
U. S. striking forces would be the programmed overkill of
high-priority USSR complexes and an insuf ficient weight of
effort directed toward other targets.
53Statement of John McCone, Director, CIA, Hearings,
House, Subc. of Comm. on Approps
.
, Department of Defense
Appropriations 19 64, 8 8th, 1st, February 1963, p. 52.

CONCLUSION
THE U. S.-USSR AIR DEFENSE DIALOGUE
IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
The fundamental premise of a U. S.-USSR strategic
dialogue is that each power views the "arms race" as a
two-sided adaptive system rather than as a pair of uni-
lateral programs. As such, each power seeks to calculate
rationally the opponent's military offensive capability
and intent, and develop a defense whose dimensions reflect
such a perceived threat and take the opponent's expected
response to this move into account -- while simultaneously
communicating to the other side the likely consequences of
his alternative responses. Such a strategic dialogue, it
would seem, was not in the foreground of Soviet-American
relations between 1346-60. It is questionable whether a
conscious dialogue of this type was even possible, given
the basic U. S.-USSR nuclear power asymmetries which
characterized this period. In any event, it is clear that
the "signals" of strategic offensive capability and intent
which were sent (whether consciously or not) by both sides
were either muffled or amplified out of proportion by
domestic bureaucratic and ideological factors with the
result that, indeed, a pair of unilateral air defense pro-
grams evolved. Hence, in the broadest sense, the U. S.




flight into more offensive programs, the USSR reacted
initially to the American signals by deploying more -or™
less anachronistic defensive programs, and neither power
reacted by developing a secure second-strike capability,
which became a principal strategic task during the late
1950' s. Let us look more closely at each of these con-
clusions ,
It seems apparent that U. S. policy-makers -- during
most of the post-war period -- were content to estimate
the Soviets' domestic arms preparations and made little
overt attempt to influence them. To be sure, the U. S.
did signal generally its intent to remain ahead quantita-
tively in the offensive nuclear air power race. But such
a " full- fury" perspective would appear to have reinforced
the Communists' "inevitable war" ideology, foreclosed any
Soviet examination of a wide range of strategic alterna-
tives, and led that country to a significant early emphasis
on air defense programs and a concerted attempt to develop
a nuclear air-atomic deterrent capability. Thus, up to
195 0, the U. S. seemed to ask simply, "When will the
Soviets get the atom bomb and what will be the rate of
growth of our own stockpile and delivery force?" Between
1950-52, the official position regarding the U. S.' of-
fensive military establishment appeared to be to multiply
its weapons systems as much as possible in relation to as
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many contingencies as possible in order to meet an "imme-
diate" threat. From 1953-60, the quest for foreign and de-
fense policy stability manifest itself in the attempted de-
velopment of a U. S. military posture based on unilaterally
perceived "long-haul" air-atomic requirements, with less
regard supposedly paid to temporary changes
. in the inter-
national system than that which was said to characterize
former U. S. nilitary policy planning.
On the other hand, however, the American reaction to
the USSR's offensive signals revealed an exaggerated sen-
sitivity to Soviet aggressive intentions, coupled with an
apparent continued misreading' of their offensive capabili-
ties. The signals from the USSR had, of course, been am-
biguous on face- value and were clouded further by the aura
of secreCy which pervaded Communist Russia, especially
during the Stalinist period. Nevertheless, until around
1953 the threat of a Red Army offensive in Western Europe
was magnified in the U. S., while the Soviets' growing long-
range air-atomic potential was underestimated. Then, in a
curious reversal of these perceptions, the U. S. military
tended to react to the Soviets' post-1953 signals by an
overestimation of the USSR's intercontinental bomber and
missile force --- without seeming to examine why the Soviets
would want to attack the U. S. in the first place.
"Curiously enough, this £ latter] question, which seems
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The fundamental cause of such a "misreading" of Soviet
signals in the U. S. lay in the extremely complex interplay
of the domestic political process and foreign and defense
policy considerations within the executive and legislative
branches of the government. This interplay manifest itself
in the major role that political choices played in the
allocation of resources for national security and the eco-
nomic bases of these choices. The result was the stress
throughout most of the 19 46-60 period on the buildup of the
Strategic Air Command as the principal deterrent to Soviet
aggression; and the basing of its requirements 'for quanti-
tative superiority vis-a-vis the USSR's strategic offense
on the assumption that a new war would begin by a Soviet
surprise air-atomic attack -- an assumption which "was ex-
plicitly rejected by Soviet theory and indeed ridiculed by
2it. " However, it is important to note that the pressures
for a buildup of U. S. long-range offensive power lay
generally outside of the executive branch. For "not once
did either ithe Truman or Eisenhower] Administration attempt
to seize upon a Soviet technological advance as a means of
so basic, is often ignored in our pre-occupation with tech-
nology and military capabilities." G. H. Snyder, Deterrence
and Defense : Toward a Theory of National Security (Prince-
ton, 1961)
, p. 57.





3intensifying or expanding the American military effort."
Indeed, the Eisenhower Administration's budget restraints
and "long-haul" view of the Communist threat seem motivated
in part by a desire not to escalate the U. S.-USSR arms
race
.
The effect of all this on America's air defense was to
retard significantly its development prior to 1954; and to
mould its development after 1954 less as a function of the
perceived bomber/missile threat than as a reflection of the
requirement for stability in the executive's defensive
programming. As a partial consequence of this latter point,
throughout most of the 1950 's the problem of protecting
SAC's second--strike capability against a bomber attack and
of re-orienting the entire CONAD posture to the incipient
ICBM threat were largely subordinate defensive concerns;
while air defense, itself, remained subordinate in the over-
all matrix of U. S. military priorities.
Of course, there were the attendant technical feasi-
bility considerations which set real limits upon the devel-
opment of U. S. air defense programs, especially prior to 1953
There was, also, the variety of historical and psychological
factors which predisposed the American public and its military
services to seek an improved offense as the best means of





defense. And it must be underlined that the U. S.' develop-
ment of an extended overseas SAC base system and a variety
of sophisticated bomber aircraft and tactics represented a
substantial complication of the Soviets ' already formidable
air defense problems; and would appear to have forced a
diffusion of their wartime offensive air-atomic effort away
from continental U. S. targets --- hence, further dimming the
perceived requirement for widespread defensive systems in
the United States.
The U. S. military disposition to react to Soviet sig-
nals by more offense tended, however, to obscure a more
objective appreciation of the - full spectrum of strategic
roles that air defense could play in the nuclear age. At
bottom, U. S. justifications for air defense assumed its
obvious wartime damage-limiting values, and moved on to
argue the technical feasibility of increasing its attrition
rate capability in the face of persistent domestic beliefs
that "70 percent of the aggressor's strike will always get
through." Such arguments diverted attention from the fact
that "because C the enemy 3 can penetrate anywhere does not
4
mean that he can penetrate everywhere.' 1 There was seemingly
little appreciation, therefore, that the mere existence of
an air defense system could force the enemy offense to assign
Thornton Read, "Strategy for Active Defense,"
American Economic Review (Proceedings), May 1961, p. 470.
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so much of its striking power to destroy some targets (or
even to suppress the defensive system itself) that it could
not attack all of them. That is, the targets saved by air
defense would not necessarily be those at which defenses were
located. Further', the air defense system could force the
enemy to reduce the payload of his bombers and increase the
technical complexity of their missions, by requiring the
aircraft to carry additional fuel for evasive tactics and
low-altitude approaches, electronic penetration aids,
decoys, etc.
From this perspective, it would appear that U. S. in-
terests might have been better served by some signals which
upgraded the expected wartime capability of its extant de-
fenses, rather than engaging primarily in a domestic dialogue
over possible technical improvements to an attrition-rate
5 ...proclaimed to be deficient. In addition, this focusing of
American attention on the system's overall attrition capa-
bility made it more likely that its components would be
deployed in depth to attempt the defense of the entire conti-
nental U. S. territory, instead of being concentrated in
Canada seems to have done a "better job" here. Its
House of Commons debates and mass media would frequently
present a quite optimistic image of its air defense capa-
bility. See, e.g., HANSARD, Session 1952-53, Vol. I,
November 30, 195 3, p. 454; Session 1953-54, Vol. V, May 21,
1954, p. 4952ff.; Session 1959, Vol. Ill, May 13, 1959, p.
3613; Session 1960, Vol. Ill, March 28, 1960, pp. 2511-2512.
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fewer areas Cat less expense) to force a corresponding Soviet
concentration of attack.
Moreover, there are other values which accrue to. an
air defense system that were apparently .considered even less
in open U. S. polemics. During peacetime --- besides simply
threatening the warning of attack — an air. defense system
can act to enforce control of continental 'airspace as a
basic component of national sovereignty. It can increase
the risks of foreign reconnaissance overflights. Also, air
defense, as indicated above, complicates an enemy's general
war planning and increases his military uncertainties. A
mature bomber defense system, ' furthermore, might tend to
reduce an enemy's political policy choices by making
"nuclear blackmail" a less credible alternative. During
the initial wartime phase -- besides blunting the first
strike -- air defense could verify whether the strike was
inadvertent, provide information regarding the initial
damage, and allow deliberate response by protected command/
control centers. During the middle phase of the war, air
defense could assist the reorganization of that part of the
strategic force which has survived, as well as direct the
returning bombers , those aircraft in the maintenance pipe-
line and training commands, interceptors on naval carriers
in continental U. S. ports, etc. During the termination
phase of the war, the military effects of air defense may
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prove to be even greater than they were earlier, due to the
combat experience of the system and its operating against a
jresidual offense which could be, perhaps, less competent
than the first-strike force and which must navigate over a
very uncertain post-attack terrain. The defensive system
could also contribute to drafting and verifying the termina-
tion agreement, provide status information to guide negotia-
tions (by permitting or denying reconnaissance) , and signal
deception or violation of the agreement.
Now it is possible that these values of air defense
may have been more sharply in the perceptions of U. S.
policy-makers than has otherwise been suggested. For ex-
ample, it could be argued that the widespread deployment of
active defensive systems during the second Eisenhower
Administration reflected -- not simply a bureaucratic
inability to choose between "rival" military programs ~~
but a definite executive desire to develop overlapping area
coverage due to a view of general war as an extended, "long-
haul" operation in which some of the above listed values of
7
air defense would become important.
For a more extended discussion of some of these air
defense values, see Roger Levien, An Appreciation of the
Value of Continental Defense (RAND Memorandum RM-39 8 7-PR)
,
March 1964; and Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, pp. 102-109.
7There is some evidence that Eisenhower retained
throughout his Presidency the soldier's "war of attrition"
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There seemed to be, however, no overt attempt made
between 1953-60 to communicate any such appreciation of the
values of air defense to the USSR. Nor was there any
authoritative American expression of the possible deterrent
role which its defensive systems might have played in the
Soviets ' decision not to procure a large intercontinental
bomber force during the leitter 1950' s. In short, U. S. air
defense was at no time in the post-war period a significant
component of the international military dialogue of strategic
deterrence
.
The actual development of America's mature bomber de-
fense posture, moreover, can be seen most fundamentally as
the product of --- in Huntington's phrase -- the "executive
view of nuclear conflict. For example: his preferences for
a "balanced" military force structure; his industrial mobili-
zation base policy; his national stockpile inventory which
emphasized unprocessed raw materials located in unprotected
storage; and his civil defense policy that -- until May
1953 -- had at its core the "mass evacuation" concept, which
also seems to imply a non-conclusive first phase. Indeed,
Eisenhower had written the following in a letter to Secre-
tary Wilson of January 5, 1955:
"The initial phase of a general nuclear war would
consist of exchanges of staggering blows at the
homelands of the antagonists. The great test for
the U. S. would be to survive this terrible period,
knocking out in the meantime the enemy's capacity to
inflict further damage on America. Once this point
had been reached, the country could then proceed in
the customary way of building up the resources
needed to go on and win the war."
Cited in Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story
(New York, 1956), p. 328.

2 80
legislation" of strategic programs. Decisions regarding iiir
defense structural requirements have been the result of- con-
troversy, bargaining, and compromise among various government
agencies and officials whose different interests and perspec-
tives compelled recourse to the involved process of legisla-
tion. The U. S. Air Force's relationships with the Bureau
of the Budget, the Secretary of Defense, the Army, and the
National Guard Bureau, for example, are henceforth more im-
portant to an understanding of the evolution of American air
defense organizations, systems R&D and deployment, and defen-
sive doctrine between 1946-60 than are the patterns in the
Soviet-American strategic balance.
Basic to this point is the fact that the U. S. demon-
strated until the latter 1950 's a conspicuous unreadiness e-
ven to minimize the advantages to the USSR of a first-strike
by actively protecting SAC ' s nuclear retaliatory force (in-
cluding the associated command and control elements), de-
spite the high targeting priority which the Soviets had ap-
peared to assign to SAC bases, and the persistent urgings of .
the American attentive public. One can only conclude that
here again domestic bureaucratic factors acted to muffle
such signals and caused U. S. military policy-makers to per-
ceive air-atomic power as a "one-way" weapon.
All of this is not to suggest, of course, that inter-
national systemic factors had no influence upon the evolution
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of the American air defense posture. From the Czechoslo-
vakian coup of 1948, through the Korean War, the initial
Soviet hydrogen bomb explosion, and the 1954--55 May Day
bomber fly-bys, to Sputnik, U. S. policy-makers — as we
have seen -- have responded in part by alterations in
their air defense programming. What is important to re-
iterate, however, is that in every case, with the possible
exception of the 1948-49 tensions in Europe and the initial
Soviet atomic bomb explosion, the international disturbances
have caused the U. S. to perceive other military needs to be
more important than an acceleration of defensive systems
expenditures. Indeed, the U. S. response has often been
at the expense of approved bomber defense programs. Whether
it be the Far East and European defense problems in the
early 19 50 's, the strategic airpower problems of the mid-
1950 's or the post-Sputnik problems of the late 1950 's,
the U. S. Air Force has been primarily concerned to buildup
its SAC and TAG components; and — under the pressures of
budgetary ceilings -- has consistently devoted less attention
to its Air Defense Command organization whose forces have
always comprised over 80 percent of the total American air
defense effort.
In this regard, it is interesting to speculate whether
the absence of a Korean War in 19 50-53 might have profoundly
altered the future course of U. S. bomber defense systems.
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During the preceding two years, the attempt to develop a
continental air defense capability to meet the onset of the
Cold War was in the foreground of U. S. national security
efforts. The impetus which was being generated for these
defensive programs was abruptly halted, however, by the
Communist aggression in June 1950. Beyond the immediate
needs of the Korean conflict (which, indeed, caused a
substantial deployment of continental fighter-interceptor
forces overseas) , America then adjusted its strategic efforts
to the improvement^ of the NATO alliance structure to deter
any military encounters in Europe. The defense of U. S.
interests in this area through strengthened offensive air-
atomic forces, along with an increase in conventional ground
forces, became a paramount U. S. security concern. SAC '
s
forward-base system underwent a rapid expansion. American
scientists concentrated on innovations in tactical nuclear
weapons for European defense. Preventive war urgings ap-
peared with increasing frequency within the U. S. mass media.
All of these phenomena acted to divert attention from pro-
grains to defend North America against the incipient Soviet
intercontinental bomber threat.
Moreover, insofar as the lack of a Korean conflict
could have facilitated the re-election of a Democratic
Administration in 1952, continuation of the prevailing
"crisis year" approach to military programming would also
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seem to have furthered the buildup of continental defense
systems in 1953-54. With the "year of maximum danger"
(wherein the USSR would have an effective intercontinental
air-atomic capability) having been established as 195 4 by
the Truman Administration, procurement expenditures for
defensive systems might well have been greater in the' early
1950 's than they were to be under the Eisenhower "long-
haul" perspective which pushed this danger point toward the
end of the decade and emphasized stability in military
programming. Indeed, the expansion of the U. S. air de-
fense effort which was to be embodied in Eisenhower's
;
'new~look" did not result in any tangible increase in the
operational capability of the system to attrite an atomic
attack until after 1954. And as it was, this defensive
buildup occurred somewhat paradoxically with the simul-
taneous demonstrations in the Soviet Union of a developing
long-range thermonuclear delivery capability -that reduced
considerably the tactical significance of CONAD ' s improving
overall attrition-rates.
Whether any such hypothetical momentum for continental
defenses in 1950-53 could have induced concomitant techno-
logical breakthroughs in defensive systems, and otherwise
surmounted the various domestic phenomenological and
budgetary obstacles to air defense expenditures is of
course unanswerable. It is conceivable, however, that
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with an earlier buildup of. reasonably effective continental
defenses (especially in the area of radar warning systems)
,
America might have been somewhat less disposed to emphasize
the development and maintenance of a quantitatively superior
strategic air-atomic force, based on the assumption that any
new war would be a general one, begun by a Soviet surprise
intercontinental attack. The deterrent effect of these
U. S. defenses against a very limited Soviet A-bomb force
could not only make a surprise attack appear less likely,
but, if war ca.me , the early warning and attrition capabili-
ties of the defenses could theoretically enable effective
U. S. retaliation with a less ' massive atomic (or thermo-
nuclear-equipped) offensive Air Force.
Consequently, American military planners might then
have responded to the Soviets' 1953 hydrogen bomb explosion
and the 1954-55 May Day bomber fly-bys in a more balanced
fashion. These USSR signals might then have .indicated to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff,, for example, that the SAC de-
terrent was a wasting one (within a newly perceived envir-
onment of imminent U. S . -USSR strategic parity), and
pointed to the requirement for much stronger limited war
conventional forces as a primary component of the American
national security posture. (The absence of a Korean War
would also seem to have removed an obstacle to the buildup
of U. S. conventional forces in the mid-1950' s, in that the
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scope and methods of Korea had become condemned in America
as intolerably wasteful and had led accordingly to the
"massive retaliation" doctrine.) And with strategic air-
power seen less as the single solution to the complex
problems of international relations, the Air Force's Air
Defense Command responsibilities could, perhaps, have been
discharged with less ambivalence in the succeeding years.
But -- rightly or wrongly -- the actual development
of America's continental defenses went forward basically
within a policy framework which emphasized the primacy of
offensive air-atomic power in a strategy of general war
deterrence. While the U. S. Administration took pains to
minimize the psychological impact of major international
system disturbances on its domestic society, the U. S.
national security policy responses to these disturbances
were generally aimed at improving, not the country's mili-
tary ability to defend against attack, but rather at in-
creasing America's ability to inflict nuclear destruction.
As we have seen, however, such a brandishing of the
"invincible" SAC sword did not cause the Soviet Union to
fret itself into an air defense paralysis. In a certain
sense, the full gamut of the Soviet response to U . S.
strategic signals was defensive or "defense-by-bluff."
For it is evident that the Soviets' strategic resources
before 1950 were allocated primarily for air defense programs,
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while relying on the image of .a Red Army "colossus" behind
the Elbe River to deter the West. Also, it has been ' argued
that "defense-by-bluf f " was involved in the post-Stalinist
May Day signals which "led us to believe -that they were
building a sizeable long-range bomber force, whereas in fact
they were investing most of their national product for their
glong-range forces in long-range ballistic missiles." Such
a "bluff", from the Soviet view, would cause the U. S. to
embark upon an expensive bomber program in response, while
the USSR's projected air defense programs were perceived to
be adequate to meet such a buildup.
Yet, at its most fundamental level, the Soviet-American
arms race was not viewed in the USSR as a "two-sided adaptive
system." The Stalinist air defense posture- was developed
primarily from the ideological dictates of an inevitable war
of attrition in which offensive airpower would play an impor-
tant but by no means decisive role. As such, the organiza-
tion and deployment of air defense to meet a series of bomb-
er raids in the rear prior to a Soviet counter-offensive
seemed rather anachronistic in the nuclear age. But the
USSR apparently saw little point in directly adapting Soviet
programs to U. S. strategic-technical signals, and, indeed,
"from 1946 until 1954 non-Soviet military thought was





considered below discussion, save for occasional propagan-
9distic ideological diatribes." Moreover, from the pure
Stalinist perspective, there would be little reason to
think that Soviet signals could have a long-run influence
on American military policy which was, after all, determined
by the necessities of the capitalist system.
The post-Stalinist revisions in the Soviets' perspec-
tive on air defense brought their program more in line with
the nature of the U. S. offensive threat, by emphasizing
extended early-warning, all-weather capabilities, integrated
organization, and blunting, pre-emptive attacks. Yet there
remained in the Soviet view the disdain for the U. S. sig-
nals which stated that its atomic bombs could be dropped
"where, how, and when they were wanted", since Soviet bomber
bases until the late 1950' s seemed to be accorded no special
defensive protection.
Thus, both the U. S. and USSR were slow to appreciate
the advantages to strategic deterrence of a secure second-
strike air-atomic capability which could have acted to re-
duce the reciprocal fears of surprise attack between these
two powers. Further, it seems clear that active defenses
to reduce specifically the vulnerability of nuclear retali-
atory forces would (1) have been less expensive to deploy
9Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, p. 70
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' han were the population and industry defense systems in
that less geographical coverage would be required, (2) have
had a higher tolerance of failure insofar as they were sup-
plemented by other defensive measures such as dispersal and
hardening, (3) have been less susceptible to obsolescence
than were population defenses due to the greater accuracies
required to hit the defended bases, and (4) have tended to
draw enemy attacks away from cities and other major indus-
trial complexes. Perhaps it is this lesson from the devel-
opment of air defenses in the nuclear age which should be in
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